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ABSTRACT 
 
The central theme of this dissertation is to test and understand bubbles in agricultural futures 
markets.  Building on current bubble literature, the dissertation applies a recent-developed forward and 
backward recursive bubble testing procedure that is capable of date-stamping the exact origination and 
termination dates of multiple bubbles to various commodity futures markets under various specifications.  
To account for conditional heteroskedasticity, inferences of the bubble testing procedure is derived based 
on the recursive wild bootstrap.  Though organized under the same framework and examined using the 
same procedure, the three essays of this dissertation focus on different aspects of speculative influences 
on recent commodity price booms, with each providing a separate explanation for the booms.  All our 
analyses indicate that speculators may not have been the culprit of recent heightened commodity price 
volatility as many market analysts have argued.  Specifically, in the first essay, we focus on an in-depth 
analysis of historical patterns of bubbles in a variety of agricultural markets including grains, softs, and 
livestock products.  We find that in general, bubbles are rather rare events and did not become more 
common in the most recent episode, as compared to the 1971-1976 episode.  In addition, bubbles tend to 
be very short-lived and of small magnitude.  In the second essay, we focus on analyzing the market 
impact of financial index investment in grain futures markets during explosive and non-explosive periods 
of price behavior.  We find that on balance, the effect of index investment on grain futures spikes is very 
limited, even during periods when prices are explosive and may have been of central concern to policy-
makers.  In the third essay, we go beyond bubble testing and date-stamping and attempt to relate the 
timelines of bubble occurrence with various fundamental and non-fundamental factors.  Using a logit 
model that accounts for bias due to events rarity, we find that in the presence of bubbles, inventory and 
exchange rate tend to be lower, while aggregate global demand, crude oil prices, and US export sales tend 
to be higher.  For speculative activities, we find that the market may have benefited from the added 
liquidity brought in by speculators, which apparently reduces the probability of bubble occurrence.   
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Agricultural commodity prices have undergone alarmingly large fluctuations since 2006, with enormous 
price spikes in early 2008 and mid-2010.  For example, the average monthly prices of corn, soybeans, and 
wheat all more than doubled between 2000 and 2008, then plummeted in the second half of 2008, before 
resurging again at the beginning of 2010.  As of August 2012, the price of corn, soybeans, and wheat 
were $7.  60/bu., $16.20/bu., and $8.00/bu., respectively, more than 400% of year 2000 prices.1  This 
heightened price volatility is not confined to agricultural commodities, as metal and energy products have 
both experienced sharp price increases and declines in the same time frame.   
Given the broad range of commodities involved and the magnitude of price increases during this 
period, the consequences are widespread and can be devastating.  Since consumers in less-developed 
countries spend a large portion of their disposable income on food purchases, sharp increases in food 
commodity prices can cause severe hardship and suffering for a significant fraction of the world 
population.  This negative effect disproportionately affects the urban poor and those living in major food 
importing countries.  The World Bank, for instance, estimates that the cost associated with high food and 
fuel prices to consumers in developing countries was about $680 billion in 2008, pushing over 130 
million people into extreme poverty and increasing the number of children suffering permanent cognitive 
and physical injury due to malnutrition by 44 percent (World Bank 2008).  In addition, a number of 
studies find that food price increases have led to a significant deterioration of democratic institutions and 
increased political unrest, particularly in low-income countries (Arezki and Bruckner 2011, Bellemare 
2011).   
                                                            
1See http://www.farmdoc.illinois.edu/manage/uspricehistory/us_price_history.  html.   
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 It is thus imperative to understand the causes of these large spikes so that appropriate policy 
responses may be formulated.  To date, some common factors investigated include strong demand from 
developing countries, notably China and India, tight market-specific supply conditions due to recent bad 
weather in important growing regions, inelastic supply response of agricultural commodities, low 
inventories, expanded biofuel production, loose US monetary policy, the world-wide financial crisis, 
hoarding and export controls, and financial speculation  (see Abbott, Hurt, and Tyner (2011) for a detailed 
discussion).  Despite the abundant literature investigating sources of recent agricultural commodity price 
volatility, there is little consensus among economists regarding the root causes.  Controversies 
surrounding this issue stem from the fact that economic interpretation of commodity price behavior 
remains in dispute.  Indeed, as Wright (2011) points out, “(t)his is a complex topic, and even the basic 
economics needed to begin to understand key phenomena has implications that are not necessarily well 
known by analysts and policymakers.  ” 
Among all the causes considered, much of the academic debate has been directed toward one 
particular group of market participant in futures markets—financial index traders who trade baskets of 
commodities to obtain the risk diversifying benefits of commodities.  Fueled by academic studies 
showing a positive risk premium and reduced portfolio risk through investments in long-only commodity 
index funds (e.g., Gorton and Rouwenhorst 2006, Erb and Harvey 2006), a large amount of money in the 
last decade quickly moved into commodity futures markets as investors hungry for new investment 
opportunities poured funds into commodity index funds.  According to the U.S. Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission (CFTC), the amount of money flowing into commodity markets through commodity 
index funds increased more than tenfold in 2008 as compared to 2003 (Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC) 2008).  The boom of index funds in commodity markets has been labeled the 
“financialization” of commodity futures markets (Domanski and Heath 2007).   
The fact that commodity market financialization largely coincides with the recent period of 
unprecedented price volatility has led some market analysts to believe that this new breed of speculator 
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created a commodity price spike that cannot be justified by market fundamentals.  Given the size and 
scope of index traders' investment activities within the commodity futures market, the popularity of this 
argument within both academic and policy arenas is not surprising.  Hedge fund manager Michael W.  
Masters has played a leading role in raising concerns, testifying numerous times before the U.S. Congress 
and the CFTC that unprecedented buying pressure from index investment created a series of massive 
bubbles in commodity futures prices (e.g., Masters 2008, 2009).  These bubbles were then transmitted to 
spot prices through arbitrage linkages between futures and spot prices, with the end result that commodity 
prices far exceeded fundamental values.  Irwin and Sanders (2012) use the term “Masters Hypothesis” as 
a short-hand label for this argument.  Several prominent international development organizations (e.g., 
Robles, Torero, and von Braun 2009, de Schutter 2010, Herman, Kelly, and Nash 2011) have expressed 
strong support for the Masters Hypothesis.  However, a number of researchers have concluded that 
commodity index traders are unlikely to be the driving force behind the recent commodity price boom as 
little relationship has been established between commodity index trading activities and futures price 
movements in various empirical examinations (e.g., Stoll and Whaley 2010, Sanders and Irwin 2011a, b, 
Hamilton and Wu 2013).   
The general failure to find a direct link between the positions of a particular group of traders 
(commodity index traders) and agricultural futures prices does not rule out the presence of bubble 
components in prices, particularly during the spikes that have been of such concern to policymakers.  This 
broader issue of the existence of bubble components in agricultural futures prices has received much less 
attention.  In general, bubbles are defined as periods when sharp upward movements in prices are 
unjustified by fundamentals and/or the trading motives of market participants that dominate price 
behavior is speculative, i.e., the belief that someone can resell at a higher price later (e.g., Irwin and 
Sanders 2011).  Clearly, this definition covers speculation beyond index traders alone; bubbles could 
occur due to other more traditional speculators such as momentum or technical traders.  Unfortunately, 
this aspect of potential speculative influences is often missed as traditional speculators have long existed 
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in futures market.  Furthermore, given the existence of traditional speculators before the recent 
commodity price spikes, they may receive less attention than newer types of traders.  Nevertheless, the 
importance of traditional speculators cannot be easily dismissed as a large body of theoretical and 
empirical evidence suggests that bubbles can be driven by such speculators under certain circumstances.  
For instance, Shiller (2005) argues that “irrational exuberance” driven by the media, investment banks, 
and technology analysts can raise stock prices above their fundamental values when there is substantial 
uncertainty about market fundamentals.  Bubbles caused by irrational traders can survive and persist even 
when there are limits to rational arbitrage in markets that are relatively well-informed and well-financed 
(e.g., De Long et al. 1990).  As demonstrated by the theoretical model of Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003), 
the resilience of bubbles could be a result of synchronization problems between arbitrageurs who are 
unable to temporarily coordinate their selling strategies.  Xiong and Yu (2011) also show that the 
existence of a mix of inexperienced and sophisticated investors with heterogeneous beliefs and constraints 
on short-selling could explain a massive bubble in the Chinese warrants market in 2005-2008.   
The starting point in the detection and modeling of market bubbles is often to define the 
fundamental value of an asset as the sum of expected cash flows discounted by some appropriate interest 
rate and assume that the observed price is composed of this fundamental value and a bubble component 
that may or may not exist.  Under this line of argument, previous research has mainly attempted to either 
derive testable implications based on the relationship between fundamental and observed prices or to 
directly investigate whether the characteristics of the observed price is consistent with a specific bubble 
process.  For instance, the variance-bounds tests of Shiller (1981) and LeRoy and Porter (1981) is based 
on the assumption that there exists an upper bound of the observed price if bubbles are absent.  The 
empirical implication of this assumption is that the ex post rational price should be at least as variable as 
observed prices that do not include the variation of forecast errors.  A violation of this variance bound 
may be an indication of the presence of bubbles.  However, it is hard to construct the unobserved ex post 
rational prices since the terminal price at an infinite horizon cannot be realized.  As another example, 
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Diba and Grossman (1988) investigate the relationship between asset prices and fundamentals and argue 
that observed stock prices should not be more explosive than dividends when bubbles are not present.  
However, Evans (1991) shows that the integration and cointegration tests suggested by Diba and 
Grossman (1988) may fail to detect the existence of bubbles when they experience periodic collapse.  
Gürkaynak (2008) surveys the empirical bubble testing literature and argues that the available 
econometric procedures often combine the null hypothesis of no bubbles with an overly simple model of 
fundamentals.   
In addition to the aforementioned problems, previous testing procedures generally provide only a 
mechanism for detecting the existence of bubbles without estimating the exact origination and termination 
dates of bubble episodes.  This is an important shortcoming.  Determining exact bubble starting and 
ending dates is essential to policymakers, who are keenly interested in knowing when abnormal periods 
occurred and what policy initiatives may be taken to prevent future bubbles.  Obtaining a robust measure 
that precisely distinguishes between bubbles periods and periods of normal price behavior is nontrivial 
due to the nonlinear complexity of many price series.  Testing bubbles along these lines essentially 
involves determining when structural breaks, or regime switchings, occur in time series of market prices.  
To date, previous methods serve only to either confirm whether a known single break point has occurred 
(the Chow test) or to find only one unknown break point (the Zivot and Andrews (2002) structural break 
test).    
Phillips, Wu, and Yu (2011, PWY hereinafter) and Phillips and Yu (2011, PY hereinafter) 
recently devised a new testing procedure based on forward recursively calculated Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) test statistics to detect the existence of one single explosive period and find its origination 
and termination dates.  Phillips, Shi, and Yu (2012, PSY hereinafter) extended the testing procedure by 
deriving the limiting distribution of multiple regime switching test statistics and developing a consistent, 
real-time date-stamping algorithm.   In numerous simulation studies, they show that the test statistic 
possesses good discriminatory power and can not only consistently detect the existence of explosive 
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periods of a price series, but also can locate the origination and collapse dates of bubbles.  Another 
advantage of the PSY procedure is that it can serve as a real time surveillance tool to monitor the price 
behavior since its date-stamping strategy is developed under a forward recursive framework.  In the realm 
of agricultural futures markets, policy makers could benefit from knowing in real-time whether prices are 
behaving abnormally.   
Compared to previous bubble testing procedures that rely on assumptions about unobserved 
fundamentals, the PWY, PY, and PSY procedures have the important advantage of detecting periods of 
price explosiveness independent of fundamentals since the tests can be applied directly to observed 
prices.  Given the unobserved nature of fundamental prices of agricultural commodities, attempting to 
disentangle the degree to which prices are influenced by market supply and demand fundamentals 
compared to bubble components is often subjected to the criticism of incorrectly specified fundamentals 
and therefore misleading conclusions (van Norden and Vigfusson 1998).   By avoiding direct estimates of 
fundamental values, the PWY, PSY, and PY procedures can reduce the possibility that specifications 
regarding the underlying fundamental values are in error.   
Most empirical studies of agricultural price spikes to date do not provide an accurate definition of 
bubbles that can be empirically validated, at best referring to bubbles as a long period of run-ups in 
commodity prices.  A common practice is to examine a price chart and crudely date-stamp a highly-
volatile period as the “bubble” period.  Such ad hoc bubble definitions commonly employed in the recent 
literature invariably leads to disparities regarding the specific periods that warrant special attention.  
When researchers then relate these ad hoc definitions of bubble periods to potential contributing factors, 
they may be led to different conclusions regarding what is behind the recent commodity price spikes.  For 
instance, Robles, Torero, and von Braun (2009) and von Braun and Torero (2009) considered 2006-2008 
to be the food crisis period.  In contrast, the same episode is considered the pre-crisis period in Capelle-
Blancard and Coulibaly (2011).   
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The central theme of this dissertation is to test and understand bubbles in agricultural futures 
markets.  In particular, the dissertation applies the recent forward and backward recursive bubble testing 
procedure of PSY that is capable of date stamping the exact origination and termination dates of multiple 
bubbles in various agricultural markets.  This procedure is shown to possess higher power when the 
underlying data exhibit multiple explosive periods.  The dissertation has three specific objectives: (1) to 
detect bubble behavior in agricultural futures markets and any patterns in this behavior over time; (2) to 
test whether index traders drove price movements in agricultural futures markets during the explosive 
periods that are of particular concern to policymakers; and (3) to determine under what market conditions 
bubbles in agricultural futures markets are most likely to occur.  The dissertation consists of three stand-
alone essays that focus on each of these objectives.  While the three essays share many similarities in 
terms of econometric estimation methodology, each essay provides a unique viewpoint on whether 
agricultural price movements are indeed driven by bubble behavior.   
The first essay is entitled “Bubbles in Food Commodity Markets: Four Decades of 
Evidence.  ” This essay directly attempts to examine the broader issue of bubble existence in agricultural 
futures markets.  Specifically, we use the daily prices from individual futures contracts to test whether 
speculative bubbles exist in agricultural futures markets from 1970 to 2011 and to identify whether 
patterns of bubble behavior exist over time.  Results are based on the PSY bubble testing procedure.  
While several previous studies have used the PWY, PY, and PSY procedures to detect bubbles in 
agricultural commodity markets (e.g., Gilbert 2010, Gutierrez 2013), their results are compromised by the 
use of rolling nearby or cash prices, where explosive periods may be classified as bubbles but are actually 
driven by explosive fundamentals.  Assuming rational expectation, no risk premium, and no basis risk, 
prices of individual futures contract may be treated as following a random walk in the absence of bubbles.  
Following this definition, evidence of explosiveness in observed prices indicates the existence of a bubble 
in prices.  In addition, this study is the first to account for potential conditional heteroskedasticity in the 
data generating process when testing for bubbles.  Compared to inference accounting based on Monte 
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Carlo simulation, the traditional residual-based bootstrap may reduce small sample bias when date-
stamping for bubbles, as shown by Gutierrez (2013).  However, conditional heteroskedasticity often exists 
in higher frequency data, as is the case in this study, invalidating traditional residual-based bootstraps.  
We use the recursive wild bootstrap procedure of Gonçalves and Kilian (2004) when date-stamping 
bubbles using the PSY technique to remedy this problem.  This study also represents the first 
comprehensive analysis in the literature that examines a wide range of agricultural futures markets over a 
long sample period.   The findings demonstrate that all 12 agricultural markets, including grains, softs, 
and livestock commodities, experienced multiple periods of price explosiveness.  However, bubble 
episodes represent a small portion—between 1.5 to 2%—of the price behavior during the 42-year period.   
The second essay is entitled “Bubbles, Index Traders, and Grain Futures Prices.  ” Several 
previous studies have examined the role of index investment in commodity price movements using 
statistical testing procedures.  While most of the existing evidence does not support the conjecture that 
index investment was a primary driver of recent commodity price spikes, the available evidence is 
nonetheless limited in two important dimensions.  The first limitation is that the measurement of the 
market impact of index investment has not allowed for a differential impact during price spikes, 
potentially masking effects in periods when arguably they are most likely to be the largest.  The second 
limitation in previous studies is that a rigorous procedure is not used to precisely define when price spikes 
start and end.  Some studies only refer to a broad increase in commodity prices.  Other studies rely on ad 
hoc definitions of spikes that may easily miss the periods of most concern.  In this essay, we analyzes the 
market impact of financial index investment in grain futures markets during explosive and non-explosive 
periods of price behavior between 2004 and 2012.  This is the first study in the literature to examine the 
causal linkages from index investment to commodity futures price changes while allowing for differential 
impacts during rigorously determined explosive and non-explosive market regimes.   Corn, soybeans, and 
wheat traded at the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) and wheat traded at the Kansas City Board of Trade 
(KCBT) are examined over 2004-2012.  We focus on grain futures markets because these markets have 
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been at the forefront of concerns about the effect of index investment on food prices.  In the first part of 
the analysis the forward and backward recursive PSY procedure is used to detect and date-stamp mildly 
explosive periods in the four grain futures markets.  To account for conditional heteroskedasticity and 
small sample bias, inferences are derived using a recursive wild bootstrap procedure.  In the second part 
of the analysis, Granger causality tests are used to investigate lead-lag dynamics between index trader 
positions and weekly returns (price changes) in the four grain futures markets during different market 
regimes.  The findings in this essay provide little evidence to support the notion that index investment 
was a primary driver of the spikes in grain futures prices in recent years.    
The third essay is entitled “Bubbles in Grain Futures Markets: When are They Most Likely 
to Occur?” The previous two essays of this dissertation examine the general pattern of bubble behavior 
in agricultural futures markets and the role of index investment during different market regimes.  These 
essays do not, however, resolve the question of what may be driving bubbles when they do occur.  In the 
third essay, we investigate the conditions in which bubbles are more likely to occur in US grain futures 
markets between 2004 and 2012.  Under the resale option theory of Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) and 
Scheinkman (2013), we argue that relating various contributing factors to bubbles is equivalent to 
identifying the market conditions under which divergence in beliefs is more likely to increase.  We use 
the recently developed PSY multiple bubble testing procedure to detect and date-stamp bubbles in corn, 
soybean, and wheat futures markets between 2004 and 2012.  To account for conditional 
heteroskedasticity and small sample bias, inferences are derived using a recursive wild bootstrap 
procedure.  A logit model that accounts for bias due to the rarity of an event is used to estimate the impact 
of non-fundamental and fundamental factors on the existence of a bubble.  We find that bubbles are more 
likely to occur in the presence of large aggregate global demand, low stocks to use ratios, large US export 
sales to other countries, and a weak US dollar.  In contrast, commodity index traders and speculative 
activity exceeding the minimum level required to absorb hedging activities as measured by the Working’s 
T tends to reduce considerably the probability of a bubble.   
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This dissertation will contribute to the current debate about agricultural price movements by 
providing new information regarding historical speculative bubble patterns in agricultural futures markets, 
the role of index investment, and the relative importance of various fundamental and non-fundamental 
factors in determining corn, soybeans, and wheat price bubbles.  The results will be of interest to not only 
policymakers interested in policies that will help to ameliorate the drastic price increases, but also to 
economists interested in finding what drove the heightened price volatility.  In particular, the findings of 
this study may provide additional insight as to whether speculators are to blame for the recent commodity 
price boom and whether additional regulatory efforts should be implemented to limit speculative activities 
in futures markets.   
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CHAPTER 2  
BUBBLES IN FOOD COMMODITY MARKETS: FOUR DECADES OF 
EVIDENCE1 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Food commodity prices have trended upward and experienced several large spikes since 2006, the most 
dramatic in 2007-2008.  An acrimonious world-wide debate has ensued about the nature and cause of the 
price spikes.  Much attention has been directed towards the trading activities of a new type of participant 
in commodity futures markets—financial index investors.  A common assertion (e.g.,  Masters 2008, 
2009) is that unprecedented buying pressure from financial index traders created a series of massive 
bubbles in agricultural futures prices.  However, a number of recent studies fail to find a direct empirical 
link between index trading and agricultural futures price movements, casting doubt on the view that index 
trading distorted pricing in these markets (see Irwin and Sanders (2011) for a review). 
The failure to find a link between the positions of a particular group of traders (commodity index 
traders) and agricultural futures prices does not rule out the presence of bubble components in prices, 
particularly during the spikes that have been of such concern to policy-makers.  This broader issue of the 
existence of bubble components in agricultural futures prices has received much less attention.  To date, 
four studies have tested for the presence of bubble components in various agricultural prices over the past 
few years and find mixed results (Gilbert 2010, Phillips and Yu 2011, Etienne, Irwin, and Garcia 2012, 
Gutierrez 2013).  These studies utilize new bubble tests developed by Phillips, Wu, and Yu (2011), 
Phillips and Yu (2011), and Phillips, Shi, and Yu (2012) that can detect and date-stamp bubbles by 
                                                            
1 This chapter is coauthored with Scott Irwin and Philip Garcia.  It is forthcoming in the Journal of International 
Money and Finance.  The copyright owners have provided permission to reprint.  The authors of this paper thank 
Vipin Arora, Jim Hamilton, Lutz Kilian, Dwight Sanders, Aaron Smith and our referee for helpful comments on an 
earlier version of this article. 
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determining whether prices deviate from a random walk and become mildly explosive.  In general, these 
studies indicate grain futures prices experienced periods of explosiveness with bubbles in soft and 
livestock markets less prevalent. 
 While the findings are informative, results of previous tests for bubbles in agricultural futures 
prices may be compromised by the use of a series of cash prices or rolling nearby futures price (i.e., the 
series are constructed using prices until near the maturity date and then switching to the subsequent 
maturing contract).  Bobenrieth, Bobenrieth, and Wright (2013) show that in the presence of supply and 
demand shocks in a rational storage model cash prices of storable commodities may behave in a bubble-
like fashion, but the “bubble” is driven entirely by fundamentals.  In earlier work, Wright and Williams 
(1991) demonstrate that in the presence of demand and supply shocks cash prices of a storable commodity 
may contain large spikes similar to the patterns detected by the new bubble tests.  Wang and Tomek 
(2007) also show that cash prices in general do not follow a random walk and may contain systematic 
components.  Nearby futures prices often behave essentially as cash prices given the short time to contract 
expiration (Peterson and Tomek 2005).  Thus, explosive periods identified for a cash price or nearby 
futures price series may be a result of fundamental factors rather than bubbles.  
Another technical problem is presented by the use of a nearby futures price series for storable 
commodities.  The new bubble tests (e.g., Phillips, Wu, and Yu 2011) are based on price levels and 
require the price levels to be differenced before conducting statistical tests.  Since a nearby futures price 
series must be “rolled” from a nearby to a next deferred contract near expiration, the price difference on 
each roll date is computed across contracts.  When a storable market is in contango (i.e., nearby price less 
than deferred price), the price change will be positive, with the price of storage as an upper bound.  
However, when a storable market is in backwardation (i.e., nearby price greater than deferred price) the 
price change will be negative, with no lower bound as the nearby futures converges to a cash price that is 
influenced by immediate commodity scarcity.  As a result of the roll, considerable noise may be 
introduced into bubble tests applied to a series of nearby futures prices and the potential for large 
distortions in test results exist in the presence of strong and recurrent backwardation.  
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In this paper, we use the daily prices from individual futures contracts to test whether speculative 
bubbles occur in agricultural futures markets and identify whether patterns of bubble behavior exist over 
time.  A series of prices from an individual futures contract will behave as a sequence of expected cash 
prices at maturity and should follow a random walk if one assumes rational expectations and no risk 
premium or basis risk (Peterson and Tomek 2005).  Deviations from a random walk in the series of prices 
for individual futures contracts may thus provide more reliable evidence for the presence of a bubble 
component in food commodity prices.  We also test for bubbles over a very long sample period.  In 
particular, we test for bubbles in samples of daily futures prices for 12 agricultural futures markets that 
begin as far back as 1970 and run through 2011.  This allows us to compare the behavior of agricultural 
futures prices during recent spikes with those during the mid-1970s, the last period of comparable market 
volatility (Piesse and Thirtle 2009).   
The testing algorithm recently developed by Phillips, Shi, and Yu (2012) is based on forward and 
backward recursively calculated Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test statistics and is more powerful 
than previously developed tests because it can detect the existence of multiple explosive periods and find 
their origination and termination dates.  To avoid potential inference problems caused by changes in 
volatility during explosive periods, we use a recursive wild bootstrap procedure (Gonçalves and Kilian 
2004) to account for the conditional heteroskedasticity that can occur when using high frequency futures 
price data.  The procedures are applied to daily prices from one individual agricultural futures contract per 
year, typically the maturity with the highest trading volume.  In addition to these formal tests of bubble 
behavior and time-stamping of bubble periods, we analyze the characteristics of the bubble periods in 
terms of length, size of autoregressive coefficients, and the over-reaction of prices during bubble periods. 
The findings demonstrate that all 12 agricultural markets experienced multiple periods of price 
explosiveness.  However, bubble episodes represent only a very small portion of the price behavior during 
the 42-year period from 1970 to 2011.  Most bubbles are short-lived, lasting fewer than 10 days. Relating 
bubble magnitudes to coefficient estimates from the SADF test, we find with few exceptions that bubbles 
have tended to be relatively mild during explosive episodes.  Large coefficients are typically associated 
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with extremely short-run price spikes.  While receiving far less attention, negative bubbles (troughs) 
contribute significantly to price behavior, accounting for nearly one-third of total explosive episodes.  
During both positive and negative explosive periods, markets over-react and then correct as prices return 
to a random walk.  This effect is more pronounced in positive bubbles particularly during the earlier part 
of the sample.  While these corrective adjustments are statistically significant they are small in magnitude, 
ranging from 1.4% to 0.5%.  We also find that explosive periods did not become more common or last 
longer in the second half of the sample period and that the most recent bubble episodes may not have 
been as severe as in the mid-1970s.  
 
2.2 Bubble Testing Procedure 
Phillips, Wu, and Yu (2011, PWY hereinafter), Phillips and Yu (2011, PY hereinafter), and Phillips, Shi, 
and Yu (2012, PSY hereinafter) recently developed a series of recursive bubble testing procedures to 
detect and date-stamp exact bubble origination and collapse dates.  These procedures were motivated by 
the observation that the traditional unit root and cointegration-based tests proposed by Diba and 
Grossman (1988) may fail to detect the existence of bubbles when they are periodically collapsing, as 
demonstrated by (Evans 1991). 
Specifically, PSY consider the null hypothesis that 𝑃𝑡 follows a random walk with an 
asymptotically negligible drift: 
(1) 𝑃𝑡 = 𝑑𝑇
−𝜂 + 𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 , 
where 𝑑 is a constant, 𝑇 is the sample size, 𝜂 > 1 2⁄ , and 𝜀𝑡  ~𝑖𝑖𝑑 𝑁(0, 𝜎
2).  In the alternative case there 
are bubbles in the prices.  For illustration, consider when there are two bubble periods with the first 𝐵1 =
[𝜏1𝑒 , 𝜏1𝑓] and the second 𝐵2 = [𝜏2𝑒 , 𝜏2𝑓] , where 𝜏1𝑒, 𝜏1𝑓, 𝜏2𝑒, 𝜏2𝑓 are the origination and termination 
dates of each episode, respectively.  This data generating process can be represented as: 
(2) 𝑃𝑡 = 𝑃𝑡−1𝟏{𝑡 ∈ 𝑁0} + 𝛿𝑇𝑃𝑡−1𝟏{𝑡 ∈ 𝐵1 ∪ 𝐵2} + ( ∑ 𝜀𝑘 + 𝑃𝜏1𝑓
∗
𝑡
𝑘=𝜏1𝑓+1
) 𝟏{𝑡 ∈ 𝑁1} 
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      + (∑ 𝜀𝑘 + 𝑃𝜏2𝑓
∗𝑡
𝑙=𝜏2𝑓+1
) 𝟏{𝑡 ∈ 𝑁2} + 𝜀𝑡𝟏{𝑡 ∈ 𝑁0 ∪ 𝐵1 ∪ 𝐵2}, 
      𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇, 𝛿𝑇 = 1 + 𝑐 𝑇
𝛼⁄ , 𝑐 > 0, 𝛼 ∈ (0,1), 
where 𝟏{. } is the indicator function such that 𝟏{. } = 1 when the conditions in the bracket hold and 0 
otherwise, 𝜀𝑘 is an iid normally distributed error term, and 𝑁0 = [1, 𝜏1𝑒), 𝑁1 = (𝜏1𝑓 , 𝜏2𝑒), and 𝑁2 =
(𝜏2𝑓 , 𝑇] are three non-explosive sub-periods.  At the bubble collapse dates 𝜏1𝑓 and 𝜏2𝑓, the price 
reinitializes and jumps to a new level 𝑃𝜏1𝑓
∗  and 𝑃𝜏2𝑓
∗  , respectively.  For given values of 𝑐 and 𝛼, the 
parameter 𝛿𝑇, which equals 1 + 𝑐/𝑇
𝛼, is greater than one in finite samples and approaches one when the 
sample size 𝑇 approaches infinity.  This defines the mildly-integrated root as specified in Phillips and 
Magdalinos (2007a).  While no general asymptotic inference can be established for purely explosive 
autoregressive processes as the central limit theory does not apply (White 1958, Anderson 1959), the 
asymptotic behavior of mildly explosive processes is more regular and a least squares regression theory 
can be established to construct confidence intervals (Phillips and Magdalinos 2007a, b). 
 Equation (2) implies that to measure the start and end dates of multiple explosive price periods 
accurately the testing procedure must first distinguish the explosive behavior of a price series at 𝜏1𝑒 from 
its non-explosive behavior at 𝜏1𝑒−1.  Similarly, at 𝜏1𝑓 the testing procedure must be capable of identifying 
the transition from an explosive path to a random walk.  To achieve this PSY use a generalized 
framework with variable window widths in the recursive regressions on which the test procedures are 
based.  Defining the estimation start and end points as 𝑟1 and 𝑟2, respectively, their estimation equation 
becomes: 
(3) ∆𝑃𝑡 = 𝛼𝑟1,𝑟2 + 𝛽𝑟1,𝑟2𝑃𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑟1,𝑟2
𝑖 ∆𝑃𝑡−𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1
+ 𝜀𝑡 , 
where ∆𝑃𝑡 = 𝑃𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡−1, 𝑘 is the lag order, and 𝜀𝑡  ~𝑖𝑖𝑑 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑟1,𝑟2
2 ).  The ADF t-statistic corresponding to 
this equation is 𝐴𝐷𝐹𝑟1,𝑟2 =
𝛽𝑟1,𝑟2
𝑠𝑒(𝛽𝑟1,𝑟2)
.  The varying window size of the regression 𝑟𝑤 is a function of 𝑟1 and 
𝑟2 such that 𝑟𝑤 = 𝑟2 − 𝑟1 + 1. Defining 𝑟𝑤0  as the minimum window size required to estimate equation (3) 
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and a fixed ending point 𝑟2, the starting point 𝑟1 can vary between the first observation to observation 
𝑟2 − 𝑟𝑤0 + 1.  By varying the starting point 𝑟1 there are [𝑟2 − 𝑟𝑤0 + 1] ADF t-statistics for any fixed 
ending point 𝑟2.  Let 𝑆𝐴𝐷𝐹𝑟2  be the maximum of those [𝑟2 − 𝑟𝑤0 + 1] ADF t-statistics such that 
𝑆𝐴𝐷𝐹𝑟2 = 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑟1∈[1,𝑟2−𝑟𝑤0+1]
𝐴𝐷𝐹𝑟1,𝑟2 .
2  Now allow the ending point 𝑟2 to vary between 𝑟𝑤0  and 𝑇, the last 
data point included in the estimation; we then obtain [𝑇 − 𝑟𝑤0 + 1] 𝑆𝐴𝐷𝐹𝑟2 statistics from a backward-
expanding window.  These 𝑆𝐴𝐷𝐹𝑟2 test statistics are then compared to the critical values.  The estimated 
origination and end dates of the first explosive episode are specified by: 
(4) 𝑟1?̃? = 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑟2∈[𝑟𝑤0 ,𝑇]
{𝑟2: 𝑆𝐴𝐷𝐹𝑟2 > 𝑐𝑣𝑟2
𝜌
} and 
(5) 𝑟1?̃? = 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑟2∈[𝑟1?̃?+ℎ,𝑇]{𝑟2: 𝑆𝐴𝐷𝐹𝑟2 < 𝑐𝑣𝑟2
𝜌
}, 
where 𝑐𝑣𝑟2
𝜌
 is the 100𝜌% critical values of the backward-expanding SADF statistic based on 𝑟2 
observations and h is the minimum defined length of the bubble episode.  In essence, the origination date 
is defined as the first date that the sup test statistics 𝑆𝐴𝐷𝐹𝑟2  exceeds the corresponding critical value and it 
terminates as soon as it falls below the critical value.  The estimated origination and collapse dates of the 
second explosive episode can be defined in a similar way.  PSY obtained the asymptotic distribution of 
the backward-expanding SADF test statistic and proved that under a variety of scenarios the SADF test 
can consistently detect the start and end dates of explosive periods.3 One important advantage of the PSY 
testing procedure is that it allows testing the bubble origination and termination dates on a real-time basis, 
which may be of considerable value to policymakers who want to reduce price variability and explosive 
episodes. 
                                                            
2 The SADF statistic here is based on a backward-expanding window, different from the SADF statistic in PWY 
(2011) and PY(2011) where a forward-expanding window is used. 
3 Specifically, the asymptotic distribution of 𝑆𝐴𝐷𝐹𝑟2 (based on a backward-expanding window) follows  
 𝐹𝑟2
𝑟0 = Sup
𝑟1∈[0,𝑟2−𝑟0]
{
1
2
𝑟𝑤[𝑊(𝑟2)
2−𝑊(𝑟1)
2−𝑟𝑤]−∫ 𝑊(𝑟)𝑑𝑟[𝑊(𝑟2)−𝑊(𝑟1)]
𝑟2
𝑟1
𝑟𝑤
1/2
{𝑟𝑤 ∫ 𝑊(𝑟)2𝑑𝑟
𝑟2
𝑟1
−[∫ 𝑊(𝑟)𝑑𝑟]
𝑟2
𝑟1
2
}
1/2 }, where 𝑟𝑤 = 𝑟2 − 𝑟1 and W is a standard Wiener 
process.  Detailed proofs of the consistency of the PSY estimators in the presence of multiple bubbles can be found 
in Phillips, Shi, and Yu (2013c). 
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Earlier work by PWY and PY are also based on recursively calculated ADF statistics, however in 
PWY the starting point of each regression 𝑟1 is set to the first observation of the sample, and in PY the 
starting point is selected based on the BIC value.  Homm and Breitung (2012) show that in various 
simulations the PWY procedure performs satisfactorily against other recursive procedures and is 
particularly effective as a real-time detection algorithm for explosive market behavior.  Regardless, in 
either case, the regression only involves a forward recursive window given that 𝑟1 is the same for every 
test statistic.  While the PWY and PY procedures can consistently detect the origination and termination 
dates of the first bubble period (𝐵1 in equation (2)), it is not difficult to understand that these two 
procedures may be severely biased when estimating the timespans of the second bubble period 𝐵2, 
especially when 𝐵1is longer than 𝐵2.  Since the PWY and PY procedures use a single starting point for 
the entire testing process, signals from the first explosive episode may be mixed with the second one.  
Often the downward bias from the first explosive sub-period can contaminate the ability of successful 
detection of the following explosive period, resulting in test procedures that are too conservative and the 
detection of too few explosive episodes.  Extensive finite sample simulations reported in PSY and Phillips, 
Shi, and Yu (2013b, c) show that in the presence of multiple bubbles the PSY test has significantly 
improved discriminatory power compared to the earlier PWY test and the CUSUM test developed by 
Homm and Breitung (2012).   
Several studies have applied the PWY and PY procedures to various agricultural markets and find 
mixed results.  Gilbert (2010) examines seven commodity futures markets and only finds explosive 
periods in copper and soybean prices.  In contrast, Gutierrez (2013) finds evidence of explosiveness in 
wheat, corn and rough rice prices in 2007–2008 but not in soybean prices.  Phillips and Yu (2011) find no 
explosive periods in deflated coffee, cotton, cocoa, sugar, and feeder cattle cash prices.  Only Etienne, 
Irwin, and Garcia (2012) applied the PSY procedure to nearby grain futures prices and find significant 
evidence of explosive periods in all four markets examined. 
 
2.3 Futures Price Data 
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As noted, explosive periods identified by previous work that relies on cash prices (Phillips and Yu 2011) 
or rolling nearby futures prices (Gilbert 2010, Etienne, Irwin, and Garcia 2012, Gutierrez 2013), may be 
driven by fundamental demand and supply factors rather than an explosive bubble component.  In contrast, 
futures prices derived from an individual contract should behave as a random walk under fairly general 
conditions.  Specifically, the futures price at time 𝑡 for a contract maturing at 𝑇 is the expected cash price 
of a certain commodity at time 𝑇 conditional on the information available at time 𝑡 (e.g., Fama and 
French 1987, Tomek 1997), or 𝐹𝑡
𝑇 = 𝐸𝑡(𝑃𝑇|𝐼𝑡), assuming rational expectations, no risk premium, and no 
basis risk.  Hence, prices from individual futures contracts will behave approximately as a sequence of 
expected cash prices at maturity and follow a random walk (Peterson and Tomek 2005).  Deviations from 
a random walk in the series of prices for individual futures contracts may thus provide a more reliable test 
of bubble components in agricultural futures prices.4  
We consider the 12 agricultural futures contracts included in the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC) Supplemental Commitment of Traders (SCOT) report.  Specifically, these include 
five grain futures (Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) corn, soybeans, soybean oil and wheat; Kansas City 
Board of Trade (KCBOT) wheat), three livestock futures (Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) feeder 
cattle, live cattle, and lean hogs), and four soft futures (Intercontinental Commodity Exchange (ICE) 
cocoa, coffee, cotton, and sugar).  For each commodity, we examine one contract each year, typically the 
contract with the highest trading volume, i.e., the December contract for corn, soybean oil, lean hog, live 
cattle, cocoa, coffee, and cotton futures, the November contract for soybean and feeder cattle futures, the 
October contract for sugar futures, and the July contract for the two wheat futures series.  We use log 
daily prices and samples are extended as far back as 1970 and all run through 2011.  This results in 42 
contracts (or individual price sequences) for each commodity.  The only exceptions are feeder cattle and 
coffee futures, whose data were not available until 1972 and 1973, respectively.  As a result, 40 contracts 
are examined for feeder cattle and 39 for coffee futures.   
                                                            
4 In the case when risk premiums exist, the futures prices need to be adjusted by a constant or time-varying term.  
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Since one futures contract is used per year, sample sizes for the individual contracts range from 
about 240-260 days.  Simulations in Phillips, Shi, and Yu (2013b) indicate the PSY date stamping 
procedure has high power (roughly 80% or more) for a samples size of 100 or more monthly observations.  
Although not directly relevant to a daily sampling frequency, these simulations suggest that samples of 
240-260 daily observations available here should allow reasonable power to detect explosive periods of 
price behavior.  
Given that trading for agricultural futures contracts often extends more than a year before 
expiration, the price data need to be aligned to avoid periods of potentially overlapping bubbles.  For 
instance, futures quotes on 6/1/2010 are available for both December 2010 and December 2011 corn 
contracts.  If both prices pass the PSY test then this date will be considered explosive in both price 
sequences, which would not be surprising given the arbitrage relations between different futures contract 
maturities for storable commodities.  To avoid this potential overlap, we let each price sequence start 13 
months before the contract expiration date and end on the last trading day of the month before the contract 
expires.  These two rules result in a 13-month sample period for each contract.  For example, the sample 
for the December 2011 corn contract includes observations from 11/1/2010 to 11/30/2011 and the sample 
for the December 2010 corn contract starts on 11/1/2009 and ends on 11/30/2010.  Since the first 20 
observations are used as the initial start-up sample for the PSY procedure (𝑟𝑤0  in the testing procedure, or 
the minimum window size), bubbles in the December 2011 contract will fall within 12/1/2010 to 
11/30/2011.  For the December 2010 contract, the feasible range of bubble is from 12/1/2009 to 
11/30/2010.  Constructing data in this way ensures that all non-overlapping bubble periods, if they exist, 
can be detected in the individual contract sequences. 
  The commodities and sample periods selected for analysis represent a wide range of production, 
storage, and marketing characteristics, and a long span of time in which technologies, government 
programs, and market conditions have changed.  The structure of the data permits a broad overview of the 
presence of explosive periods in agricultural futures markets. When combined with the use of prices for 
individual futures contracts it also reduces the likelihood that any bubbles identified in agricultural futures 
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markets will arise solely as a reflection of a competitive storage framework.  Our broad-based assessment 
will help to identify whether bubbles tend to occur in markets with particular characteristics or in periods 
of time with specific conditions and this should be informative to market analysts, traders, and policy 
makers.  In contrast, failure to identify the existence of explosive periods in agricultural futures markets 
will point to the ability of markets to uniformly reflect information in an efficient manner. 
 
2.4 Inference and the Wild Bootstrap Procedure 
Several inference issues can emerge when using individual daily futures prices for bubble tests.  First, an 
important characteristic of futures prices for an individual contract is that price variance increases as 
contract maturity approaches (Samuelson 1965).  This hypothesis has been widely-tested empirically, and 
in general, studies have agreed that the “time-to-maturity” effect does exist (e.g., Anderson 1985).  
Second, prices and price variability for annual crops are affected by the seasonality of underlying markets.  
This implies that, holding other factors constant, prices should be more volatile in the growing season as 
more information about expected yield arrives in this period (Tomek and Peterson 2001).  Fortunately, the 
PSY testing approach is likely to account for these situations, as the forward and backward recursive 
procedure ensures that for different regressions, the error terms are allowed to have different variances.5  
Finally, the PSY procedure calls for a well-defined sequence of critical values for the backward 
SADF test statistic when date-stamping bubbles.  PSY derived the asymptotic distribution of the SADF 
test statistic and obtained finite sample critical values via Monte Carlo simulation under the null of no 
bubbles.  To account for potential small sample sizes, Gutierrez (2013) uses a residual-based 
bootstrapping procedure to draw inferences from the empirical distribution of the test statistic when 
applying the PWY procedure.  The main reason for using a bootstrap inference is that hypothesis tests 
based on asymptotic theory may often seriously over-reject or under-reject when the sample size is small 
(MacKinnon 2002).  However, inference based on standard residual-based bootstrap for dynamic 
                                                            
5 In addition, we do not include prices from the last trading month, which tend to present large price variabilities. 
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regression models is invalid if regression errors in equation (3) are not independent or identically 
distributed.  Since agricultural futures price data often exhibit conditional heteroskedasticity at daily and 
weekly frequencies (e.g., Taylor 1986, Yang and Brorsen 1994, Garcia and Leuthold 2004) the bubble 
testing procedure based on a standard residual bootstrap or finite sample simulated critical values is likely 
inaccurate. 
To account for conditional heteroskedasticity in the bubble tests, we use the wild bootstrap 
procedure of Gonçalves and Kilian (2004) when applying the PSY procedure.  Gonçalves and Kilian 
(2004) demonstrate the first-order asymptotic validity of the recursive wild bootstrap procedure for finite-
order autoregressions with possible conditionally heteroskedastic errors.  Specifically, we use the 
recursive wild bootstrap method to derive an empirical distribution of the backward SADF test statistic as 
follows: 
1. For each data sequence, we first estimate an autoregressive model under the null hypothesis 
of no bubble as in equation (3), where 𝛽𝑟1,𝑟2 = 0.  Denote the resulting residuals as 𝜀?̂? and the 
estimated autoregressive coefficients as ?̂?𝑟1,𝑟2
𝑖 .  
2. Generate wild bootstrap residuals 𝜀?̂?
∗ such that 𝜀?̂?
∗ = 𝜀?̂?𝜂𝑡 , where 𝜂𝑡 is an i.i.d. sequence with 
zero mean and unit variance.  Here we let 𝜂𝑡~ N(0,1).
6 
3. Generate recursive bootstrap samples 𝑃𝑡
∗ from 𝑃𝑡
∗ = 𝑃𝑡−1
∗ + ∑ ?̂?𝑟1,𝑟2
𝑖 ∆𝑃𝑡−1
∗𝑘
𝑖=1 + 𝜀?̂?
∗ for 𝑡 =
1,2, … . 𝑇.  We then calculate the backward SADF values on the bootstrap sample using 
equation (3) for every ending point given some minimum window size.  The White 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error is used while computing the ADF t-statistic. 
4. Repeat steps 1 to 3 many times, and obtain the bootstrap distribution of the backward SADF 
test statistic.  The number of bootstrap draws is set to 2,000.  
 
                                                            
6 The results are robust to alternative distributions. 
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In essence, the wild bootstrap sample mimics the pattern of conditional heteroskedasticity in the original 
data generating process and is thus more effective than the simulated finite sample or standard residual-
based bootstrap critical values.  The empirical distribution from the wild bootstrap can then be used to 
derive inference for the SADF test statistic with the original data (again using White standard errors).  We 
use the 95% quantile from the wild bootstrap distribution to date-stamp bubbles.  Gonçalves and Kilian 
(2004) argue that the robust wild bootstrap procedure should be favored in empirical applications over the 
standard residual-based bootstrap based on an iid error assumption.  Cavaliere and Taylor (2008) show 
that, under a unit root null with nonstationary volatility, test statistics from the wild bootstrap converge to 
the same asymptotic distribution as the test statistics computed on the original data.  It can thus be 
inferred that the same results will hold for the SADF test statistic provided that the sup(.) operator is a 
continuous function (Gutierrez 2013). 
In order to assess the impact of using the wild bootstrap for inference we also conducted bubble 
tests for ℎ = 5 applying the original Monte Carlo simulation procedure in PSY.  The difference in the 
critical values for the two procedures was substantial.  For example, the average 95% SADF critical value 
for the December 2008 corn futures contract was 1.011 for the wild bootstrap and 0.587 for the Monte 
Carlo simulation.  Overall, the frequency of bubble detection was 3.3 times larger across the 12 markets 
and average bubble length was 2.5 times larger using the PSY procedure with simulated critical values as 
compared to the wild bootstrap procedure.  This demonstrates the importance of using the wild bootstrap 
procedure when testing for bubbles in higher frequency (daily) prices. 7 
 
2.5 Test Results 
2.5.1 Preliminary Considerations 
Several points must be considered prior to determining the existence of explosive periods and locating 
their origination and termination dates.  First, the lag order in equation (3) must be specified.  Phillips and 
                                                            
7 The alternative bubble test results are available from the authors on request.  
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Yu (2011) employ a lag order of zero arguing that the asymptotic distributions of the test statistics remain 
the same when a low lag order is used.  Similarly, PSY contend that adding lag orders can potentially 
influence the estimation results and suggest obtaining the ADF test statistics with a lag order of zero.  
However, in their most recent work Phillips, Shi, and Yu (2013b) present simulation evidence that size 
distortions actually are smallest when a fixed lag length is used.  Consequently, we use a fixed lag order 
of one (𝑘 = 1 in equation (3)) to allow for the possible low order autocorrelation that has been observed 
in daily agricultural futures returns (e.g., Taylor 1986, Yang and Brorsen 1994, Isengildina, Irwin, and 
Good 2006).  Second, the minimum window size is chosen so that the chance of finding explosive periods 
is maximized and there are a sufficient number of observations for estimation.  The initial start-up sample 
for the generalized forward recursive analysis contains 20 observations, or roughly one month.  The 
minimum window size is 20 observations as well.  To illustrate, consider obtaining the SADF test 
statistics for a fixed ending data point 21 (𝑟2 = 21), two regressions are estimated where the first starts 
with observation 1 (𝑟1 = 1) and the second with observation 2 (𝑟1 = 2).  𝑆𝐴𝐷𝐹21 is then set to the larger 
ADF t-statistics calculated from those two regressions.  
Third, an assumption we implicitly make under the random walk null is that individual futures 
contract prices do not contain a risk premium, or 𝐹𝑡
𝑇 = 𝐹𝑡−1
𝑇 + 𝜀𝑡.  It is possible that short hedgers reward 
long speculators with a risk premium for bearing price risk, as first argued by Keynes (1930) and Hicks 
(1939).  If this is true, futures prices before the maturity date are biased downward in order to embed the 
risk payment.  Such a data generating process including a drift term is 𝐹𝑡
𝑇 = 𝑑𝑇−𝜂 + 𝐹𝑡−1
𝑇 + 𝜀𝑡, as shown 
in equation (1).  Though the risk premium assumption remains rather controversial and empirical 
evidence provides mixed results (e.g., Carter 1999, Garcia and Leuthold 2004), it is true that when the 
drift term is large and the variance of the random component is small the drift/risk premium term can 
dominate periods of price spikes.  Phillips, Shi, and Yu (2013a) show that when the drift term is 
negligible, or 𝜂 > 1 2⁄  for a fixed constant 𝑑, sharp price changes generated by explosive behavior can be 
consistently distinguished from a unit root process.  They also propose a consistent procedure to estimate 
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𝜂, which we apply to our data and find that estimated values range from 0.91 to 2.19 for the individual 
futures contract series.  Hence, the drift term may be negligible for the data considered in this study, a 
result that is consistent with recent evidence on risk premiums in commodity futures markets (Sanders 
and Irwin 2012).  Overall, results from the PSY procedure applied to our current dataset indicate that test 
results are unlikely to be materially affected by a risk premium component in futures prices. 
Finally, when defining the end dates of the explosive periods in equations (4) and (5) note that 
price explosiveness needs to last at least h periods to be considered economically meaningful.  Phillips, 
Wu, and Yu (2011) suggest the minimum length of the explosive period be set to 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑇).  With sample 
sizes for each contract ranging from about 240 to 260 days, this results in a minimum length of 5-6 days 
for our data.  In a competitive futures market it is reasonable to assume that information is reflected 
quickly in futures prices, even if not instantaneously, and market participants react rapidly to any new 
information.  Hence, any price movement away from prices based on fundamentals is likely to be short-
lived.  This also supports a relatively short 5-day rule for defining bubble periods.  As a robustness check 
we also consider minimum bubble lengths of 3 and 7 days. 
For illustration, the PSY SADF testing procedure is presented in figure 2.1 where we detect and 
date-stamp bubbles in the 2008 contract prices of soybean oil, KC wheat, and sugar using critical values 
developed with the recursive wild bootstrap procedure.  Date-stamping results are found by comparing 
the SADF statistic with the 95% critical value sequences from the wild bootstrap.  With a minimum 
bubble length of three days (h = 3), five, two, and three bubble episodes are identified in the 2008 
soybean oil, KC wheat, and sugar contract prices, respectively. 
 
2.5.2 SADF Date-Stamping Results 
To facilitate discussion, the 42-year sample is divided into two periods, 1970-1990 and 1991-2011, which 
are referred to as period 1 and period 2, respectively.  Based on the SADF tests, tables 2.1 and 2.2 provide 
the number of days experiencing explosive episodes for each commodity by year for a minimum bubble 
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length of 3 and 5 days.8  The specific date-stamping results based on the SADF test vary with the 
minimum bubble length used.  On average, about 50% more days experiencing bubbles are identified 
when using a minimum bubble length of 3 days.  The difference is most pronounced in soybean oil and 
KC wheat futures, where over 70% more days exhibited bubble episodes (212 vs. 123 days for soybean 
oil, 192 vs. 109 days for KC wheat).  These differences highlight the importance of specifying the 
minimum bubble length and the short-lived nature of explosive price behavior.  
An important pattern across both sets of results (h = 3 or h = 5) is that bubbles tend to occur 
roughly at the same frequency in periods 1 and 2.  Using a 3-day minimum length, the percentage of days 
experiencing bubbles in all 12 markets decreases slightly from 2.2% in period 1-2.1% in period 2.  Using 
a 5-day minimum length, a similar pattern exists; bubble frequency decreases from 1.5% to 1.4% from 
period 1 to period 2.  In terms of markets, with few exceptions bubbles occur more frequently in the 
earlier sample period in the softs and livestock markets.  For instance, bubbles in coffee (h = 3) occurred 
4.2% of the time in period 1 and dropped to 2.2% in period 2.  For grains like corn and the two wheat 
contracts, however, bubbles occurred somewhat more often in period 2.  
Figure 2.2 presents the percentage of days experiencing bubbles across all markets by year.  Not 
surprisingly, 1973 and 2008 are the two years with the highest bubble frequency, with about 5.9% and 6.4% 
of the days in explosive episodes with a 3-day minimum length.  These numbers drop with a 5-day 
minimum length, but only modestly.  For the remaining years, bubble periods generally span less than 3% 
of the time and bubbles tend to occur in a rather unpredictable fashion, with no evident patterns through 
the years.  Overall, it is important to note that bubble episodes only appear to represent a small portion of 
the price behavior for the entire sample.  With very few exceptions, the percentage of trading days with 
explosive prices is less than 3% over the 42-year period. In addition, there is little evidence that bubbles 
occurred much more frequently in period 2 compared to period 1.  
 
                                                            
8 Results for ℎ = 7 days are available upon request from the authors. 
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2.5.3 Bubble Characteristics 
Here, we provide more specific information on the characteristics of the bubble episodes.  Table 2.3 
summarizes the number of bubble episodes and their average length by commodity, while figure 2.3 
shows the frequency distributions of bubble length across all commodities.  Several prominent patterns 
emerge.  First, the total number of bubble episodes in the two periods, regardless of the minimum h 
criteria used, are nearly the same.  Second, bubbles tend to be slightly shorter with smaller variations in 
period 2 than in period 1.  For instance, the average bubble duration in period 1 (ℎ = 3) is 6 days, 
declining to 5 days in period 2.9  Also, for many individual commodities, the longest bubble episodes 
occurred in period 1 (e.g., 30 days in sugar).  Finally, the distribution of bubble length for all commodities 
(figure 2.3) is skewed to the right, and most bubbles are short-lived, with about 80-90% of the episodes 
lasting less than 10 days.  
The degree to which prices deviate from a random walk may shed light on the strength of a 
bubble episode.  An implied growth rate can be measured by 𝛿𝑇 in equation (2), or 𝛽𝑟1,𝑟2  in equation (3), 
when a significant SADF value is achieved for a fixed ending point 𝑟2.
10  It is tempting to measure 
strength of a bubble by the magnitude of the SADF statistics.  However, recall that the SADF is the 
estimated, 𝛽𝑟1,𝑟2 , divided by its White standard error, and as such does not necessarily provide an 
accurate measure of an implied growth rate of prices.  For instance, consider the SADF sequences for the 
December 1973 corn futures (figure 2.4(a)).  There were four explosive events when the SADF statistics 
exceed the critical values, but only one lasted more than 3 days (shaded area), corresponding to a bubble 
for the period 8/7/1973 – 8/17/1973.  Based on the SADF statistics, the growth rate of the bubble appears 
most significant around 8/14/1973 which also coincides with the date when prices reached their peak.  
However, examination of the regression coefficient 𝛽𝑟1,𝑟2  in figure 2.4(b) shows that prices during this 
                                                            
9 This difference in length, however, is not statistically significant at the 10% level. 
10 Coefficient estimates in first-order autoregressions obtained from OLS can be downward biased. In PWY (2011), 
the OLS estimates are adjusted for a small-sample bias correction, which are computed from simulation. Here we do 
not take into account this modification, suggesting our findings may be conservative.   
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period only deviated from a random walk slightly, with the average 𝛽𝑟1,𝑟2being 0.0176, corresponding to 
an AR coefficient of 1.0176.  The large SADF statistics observed during this period is a reflection of the 
relatively small standard errors in the backward recursive regressions rather than large regression 
coefficients. 
Of course, the AR coefficient may also be relatively large and the resulting SADF statistic 
exceeds the critical value, yet the event is not viewed as a bubble.  Consider 6/5/1973 in figure 2.4(a) 
when 𝛽𝑟1,𝑟2  is near 0.07 (AR coefficient of 1.07).  The SADF statistic is larger than the 95% critical value, 
but this large coefficient only lasted for two days prior to falling back and becoming indistinguishable 
from zero.  This period was thus too short to be considered a bubble.  A similar pattern is observed for the 
two other short periods in which the SADF statistic exceeds the critical values (one at the beginning and 
the other at the end of May 1973), pointing to a pricing process with a spiky component.  In examining 
these relationships for a number of contracts we often find that the more pronounced growth rates only 
last a short period of time.  
To reflect a representative range of results, we present eight other contracts in which relatively 
long bubble periods are detected using the PSY procedure (figure 2.5).  Combined for each contract, the 
bubbles lasted more than 20 business days or roughly one month.  Two negative bubbles with prices 
trending downward occurred (shaded area), one in the December 2000 corn contract (figure 2.5(a)), and 
the other in December 2007 lean hog contract (figure 2.5(h)).  For instance, the December 2000 corn 
contract price decreased from a peak of over $2.67/bu. in May 2000 to a low of $1.87/bu. in August 2000.  
Notice that most of the estimated regression coefficients for the December 2000 corn contract in the 
bubble episodes did not exceed 0.015.  For the December 2007 lean hog contract, the average coefficient 
estimate is 0.03 for the bubble episode.  In the remaining six contracts in figure 2.5, a similar pattern 
exists; i.e., the regression coefficient tends to be of low magnitude throughout the explosive periods with 
the exception of a few beginning dates.  While the degree to which a price sequence deviates from a 
random walk may not completely reveal how large the bubble has been, it certainly indicates that from a 
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statistical perspective, most explosive periods identified here in agricultural futures markets over the past 
42 years may have been relatively mild. 
 
2.5.4 Behavior of Returns during Bubbles 
Another approach to examine the strength or magnitude of a bubble is to assess the extent to which 
observed prices are overvalued compared to economic fundamentals.  For instance, Gheit (2008) argues 
that a price of crude oil exceeding $135 per barrel in 2008 was unwarranted, based on his perception that 
the fundamental price was below $60 per barrel.  More formally, Gilbert (2010) estimates that financial 
index traders in recent years pushed up prices by 9.6-17.1% for grains, metals, and energy products.  As 
another example, Liu and Tang (2010) follow Pindyck (1993) and estimate fundamental value based on 
convenience yields derived from the term structure in futures markets.  They report a substantial 
deterioration in the relationship between convenience yields and commodity price movements after 2004 
and interpret this as an implicit estimate of the size of bubbles.  While informative, these and similar 
studies are subject to criticism because of the difficulty in disentangling the degree to which prices are 
influenced by market supply and demand fundamentals compared to bubble components (van Norden and 
Vigfusson 1998).  Simply put, it is challenging to measure fundamental values.  
In this study we avoid estimating fundamental values and use an “event study” approach to infer 
the strength of bubbles directly from price changes during explosive episodes.  If prices follow a random 
walk in the absence of bubbles, then in theory prices should correctly reflect fundamental demand and 
supply conditions.  On the date when a bubble is identified, an explosive component becomes present and 
price can no longer be considered equal to fundamental value.  In a competitive futures market, we 
assume that traders will then seek to correct the unjustified price movement until eventually an 
equilibrium is reached.  The price on the date when an explosive period ends is therefore viewed as the 
new equilibrium price, i.e., the price that correctly reflects the new fundamental supply and demand 
conditions after the market appropriately allocates all the available resources among market participants.  
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Recognizing that prices are not always upward trending when bubbles occur (e.g., figures 2.5(b) 
and 2.5(h)), we first divide explosive periods into two groups––positive and negative bubbles.  Positive 
(negative) bubbles are defined to occur when the average price during the explosive period is greater (less) 
than the initial price at the start of the explosive period.  To investigate the bubble size and shape, we use 
prices at the origination, peak (trough), and ending dates for each bubble period, and calculate the returns 
(i.e., the percentage change in price) from start to peak (trough) and the returns from peak (trough) to the 
ending date.  Under this framework, the latter indicator measures how much price corrects before 
returning to a random walk process.  Returns from peak (trough) to the end of the explosive episode thus 
provide a measure of how much price is overvalued (undervalued) compared to fundamentals. 
Tables 2.4 and 2.5 present the average percentage price changes during the bubble episodes in 
periods 1 and 2 for positive and negative bubbles.  Focusing first on the positive bubbles (the left panel in 
each table), the initial average percentage price increase is typically much larger in period 1 compared to 
period 2 (+7.1% compared to +4.4% for ℎ = 3).  On average across all 12 markets, price over-reacts by 
+0.8% in period 1 and +0.5% in period 2 when ℎ = 3, both statistically significant from zero.  The 
corresponding degree of overvaluation when ℎ = 5 is +1.4% in period 1 and +0.7% in period 2, with both 
again statistically significant.  The largest over-reaction of prices occurred in cocoa futures in period 1, as 
the average percent adjustment from the peak to the end reaches -2.2% for ℎ = 3 and -4.5% for ℎ = 5.  In 
period 1, most of the price corrections are larger than -0.5% for ℎ = 3 and ℎ = 5.  In period 2, the 
magnitude of price correction for markets other than cotton and coffee are smaller, often less than -0.5%.  
On average, the length of the bubble episodes is near 6 days for ℎ = 3 and 8 or 9 days for ℎ = 5. 
Turning to the negative bubbles (the right panel in tables 2.4 and 2.5), their importance becomes 
clear as they account for 32-40% of the bubbles across all commodities for periods 1 and 2.  For both ℎ =
3 and ℎ = 5, there was a moderate tendency for negative bubbles to be concentrated in softs during 
period 1 and grains during period 2.  On average, price declines about 3-5% from start to trough for both 
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minimum bubble lengths, then corrects from +0.3% to +0.7% prior to returning to a random walk. This 
process typically takes 5 to 7 days.    
We now examine in detail the relationship between the magnitude of the initial price change and 
the correction during bubbles.  A logical expectation is that larger initial price changes during a bubble 
episode are followed by a larger correction.  This relationship is shown in figures 2.6 and 2.7, which 
provides a scatterplot of the return (i.e., the percentage change in price) from start to peak (trough) and 
return from peak (trough) to the end for each bubble period, along with a regression line between these 
two measures.  The expected relationship is confirmed for the positive bubbles, with initial increases (x) 
“explaining” larger corrections (y) in the opposite direction. While the magnitudes of the estimated slope 
coefficients are quite close across both minimum bubble lengths and periods, the slope for positive 
bubbles is larger in period 2 than in period 1.  Care must be taken to not infer that markets were over-
reacting more in the second period based on the magnitude of the estimated coefficient, as the average 
correction was smaller during the second period and much more concentrated around its mean.  For 
negative bubbles, the explanatory power is rather low in all cases and no clear relationship between the 
percentage price decline and the price correction exists. 
The plots for positive bubbles in figures 2.6 and 2.7 also reveal the existence of several large 
outliers that exhibited relatively large corrections.  Four standout in particular: i) cocoa experienced a 
bubble for 22 (business) days between 6/27/1973 and 7/27/1973 where the increase in price from start to 
peak was +26.5% and the subsequent correction was -7.8%; ii) corn experienced a bubble for 9 days 
between 8/7/1973 and 8/17/1973 where the increase in price from start to peak was +11.9% and the 
subsequent correction was -6.8%;  iii) coffee experienced a bubble for 17 days between 6/29/1994 and 
7/22/1994 where the increase in price from start to peak was +48.6% and the subsequent correction was -
9.1%;  and iv) cotton experienced a bubble for 11 days between 11/1/2010 and 11/15/2011 where the 
increase in price from start to peak was +15.7% and the subsequent correction was -8.6%.  These 
episodes show that while the vast majority of the bubble episodes in agricultural futures markets over the 
last four decades have been short-lived and small in magnitude, on occasion the episodes, most notably in 
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softs, are longer and larger.  It is also interesting to observe the higher frequency of bubbles with 
relatively large corrections in period 1 as compared to period 2.  Specifically, there were 13 positive 
bubble episodes in period 1 with corrections of at least 3% whereas there were only 4 with corrections of 
this size or greater in period 2.   
Figures 2.8 and 2.9 provide insight into the relationship between the magnitude of the price 
change from start to peak (trough) and the duration of the bubble.  A rather strong statistical and positive 
relationship exists between positive price change and the number of days in the bubble episode.  This 
relationship is more pronounced in period 1 for both ℎ = 3 and ℎ = 5 results.  Consider figure 2.9 (ℎ =
5). Prices in period 1 systematically increased more sharply (+1.7% each day) than in period 2 (+0.9% 
each day). Again, the relationship with negative bubbles is less systematic and more difficult to establish.   
Finally, given the relatively large number of explosive episodes that existed in 1971-1976 and 
2006-2011, we compare the characteristics of the bubbles during these two sub-periods (tables 2.6 and 
2.7).  Each of these 6-year periods accounted for 34-39% of the total number of bubbles in their 
respective 21-year periods.  It is surprising that even with the rapid price increases during these two 6-
year periods there exists a substantial portion of negative bubbles (29% and 31% for ℎ = 3 and 15% and 
20% for ℎ = 5, respectively).  There was about the same number of explosive episodes in 2006-2011 as 
in 1971-1976 and the episodes have about the same average length.  However, there was also a clear 
tendency for positive bubbles during 1971-1976 to be substantially more pronounced, last slightly longer, 
and exhibit a larger correction than those during 2006-2011.  Negative bubbles are slightly fewer in 
number in 1971-1976 than 2006-2011, but the average price decline in 1971-1976 is notably larger.  The 
price over-reactions during negative bubbles in both periods are generally smaller than in positive bubbles.  
 
2.6 Conclusions 
In this paper we test whether 12 agricultural futures markets experienced bubbles between 1970 and 2011.  
The results were obtained by applying the multiple bubble testing procedure of Phillips, Shi, and Yu 
(2012) to daily price sequences for individual futures contracts.  Unlike previous studies that use nearby 
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futures prices or cash prices, which may exhibit explosive behavior due to changes in fundamentals 
within a rational storage framework, results generated from prices for individual contracts are more likely 
to reflect true bubble behavior in these markets.  The commodities and sample periods selected for 
analysis represent a wide range of production, storage, and marketing characteristics, which permits a 
broad overview of the presence of explosive periods in agricultural futures markets.  Inferences for the 
bubble date-stamping test statistic are obtained using a recursive wild bootstrap procedure with White 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors as discussed in Gonçalves and Kilian (2004).  Applying the 
date-stamping test, we find that all 12 agricultural markets experienced multiple periods of price 
explosiveness.  However, bubble episodes represent a very small portion—between 1.5 to 2%—of the 
price behavior during the 42-year period.  In addition, most bubbles are short-lived with 80 to 90% lasting 
fewer than 10 days.  Examining bubble behavior separately for the 1970-1990 and 1991-2011 periods, we 
find roughly the same number of bubbles with similar durations.  
We use an “event study” approach to infer the magnitude of bubbles directly from price changes 
during the date-stamped explosive episodes.  Allowing for positive and negative bubbles, we calculate the 
percentage price change from start to peak (trough) and the percentage price change from peak (trough) to 
the ending date.  This last measure reflects the magnitude a market corrects before returning to a random 
walk in price movements, which should characterize futures prices that incorporate available fundamental 
market information.  About 65% of the bubbles are positive and 35% are negative across all commodities.  
For positive bubbles, which last for about 8 to 9 days, the average initial price increase is significantly 
smaller in the 1991-2011 period (+6.2%) than in the 1970-1990 period (+10.8%).  Prices are also less 
overvalued in the more recent period (+0.7%) than in the first period (+1.4%), but average corrections 
differ statistically from zero.  For negative bubbles, which last for about 7 days, average price declines are 
slightly smaller in the later period, but average around 4-5% from start to trough.  Average corrections to 
new fundamental levels are statistically different from zero for both positive and negative bubbles, but the 
magnitude of the adjustment is less than 1%.  It is important to also note that average corrections mask 
several significant increases in prices and large over-reactions, most notably in the softs (e.g., cocoa 1973, 
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coffee 1994, cotton 2010).  For the negative bubbles, almost no statistical evidence emerged to support a 
relationship between the initial price change and either a correction to a random walk or the duration of 
the bubble.  
While we find bubbles throughout the 42-year sample, their higher frequency and magnitude in 
1971-1976 and 2006-2011 warranted specific investigation.  Both of these time periods are characterized 
by high market volatility and notable price spikes.  Interestingly, positive bubbles tend to be shorter in 
duration and smaller in size during 2006-2011 compared to 1971-1976.  In addition, more days exhibited 
positive bubbles during the earlier period.  This pattern holds for almost all the grain, livestock, and softs 
futures markets examined.  
In sum, our results show that bubbles do occur in agricultural futures markets but the frequency 
of bubble episodes is generally quite low, the duration of most bubbles is only a few days, and the 
magnitude that futures prices over-react during these episodes is typically very small.  Our analysis also 
indicates that agricultural futures markets are no more prone to bubbles now than four decades ago, 
despite the recent price spikes and heightened price volatility.  These findings are largely consistent with 
theoretical models (e.g., Tirole 1982) that imply commodity futures contracts are unlikely to be highly 
susceptible to bubbles because these contracts are finite-horizon instruments with virtually no constraints 
on short-sales.  The low likelihood of bubbles is also supported by experimental studies, which show that 
the introduction of a futures market lessens the incidence of bubbles (Forsythe, Palfrey, and Plott 1984, 
Noussair and Tucker 2006). 
Our results are also pertinent to the recent controversy surrounding the impact of speculation in 
commodity markets.  In particular, hedge fund manager Michael W. Masters (2008, 2009) has led the 
charge that financial index investors were responsible for unprecedented bubbles in commodity futures 
prices (“the Masters Hypothesis”).  We find that bubbles existed long before these index investors arrived 
on the scene and the process of commodity market “financialization” started.  Indeed, results for nearly all 
markets show that agricultural futures prices during 2006-2011 were less susceptible to bubbles compared 
to 1971-1976 when financial index investors were not yet in existence.  Furthermore, bubble episodes 
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during 2006-2011 were generally short-lived and quite small in magnitude, which contradicts the claim 
that the “weight” of financial index investment overwhelmed normal supply and demand factors and 
caused massive and long-lived bubbles.  While our results indicate that food commodity futures markets 
are not perfectly efficient, the arrival of new market participants coupled with a dramatic increase of 
trading volumes and open interest, as well as the adoption of new trading technologies, have apparently 
increased market liquidity and resulted in improved responsiveness to information (see Irwin and Sanders 
(2012) for further discussion).  
Given the persistence of bubble phenomena in futures markets, it is clear that additional research 
is needed to identify the sources.  They may be caused by fads, herding behavior, feedback trading, or 
other noise traders that have long been a part of futures market.  Recent empirical evidence suggests that 
herding behavior exists in futures markets among hedge funds and floor market participants (e.g., Boyd et 
al. 2013).11  Related research might investigate, for example, the behavior of commercial, non-
commercial, and managed money traders, carefully analyzing their interactions during explosive periods 
to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the causes of bubbles in futures markets.  At another 
level, in explosive periods or markets, it may be particularly informative to combine an analysis of futures 
market activity and market fundamentals to identify their relative importance in explaining price behavior.  
Finally, given the frequent occurrence of negative bubbles, it is surprising that this pattern has received 
little public attention and has been largely ignored in the literature.  More understanding of the causes and 
factors influencing the negative bubble behavior is warranted.  While they account for 35% of the bubbles 
identified, their behavior is less systematic with limited corrections in terms of return to a random walk.  
This may suggest that negative bubbles are less affected by irrational behavior and more influenced by 
sudden and large negative shocks in the fundamentals.  This and other related issues await further 
research.  
                                                            
11 However, Boyd et al. (2013) find that moderate levels of herding by hedge funds serve to stabilize, rather than 
destabilize, prices in futures markets. 
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2.8 Tables and Figures 
 
Table 2.1 Number of Bubble Days based on SADF Test for Individual Agricultural Futures 
Contracts, 1970-2011 (𝒉 =3 days) 
Year Corn Soy SOil Wheat KWheat Cocoa Cotton Coffee Sugar FCatt LCatt LHog Sum 
1970-1990 
1970 
 
4 
 
      
 
3 
     
6 13 
1971 
 
11 11       3 3 7 
 
7 
 
7 
 
49 
1972 
   
7 4 
 
21 
 
3 
 
18 
 
53 
1973 9 4 9 6 4 43 15 
  
22 42 6 160 
1974 10 17 11 4 3 3 3 9 40 7 6 9 122 
1975 7 4 3 8 4 17 
 
10 
   
18 71 
1976 
 
28 
 
      
  
24 11 
 
14 
  
77 
1977 22 3 4 3 
 
4 
 
29 
 
5 6 
 
76 
1978 
 
4 3       
   
17 27 14 4 4 73 
1979 11 6 
 
3 6 
  
12 
 
6 3 5 52 
1980 6 20 21 3 3 3 
 
3 15 9 11 
 
94 
1981 
   
6 6 4 18 5 12 
 
5 5 61 
1982 5 
  
      3 5 
 
3 
   
8 24 
1983 
 
5 31 8 4 4 
 
14 11 
  
3 80 
1984 
 
3 4       
   
9 10 4 
 
15 45 
1985 11 5 
 
3 9 
 
4 31 6 4 6 5 84 
1986 
  
17       
  
12 17 5 
  
4 55 
1987 
 
16 3       3 
 
3 
   
4 10 39 
1988 16 19 9       
   
9 6 
 
7 
 
66 
1989 
 
4 
 
3 4 
 
9 9 
 
3 
  
32 
1990 
  
3       
 
4 10 
    
4 21 
Sum 97 153 129 54 56 93 126 188 142 88 119 102 1347 
 
(1.8) (2.9) (2.4) (1.0) (1.1) (1.8) (2.4) (4.2) (2.7) (1.8) (2.3) (1.9) (2.2) 
1991-2011 
1991 
 
3 
 
      
 
6 3 5 
  
11 
 
28 
1992 
  
3 25 24 
 
3 10 4 18 8 5 100 
1993 
   
8 11 
   
11 10 
  
40 
1994 
   
12 14 
 
13 32 3 11 5 11 101 
1995 
   
4 3 
 
8 3 7 
   
25 
1996 18 12 3 10 18 
 
6 9 
 
6 16 11 109 
1997 3 
 
12       
   
8 5 18 14 3 63 
1998 
  
8       6 
     
12 3 29 
1999 4 12 
 
      12 6 3 
 
16 3 
 
12 68 
2000 34 13 4 5 7 
 
7 
 
14 
 
10 3 97 
2001 
 
3 3       5 
 
8 
  
6 7 3 35 
2002 
   
5 5 9 
     
6 25 
2003 4 10 4       
 
4 11 4 14 8 12 3 74 
2004 6 3 7       
  
15 
 
11 3 
  
45 
2005 4 4 3       
   
2 15 4 4 
 
36 
2006 12 6 
 
      
 
14 
 
6 22 4 6 
 
70 
2007 17 13 
 
      6 4 12 3 6 7 
 
16 84 
2008 16 26 25 10 19 36 4 23 15 4 
  
178 
2009 4 7 
 
      
  
10 
 
5 
  
9 35 
2010 
  
6 3 3 8 22 3 14 7 5 
 
71 
2011 
 
9 5       3 
  
7 
   
10 34 
Sum 122 121 83 82 136 87 125 115 162 109 110 95 1347 
  (2.3) (2.3) (1.6) (1.5) (2.6) (1.7) (2.4) (2.2) (3.1) (2.1) (2.1) (1.8) (2.1) 
Total 219 274 212 136 192 180 251 303 304 197 229 197 2694 
  (2.1) (2.6) (2.0) (1.3) (1.8) (1.7) (2.4) (3.1) (2.9) (2.0) (2.2) (1.9) (2.1) 
Notes: Each explosive episode must last at least 3 days to be considered a bubble. Each cell represents the total number of days with bubbles for a 
given commodity during a given year. Numbers in parentheses are the percentages of days with bubbles during each sample period.  Days less 
than 3 occur due to bubbles originated at the end of the first year and continues into the following year. 
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Table 2.2 Number of Bubble Days based on SADF Test for Individual Agricultural Futures 
Contracts, 1970-2011 (𝒉 =5 days) 
Year Corn Soy SOil Wheat KWheat Cocoa Cotton Coffee Sugar FCatt LCatt LHog Sum 
  
1970 
   
      
       
6 6 
1971 
 
11 
 
      
  
7 
   
7 
 
25 
1972 
   
7 
  
11 
   
7 
 
25 
1973 9 
 
9 6 
 
39 15 
  
19 42 6 145 
1974 7 14 11       
   
6 37 
  
5 80 
1975 
   
      
 
14 
 
10 
   
14 38 
1976 
 
28 
 
      
  
21 
  
11 
  
60 
1977 22 
  
      
   
26 
 
5 6 
 
59 
1978 
   
      
   
7 19 7 
  
33 
1979 5 6 
 
      6 
  
12 
 
6 
 
5 40 
1980 
 
20 21       
    
8 9 7 
 
65 
1981 
   
      
  
15 5 5 
 
5 5 35 
1982 5 
  
      
 
5 
     
8 18 
1983 
 
5 31 5 
   
11 11 
   
63 
1984 
   
      
   
5 10 
  
12 27 
1985 11 5 
 
      9 
  
28 3 
  
5 61 
1986 
  
14       
  
9 14 5 
   
42 
1987 
 
13 
 
      
       
7 20 
1988 13 9 6       
   
5 6 
 
7 
 
46 
1989 
   
      
  
9 6 
    
15 
1990 
   
      
  
10 
     
10 
Sum 72 111 92 18 15 58 97 135 104 57 81 73 913 
 
(1.4) (2.1) (1.7) (0.3) (0.3) (1.1) (1.8) (3.0) (2.0) (1.2) (1.5) (1.4) (1.5) 
  
1991 
   
      
   
5 
  
11 
 
16 
1992 
   
25 21 
  
6 
 
18 5 5 80 
1993 
   
8 8 
   
8 10 
  
34 
1994 
   
12 11 
 
5 25 
 
11 5 8 77 
1995 
   
      
  
8 
     
8 
1996 15 
  
      11 
 
6 6 
 
6 10 8 62 
1997 
  
5       
   
5 5 18 14 
 
47 
1998 
   
      6 
     
12 
 
18 
1999 
 
9 
 
      5 
   
13 
  
8 35 
2000 28 10 
 
5 7 
   
14 
 
6 
 
70 
2001 
   
      5 
 
8 
   
7 
 
20 
2002 
   
5 5 5 
      
15 
2003 
 
10 
 
      
  
11 
 
10 8 8 
 
47 
2004 
   
      
  
15 
 
8 
   
23 
2005 
   
      
   
2 15 
   
17 
2006 4 6 
 
      
 
14 
 
6 15 
   
45 
2007 13 13 
 
      
  
12 
 
6 
  
12 56 
2008 16 22 15 10 15 32 
 
16 15 
   
141 
2009 
 
3 
 
      
  
7 
 
5 
  
5 20 
2010 
  
6       
 
5 11 
 
14 
 
5 
 
41 
2011 
 
6 5       
   
7 
   
10 28 
Sum 76 79 31 65 94 56 83 78 128 71 83 56 900 
  (1.4) (1.5) (0.6) (1.2) (1.8) (1.1) (1.6) (1.5) (2.4) (1.3) (1.6) (1.1) (1.4) 
Total 148 190 123 83 109 114 180 213 232 128 164 129 1813 
  (1.4) (1.8) (1.2) (0.8) (1.0) (1.1) (1.7) (2.2) (2.2) (1.3) (1.6) (1.2) (1.4) 
Notes: Each explosive episode must last at least 5 days to be considered a bubble. Each cell represents the total number of days with bubbles for a 
given commodity during a given year. Numbers in parentheses are the percentages of days with bubbles during each sample period.  Days less 
than 5 occur due to bubbles originated at the end of the first year and continues into the following year. 
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Table 2.3 Length of Bubbles for Individual Agricultural Futures Contracts, 1970-2011 
 
𝒉 = 𝟑 days 
 
𝒉 = 𝟓 days 
Commodity N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Skewness   N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Skewness 
 
1970-1990 
Corn 16 6 4 3 17 1.38 
 
8 9 4 5 17 0.68 
Soy 27 6 3 3 14 1.63 
 
15 7 3 5 14 1.36 
SOil 21 6 4 3 22 2.31 
 
10 9 5 5 22 2.00 
Wheat 15 4 1 3 7 1.48 
 
3 6 1 5 7 0.00 
KWheat 14 4 2 3 9 2.18 
 
2 8 2 6 9 0.00 
Cocoa 15 6 6 3 22 2.06 
 
5 12 7 5 22 0.54 
Cotton 21 6 3 3 15 1.07 
 
12 8 3 5 15 0.74 
Coffee 32 6 5 3 29 3.26 
 
16 8 7 5 29 2.33 
Sugar 22 6 6 3 30 3.12 
 
11 9 7 5 30 2.28 
FCatt 17 5 3 3 14 2.01 
 
8 7 3 5 14 1.55 
LCatt 21 6 4 3 21 2.87 
 
10 8 5 5 21 2.27 
LHog 19 5 3 3 14 2.20 
 
11 7 3 5 14 2.12 
All 240 6 4 3 30 3.10 
 
111 8 5 5 30 2.49 
Jarque-Bera p 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
1991-2011 
Corn 22 6 4 3 17 2.09 
 
9 8 5 5 17 0.88 
Soy 22 6 4 3 18 1.97 
 
9 9 4 6 18 1.61 
Soil 20 4 1 3 9 1.87 
 
5 6 2 5 9 1.16 
Wheat 14 6 3 3 13 1.18 
 
9 7 3 5 13 0.98 
Kwheat 23 6 5 3 21 2.13 
 
10 9 6 5 21 1.11 
Cocoa 17 5 3 3 13 1.77 
 
8 7 3 5 13 1.30 
Cotton 23 5 2 3 11 0.91 
 
11 8 2 5 11 0.75 
Coffee 21 5 3 3 17 2.11 
 
10 8 4 5 17 1.65 
Sugar 27 6 3 3 15 1.19 
 
17 8 3 5 15 1.30 
Fcatt 19 6 4 3 18 1.94 
 
8 9 5 5 18 1.04 
Lcatt 19 6 3 3 14 1.28 
 
11 8 3 5 14 1.01 
Lhog 20 5 2 3 12 1.60 
 
8 7 3 5 12 0.93 
All 247 5 3 3 21 2.13 
 
115 8 4 5 21 1.67 
Jarque-Bera p 0.000   0.000 
Notes:  Each explosive episode must last at least 3 or 5 days to be considered a bubble. Descriptive statistics are based on the 
length of bubbles. The Jarque-Bera test is performed to check whether the length of bubbles during each sub-period is normally 
distributed when pooled across all markets. The total number of days with bubbles implied from this table may not equal the 
numbers shown in tables 2 and 3 due to rounding. 
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Table 2.4 Percentage Price Change (Returns) for Individual Agricultural Futures Contracts in 
Bubble Periods (𝒉 =3 days), 1970-2011 
 
Positive Bubble 
 
Negative Bubble 
Commodity N 
Avg. 
Length 
Avg. % 
Change Start 
to Peak 
Avg. % 
Change 
Peak to End 
 
N 
Avg. 
Length 
Avg. %  
Change Start to 
Trough 
Avg. % 
Change 
Trough to End 
 
1970-1990 
Corn 8 6 7.8 -1.6 
 
8 6 -3.9 0.5 
Soy 22 6 5.8 -0.8 
 
5 5 -3.2 0.5 
SOil 15 7 7.6 -1.6 
 
6 5 -4.1 0.5 
Wheat 7 4 6.5 0.0 
 
8 4 -2.0 0.4 
KWheat 6 4 6.0 -0.5 
 
8 4 -2.4 0.2 
Cocoa 8 8 10.1 -2.2 
 
7 4 -3.3 0.6 
Cotton 12 7 5.6 -0.8 
 
9 5 -1.7 0.4 
Coffee 22 7 7.4 -0.4 
 
10 5 -4.2 0.4 
Sugar 12 7 16.2 -0.7 
 
10 6 -5.6 1.2 
FCat 8 6 4.1 -0.6 
 
9 4 -5.1 0.1 
LCat 13 7 3.5 -0.4 
 
8 4 -4.6 0.0 
Hogs 10 6 4.1 -0.3 
 
9 4 -4.4 0.5 
All 143 6 7.1 -0.8 
 
97 5 -3.8 0.4 
   (0.00) (0.00)    (0.00) (0.00) 
 
1991-2011 
Corn 12 5 3.3 -0.3 
 
10 6 -2.7 0.2 
Soy 14 6 4.3 -0.5 
 
8 4 -1.9 0.2 
SOil 8 5 3.6 -0.2 
 
12 4 -2.3 0.4 
Wheat 10 6 3.8 -0.3 
 
4 6 -2.7 0.0 
KWheat 11 7 4.1 -0.3 
 
12 5 -2.9 0.2 
Cocoa 13 5 4.6 -0.3 
 
4 4 -2.2 0.2 
Cotton 14 6 4.0 -1.2 
 
9 5 -4.1 0.6 
Coffee 16 6 8.1 -1.3 
 
5 4 -1.7 0.3 
Sugar 20 7 7.0 -0.4 
 
7 5 -6.1 0.2 
FCatt 13 6 2.2 -0.2 
 
6 4 -2.0 0.1 
LCatt 10 6 1.8 -0.4 
 
9 5 -1.8 0.4 
LHog 9 5 1.9 -0.1 
 
11 5 -3.7 0.4 
All 150 6 4.4 -0.5 
 
97 5 -2.9 0.3 
   (0.00) (0.00)    (0.00) (0.00) 
Differences between 1970-1990 and 1991-2011 
 7 0 -2.7 0.3  0 0 0.9 -0.1 
  (0.46) (0.00) (0.08)   (0.81) (0.04) (0.12) 
Notes: Each explosive episode must last at least 3 days to be considered as a bubble. Bubbles are positive when the average price 
during explosive periods is higher than the price at bubble origination dates, and negative when the opposite is true.  Average 
lengths and percentage price changes are presented in the table. N refers to the number of bubble periods.  Numbers in 
parentheses are p-values for the test that the mean or difference equals zero. 
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Table 2.5 Percentage Price Change (Returns) for Individual Agricultural Futures Contracts during 
Bubble Periods (𝒉 =5 days), 1970-2011 
  Positive Bubble 
 
Negative Bubble 
Commodity N 
Avg. 
Length 
Avg. % 
Change Start 
to Peak 
Avg. % 
Change 
Peak to End 
 
N 
Avg. 
Length 
Avg. %  
Change Start to 
Trough 
Avg. %  
Change Trough  
to End 
 
1970-1990 
Corn 4 9 13.7 -3.1 
 
4 10 -4.6 0.8 
Soy 12 8 8.6 -1.4 
 
3 7 -3.2 0.6 
Soil 7 10 14.0 -3.0 
 
3 7 -5.7 0.8 
Wheat 2 7 10.9 0.0 
 
1 5 -0.5 0.3 
KWheat 1 6 6.1 -2.0 
 
1 9 -3.5 0.4 
Cocoa 3 15 18.9 -4.5 
 
2 6 -4.0 0.3 
Cotton 8 8 7.2 -1.1 
 
4 8 -2.3 0.4 
Coffee 11 10 11.8 -0.4 
 
5 6 -5.1 0.7 
Sugar 6 11 26.2 -1.5 
 
5 7 -8.1 2.1 
FCatt 5 8 5.5 -0.9 
 
3 6 -7.5 0.0 
LCatt 7 9 5.3 -0.6 
 
3 6 -5.8 0.0 
Hogs 6 8 4.3 -0.5 
 
5 5 -7.1 0.2 
All 72 9 10.8 -1.4 
 
39 7 -5.3 0.7 
   (0.00) (0.00)    (0.00) (0.00) 
 
1991-2011 
Corn 5 8 5.2 -0.1 
 
4 10 -3.8 0.5 
Soy 7 9 6.5 -1.0 
 
2 8 -3.8 0.1 
SOil 3 7 7.2 -0.2 
 
2 5 -2.7 0.6 
Wheat 7 7 3.2 -0.3 
 
2 9 -4.3 0.1 
KWheat 4 13 5.8 -0.2 
 
6 7 -4.0 0.2 
Cocoa 7 7 5.4 -0.4 
 
1 7 -6.4 0.5 
Cotton 7 8 5.6 -1.6 
 
4 7 -4.8 1.2 
Coffee 8 8 13.4 -2.2 
 
2 6 -1.9 0.6 
Sugar 14 8 8.4 -0.5 
 
3 6 -10.4 0.0 
FCatt 6 10 3.5 -0.5 
 
2 6 -3.5 0.2 
LCatt 5 9 2.7 -0.7 
 
6 7 -2.0 0.5 
LHog 5 6 2.0 -0.2 
 
3 8 -5.1 0.6 
All 78 8 6.2 -0.7 
 
37 7 -4.2 0.5 
   (0.00) (0.00)    (0.00) (0.00) 
Differences between 1970-1990 and 1991-2011 
 
6 -1 -4.5 0.7 
 
-2 0 1.1 -0.2 
  
 
(0.28) (0.00) (0.02) 
  
(0.6) (0.15) (0.23) 
Notes: Each explosive episode must last at least 5 days to be considered as a bubble. Bubbles are positive when the average price 
during explosive periods is higher than the price at bubble origination dates, and negative when the opposite is true.  Average 
lengths and percentage price changes are presented in the table. N refers to the number of bubble periods. Numbers in 
parentheses are p-values for the test that the mean or difference equals zero. Differences may not match due to rounding. 
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Table 2.6 Percentage Price Change (Returns) for Individual Agricultural Futures Contracts during 
Bubble Periods (𝒉 =3 days), 1971-1976 and 2006-2011 
 
Positive Bubble 
 
Negative Bubble 
Commodity N 
Avg.  
Length 
Avg. % 
Change Start 
to Peak 
Avg. % 
Change Peak 
to End 
 
N 
Avg. 
Length 
Avg. %  
Change Start to 
Trough 
Avg. %  
Change Trough 
to End 
 
1971-1976 
Corn 3 6 9.0 -2.4 
 
2 4 -4.0 0.0 
Soy 8 8 9.1 -1.6 
 
1 4 -5.3 0.0 
Soil 5 6 8.8 -1.7 
 
1 3 -4.5 0.5 
Wheat 3 6 11.1 0.0 
 
2 4 -3.1 1.2 
KWheat 3 4 8.2 0.0 
 
2 4 -2.3 0.7 
Cocoa 6 9 12.0 -2.6 
 
2 5 -3.7 1.0 
Cotton 8 7 7.2 -1.1 
 
3 4 -1.5 0.3 
Coffee 4 4 7.5 -0.4 
 
3 4 -5.3 0.0 
Sugar 6 8 20.2 -1.5 
     
FCatt 4 7 5.5 -1.1 
 
4 4 -6.3 0.0 
LCatt 8 8 4.9 -0.5 
 
3 4 -7.3 0.0 
Hogs 3 8 5.9 -0.6 
 
2 5 -9.4 1.5 
All 61 7 9.2 -1.2 
 
25 4 -4.9 0.4 
   (0.00) (0.00)    (0.00) (0.01) 
 
2006-2011 
Corn 7 6 4.3 -0.5 
 
1 4 -6.7 0.0 
Soy 7 7 5.3 -0.8 
 
2 5 -1.9 0.1 
SOil 4 6 5.6 -0.2 
 
3 4 -4.0 0.8 
Wheat 1 3 7.0 0.0 
 
1 10 -7.2 0.0 
KWheat 4 3 3.7 -0.2 
 
3 6 -5.1 0.5 
Cocoa 8 7 5.0 -0.4 
 
2 5 -3.3 0.4 
Cotton 6 6 5.9 -2.8 
 
3 4 -3.9 0.5 
Coffee 6 5 3.4 -0.6 
 
1 4 -0.3 0.4 
Sugar 7 8 10.2 -0.8 
 
2 4 -1.5 0.3 
FCatt 4 4 0.9 0.0 
 
2 4 -1.7 0.1 
LCatt 1 5 1.4 -0.3 
 
2 3 -1.3 0.2 
LHog 2 5 1.7 -0.1 
 
4 6 -4.0 0.3 
All 57 6 5.0 -0.7 
 
26 5 -3.4 0.3 
   (0.00) (0.00)    (0.00) (0.00) 
Differences between 1971-1976 and 2006-2011 
 
-4 -1 -4.1 0.5 
 
1 1 1.5 -0.1 
  
(0.18) (0.01) (0.10) 
  
(0.12) (0.09) (0.71) 
Notes: Each explosive episode must last at least 3 days to be considered as a bubble. Bubbles are positive when the average price 
during explosive periods is higher than the price at bubble origination dates, and negative when the opposite is true.  Average 
lengths and percentage price changes are presented in the table. N refers to the number of bubble periods.  Numbers in 
parentheses are p-values for the test that the mean or difference equals zero. Differences may not match due to rounding. 
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Table 2.7 Percentage Price Change (Returns) for Individual Agricultural Futures Contracts during 
Bubble Periods (𝒉 = 𝟓 days), 1971-1976 versus 2006-2011 
 
Positive Bubble 
 
Negative Bubble 
Commodity N 
Avg.  
Length 
Avg. %  
Change Start  
to Peak 
Avg. % 
Change Peak 
to End 
 
N 
Avg.  
Length 
Avg. %  
Change Start  
to Trough 
Avg. % 
Change 
Trough to End 
 
1971-1976 
Corn 2 8 11.8 -3.4 
     
Soy 6 9 10.1 -2.1 
     
SOil 2 10 18.1 -3.7 
     
Wheat 2 7 10.9 0.0 
     
KWheat 
         
Cocoa 3 15 18.9 -4.5 
 
1 7 -4.6 0.5 
Cotton 5 10 10.0 -1.7 
 
1 6 -1.7 0.2 
Coffee 2 5 12.4 -0.3 
 
1 6 -6.3 0.0 
Sugar 2 19 49.3 -4.5 
     
FCatt 3 8 7.3 -1.5 
 
1 5 -7.4 0.0 
LCatt 5 10 6.7 -0.8 
 
1 6 -11.7 0.0 
Hogs 2 10 7.5 -0.9 
 
1 5 -15.9 0.0 
All 34 10 13.0 -2.0 
 
6 6 -7.9 0.1 
   (0.00) (0.00)    (0.01) (0.24) 
 
2006-2011 
Corn 4 8 6.1 -0.1 
     
Soy 5 9 6.1 -1.1 
 
1 6 -1.8 0.0 
SOil 3 7 7.2 -0.2 
 
1 5 -2.4 0.3 
Wheat 
     
1 10 -7.2 0.0 
KWheat 
     
2 8 -5.5 0.7 
Cocoa 6 7 5.4 -0.5 
 
1 7 -6.4 0.5 
Cotton 3 8 7.8 -3.6 
 
1 6 -3.7 0.7 
Coffee 3 8 4.9 -1.0 
     
Sugar 7 8 10.2 -0.8 
     
FCatt 
         
LCatt 1 5 1.4 -0.3 
     
LHog 2 5 1.7 -0.1 
 
2 9 -6.3 0.3 
All 34 8 6.6 -0.9 
 
9 7 -5.0 0.4 
   (0.00) (0.00)    (0.00) (0.04) 
Differences between 1971-1976 and 2006-2011 
 
0 -2 -6.4 1.2 
 
3 2 2.9 0.3 
  
 
(0.05) (0.01) (0.02) 
  
(0.20) (0.15) (0.20) 
Notes: Each explosive episode must last at least 5 days to be considered as a bubble. Bubbles are positive when the average price 
during explosive periods is higher than the price at bubble origination dates, and negative when the opposite is true.  Average 
lengths and percentage price changes are presented in the table. N refers to the number of bubble periods. Numbers in 
parentheses are p-values for the test that the mean or difference equals zero. Differences may not match due to rounding. 
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Figure 2.1 SADF Date-Stamping Results for Selected Individual Agricultural Futures Contracts 
(𝒉 =3 days) 
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Figure 2.2 Percentage of Days with Bubbles Across All Agricultural Futures Contracts by Year, 1970-2011
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Figure 2.3 Frequency Distributions of Bubble Length for Individual Agricultural Futures 
Contracts, 1970-2011 
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Figure 2.4 SADF Statistic, Regression Coefficients, and Explosive Periods for the December 1973 
Corn Futures Contract (𝒉 =3 days) 
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Figure 2.5 Selected Estimated Autoregression Coefficients during Bubble Episodes for Individual 
Agricultural Futures Contracts (𝒉 =3 days) 
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Figure 2.6 Percentage Price Change (Returns) during Bubble Episodes for Individual Agricultural 
Futures Contracts, 1971-2011 (𝒉 =3 days) 
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Figure 2.7 Percentage Price Change (Returns) during Bubble Episodes for Individual Agricultural 
Futures Contracts, 1971-2011 (𝒉 =5 days) 
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Figure 2.8 Length of Bubbles and Cumulative Returns during Bubble Episodes for Individual 
Agricultural Futures Contracts, 1971-2011 (𝒉 =3 days) 
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(d) Negative Bubbles during 1991-2011
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Figure 2.9 Length of Bubbles and Cumulative Returns during Bubble Episodes for Individual 
Agricultural Futures Contracts, 1971-2011 (𝒉 =5 days) 
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CHAPTER 3 
BUBBLES, INDEX TRADERS, AND GRAIN FUTURES PRICES  
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Commodity prices increased rapidly after 2006, punctuated by large price spikes in 2007-2008 and again 
in 2010-2011.  Given the magnitude of these increases, the consequences can be devastating to consumers 
in less-developed countries.  The World Bank (WB 2008) estimates that the cost in 2008 associated with 
high food and fuel prices to consumers in developing countries was about $680 billion, pushing over 130 
million people into extreme poverty and increasing by 44 percent the number of children suffering 
permanent cognitive and physical injury due to malnutrition.  Other studies indicate that food commodity 
price increases led to a significant deterioration of democratic institutions and increased political unrest, 
particularly in low-income countries (Arezki and Bruckner 2011, Bellemare 2011). 
Effective policy responses to the rising and volatile commodity prices require a careful 
assessment of the underlying causes.  Much attention has been directed towards the trading activities of a 
new type of participant in commodity futures markets—financial index investors.  Hedge fund manager 
Michael W.  Masters has played a leading role in raising the concerns, testifying numerous times (e.g., 
Masters 2008, 2009) before the U.S. Congress and Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) that 
unprecedented buying pressure from index investment created a series of massive bubbles in commodity 
futures prices.  These bubbles were then transmitted to spot prices through arbitrage linkages between 
futures and spot prices, with an end result that commodity prices far exceeded fundamental values.  Irwin 
and Sanders (2012b) use the term “Masters Hypothesis” as a short-hand label for this argument.  Several 
prominent international development organizations (e.g., Robles, Torero, and von Braun 2009, de 
Schutter 2010, Herman, Kelly, and Nash 2011) have expressed strong support for the Masters Hypothesis.  
For example, Joachim von Braun, director of Germany’s Center for Development Research, stated, “We 
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have good analysis that speculation played a role in 2007 and 2008… Speculation did matter and it did 
amplify, that debate can be put to rest.  These spikes are not a nuisance, they kill.  They’ve killed 
thousands of people.”1  
Whether financial index investment created a bubble in the commodity markets during the price 
spikes of 2007-2008 and 2010-2011 is ultimately an empirical question.  To date, most research has 
focused on statistical linkages between price movements and index investment activities in commodity 
futures markets, using either time-series regression tests, such as Granger causality tests (e.g., Gilbert 
2010a, b, Stoll and Whaley 2010, Brunetti, Buyuksahin, and Harris 2011, Büyüksahin and Harris 2011, 
Sanders and Irwin 2011a, b, Capelle-Blancard and Coulibaly 2011, Hamilton and Wu 2013), cross-
sectional regression tests (Sanders and Irwin 2010, Irwin and Sanders 2012b), or conditional correlation 
tests (e.g., Tang and Xiong 2012, Büyükşahin and Robe 2013).  In general, only limited evidence of a 
causal linkage from index positions to price changes has been established in various agricultural, energy, 
and metals futures markets.2  
While most of the existing evidence does not support the conjecture that index investment was a 
primary driver of recent commodity price spikes, the available evidence is nonetheless limited in two 
important dimensions.  The first limitation is that the measurement of the market impact of index 
investment has not allowed for a differential impact during price spikes, potentially masking the effects in 
periods when arguably they are most likely to be the largest.  One exception is the study by von Braun 
and Torero (2009), who conducted Granger causality tests based on a 30-month rolling window and found 
statistical significance during 2006-2008 but not before or after.  These authors concluded, “(t)he overall 
evidence points to the following interpretation: before and after the food crisis, speculation activity had 
no effect on spot prices formation while during the crisis it did.  This is not to say that before and after the 
crisis speculation was not present, it was (probably to a less extent) but did not Granger cause spot prices” 
                                                             
1 As quoted in: Ruitenberg, R. “Global Food Reserve Needed to Stabilize Prices, Researchers Say.” Bloomberg.com. 
March 29, 2010. http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=au9X.0u6VpF0. 
2 Irwin and Sanders (2011) and Fattouh, Kilian, and Mahadeva (2013) provide surveys of this rapidly expanding 
literature. 
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(von Braun and Torero 2009, 9).  Singleton (2011) shows that learning about economic fundamentals 
with heterogeneous information may induce excessive price volatility and drift in commodity prices away 
from fundamental values, a tendency that may be exacerbated when supply and demand conditions are 
exceptionally “tight.” So, it is theoretically plausible that index investment had a notable market impact 
during price spikes but not before or after. 
 The second limitation in previous studies is that a rigorous procedure is not used to precisely 
define when price spikes start and end.  Some studies only refer to a broad increase in commodity prices.  
Other studies rely on ad hoc definitions of spikes that may easily miss the periods of most concern.  It is 
not uncommon for researchers to investigate behavior for different “abnormal” periods.  For instance, 
Robles, Torero, and von Braun (2009) and von Braun and Torero (2009) considered 2006-2008 to be the 
food crisis period.  In contrast, the same episode is considered the pre-crisis period in Capelle-Blancard 
and Coulibaly (2011).  Given that nominal and deflated cash prices for almost all commodities are 
characterized by occasional violent booms and busts due to supply and demand shocks (Wright and 
Williams 1991), this imprecision may produce empirical results that mislead and misinform policymakers.  
There is a clear need for a rigorous definition and accurate delineation of price spikes before complete 
conclusions can be drawn about the role of index investment in commodity futures markets.   
Recent work on mildly explosive autoregressive processes provides methods for addressing the 
aforementioned concerns.  If a price series’ normal behavior may be described as a random walk, an 
abnormal (spike) period can be defined as an episode where the price series demonstrates an explosive 
root (autoregressive root greater than unity).  The question then boils down to distinguishing explosive 
and non-explosive periods, i.e., finding structural time-series breaks in a price series.  Although no 
general asymptotic inference can be established for purely explosive autoregressive processes (White 
1958, Anderson 1959) as the central limit theory does not apply, Phillips and Magdalinos (2007a, b) show 
that the asymptotic behavior of mildly explosive autoregressive processes is more regular and a least 
squares regression theory can be established to construct confidence intervals.  Using this framework, 
Phillips, Wu, and Yu (2011), Phillips and Yu (2011), and Phillips, Shi, and Yu (2012) provide several 
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recursive procedures to date-stamp the origination and termination of mildly explosive episodes.  Under 
certain assumptions, these explosive periods may be interpreted as bubbles; i.e., periods during which 
prices exceed fundamental values.3 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the market impact of financial index investment in grain 
futures markets during explosive and non-explosive periods of price behavior.4 We focus on grain futures 
markets because these markets have been at the forefront of concerns about the effect of index investment 
on food commodity prices.  The specific markets analyzed include corn, soybeans, and wheat traded at 
the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) and wheat traded at the Kansas City Board of Trade (KCBT).  The 
sample consists of daily individual futures contract prices, returns calculated from weekly nearby prices, 
and index positions for each market over January 2004-October 2012.  In the first part of the analysis the 
forward and backward recursive procedure developed by Phillips, Shi, and Yu (2012) is used to detect 
and date-stamp mildly explosive periods (or “bubbles”) in the four grain futures markets.  This test is 
more powerful than previously developed tests because it can detect the existence of multiple explosive 
periods and find origination and termination dates of each explosive period.  To account for potential 
small sample bias and conditional heteroskedasticity, inferences are derived from the recursive wild 
bootstrap procedure as discussed in Gonçalves and Kilian (2004).  In the second part of the analysis, 
Granger causality tests are used to investigate lead-lag dynamics between index trader positions and 
weekly returns (price changes) in the four grain futures markets.  We introduce a dummy variable into the 
Granger regressions and create interaction terms between this dummy variable and index positions.  This 
is the first study in the literature to examine the causal linkages from index investment to commodity 
                                                             
3 The PWY, PY, and PSY procedures are based on the assumption that when underlying fundamentals follow a 
random walk but observed prices are explosive, bubbles have played a role in the price movement. One must be 
careful argue that observed prices are explosive due to bubbles.  It is possible for price to be “explosive” but this is 
solely due to the nature of pricing dynamics other than bubbles (Bobenrieth, Bobenrieth, and Wright 2013).  The 
advantage of these regime switching testing procedures is therefore to identify periods that are abnormal, either due 
to explosive fundamentals or bubbles.  These are the periods mostly likely to experience bubbles.  In this essay, with 
careful specification of the data and assumptions, we argue that we can attribute explosive prices to bubbles. 
 
4 For brevity, we use the terms “explosive” and “mildly explosive” interchangeably throughout the remainder of the 
paper.  We also argue later that identified explosive periods may be interpreted as “bubbles” with careful data 
selection. 
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futures price changes while allowing for differential impacts during rigorously determined explosive and 
non-explosive market regimes.   
Following Capelle-Blancard and Coulibaly (2011), Sanders and Irwin (2011b), and Aulerich, 
Irwin, and Garcia (2013), seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) is used to estimate lead-lag dynamics.  
The SUR approach improves the power of statistical tests by taking into account the contemporaneous 
correlation of model residuals across markets and allows a test of the overall impact of index investment 
across markets.  We also examine whether the estimated lead-lag dynamics are sensitive to conditioning 
on the positions of other large commercial and non-commercial traders.  The multivariate analysis will be 
more powerful than bivariate analysis if the variation in returns is related to the dynamic interaction of 
multiple types of traders rather than index traders alone.  Overall, no differential behavior is identified and 
we find limited evidence that index investment was an important driver of price movements in grain 
futures markets in recent years, even during explosive price periods. 
 
3.2 Testing for Explosive Price Behavior 
Distinguishing explosive episodes from their non-explosive counterparts essentially involves determining 
when regime switching or structural breaks occur in a data series.  Though numerous methods have been 
developed to serve this purpose, the complexity of the nonlinear structure usually involved in the data 
generating process makes obtaining a robust measure of the timing of the transition difficult.  Previous 
methods only serve to confirm whether a known single break point has occurred (the Chow test) or to find 
only one unknown break point (e.g., the Zivot and Andrews (2002) structural break test).  Phillips, Wu, 
and Yu (2011, PWY hereafter), Phillips and Yu (2011, PY hereafter), and Phillips, Shi, and Yu (2012, 
PSY hereafter) recently proposed new testing procedures based on recursively calculated Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test statistics to detect the existence of one single “mildly” explosive period and 
find its origination and termination dates.  These procedures were motivated by the observation that the 
traditional unit root and cointegration-based tests proposed by Diba and Grossman (1988) may fail to 
detect the existence of bubbles when they are periodically collapsing, as demonstrated by Evans (1991). 
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The underlying assumption of the PSY procedure is that outside of explosive periods, the market 
price follows a random walk process.  When the price 𝑃𝑡 becomes explosive, the random walk 
assumption no longer holds.  For illustration purposes, assume there are two explosive sub-periods in 
commodity futures prices with the first one being 𝐵1 = [𝜏1𝑒 , 𝜏1𝑓] and the second 𝐵2 = [𝜏2𝑒 , 𝜏2𝑓] , where 
𝜏1𝑒, 𝜏1𝑓, 𝜏2𝑒, 𝜏2𝑓 are the origination and termination dates of each episode, respectively.  Such a data 
generating process can be represented as: 
(1) 𝑃𝑡 = 𝑃𝑡−11{𝑡 ∈ 𝑁0} + 𝛿𝑇𝑃𝑡−11{𝑡 ∈ 𝐵1 ∪ 𝐵2} + ( ∑ 𝜀𝑘 + 𝑃𝜏1𝑓
∗
𝑡
𝑘=𝜏1𝑓+1
) 1{𝑡 ∈ 𝑁1}    
 
     + ( ∑ 𝜀𝑘 + 𝑃𝜏2𝑓
∗
𝑡
𝑙=𝜏2𝑓+1
) 1{𝑡 ∈ 𝑁2} + 𝜀𝑡1{𝑡 ∈ 𝑁0 ∪ 𝐵1 ∪ 𝐵2},      
 
     𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇, 𝛿𝑇 = 1 + 𝑐/𝑇
𝛼 , c>0,  α∈(0,1), 
where 1{. } is the indicator function such that 1{. } = 1 when the conditions in the bracket hold and 0 
otherwise, 𝜀𝑘 is an iid normally distributed error term, and 𝑁0 = [1, 𝜏1𝑒), 𝑁1 = (𝜏1𝑓 , 𝜏2𝑒), and 𝑁2 =
(𝜏2𝑓 , 𝑇] are three non-explosive sub-periods.  For given values of 𝑐 and 𝛼, the parameter 𝛿𝑇, which equals 
1 + 𝑐/𝑇𝛼, is greater than one in finite samples and approaches one when the sample size 𝑇 approaches 
infinity.  This defines the mildly-integrated root as specified in Phillips and Magdalinos (2007a).  While 
no general asymptotic inference can be established for purely explosive autoregressive processes as the 
central limit theory does not apply (White 1958, Anderson 1959), the asymptotic behavior of mildly 
explosive processes is more regular and a least squares regression theory can be established to construct 
confidence intervals (Phillips and Magdalinos 2007a, b). 
Equation (1) implies that to measure the start and end dates of explosive price periods accurately, 
the testing procedure must first distinguish the explosive behavior of a price series at 𝜏1𝑒  and 𝜏2𝑒 from its 
non-explosive behavior at 𝜏1𝑒−1 and 𝜏2𝑒−1.  Similarly, at 𝜏1𝑓 and 𝜏2𝑓 the testing procedure must be 
capable of identifying the transition from an explosive path to a random walk.  To achieve this PSY use a 
generalized framework with variable window widths in the recursive regressions on which the test 
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procedures are based.  Defining the estimation start and end points as 𝑟1 and 𝑟2, respectively, their 
estimation equation becomes: 
(2) ∆𝑃𝑡 = 𝛼𝑟1,𝑟2 + 𝛽𝑟1,𝑟2𝑃𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑟1,𝑟2
𝑖 ∆𝑃𝑡−𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1
+ 𝜀𝑡 , 
where ∆𝑃𝑡 = 𝑃𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡−1, 𝑘 is the lag order, and 𝜀𝑡  ~𝑖𝑖𝑑 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑟1,𝑟2
2 ).  The ADF t-statistic corresponding to 
this equation is 𝐴𝐷𝐹𝑟1,𝑟2 =
𝛽𝑟1,𝑟2
𝑠𝑒(𝛽𝑟1,𝑟2)
.  The varying window size of the regression 𝑟𝑤 is a function of 𝑟1 and 
𝑟2 such that 𝑟𝑤 = 𝑟2 − 𝑟1 + 1.  Defining 𝑟𝑤0  as the minimum window size required to estimate equation 
(3) and a fixed ending point 𝑟2, the starting point 𝑟1 can vary between the first observation to observation 
𝑟2 − 𝑟𝑤0 + 1.  By varying the starting point 𝑟1 there are [𝑟2 − 𝑟𝑤0 + 1] ADF t-statistics for any fixed 
ending point 𝑟2.  Let 𝑆𝐴𝐷𝐹𝑟2  be the maximum of those [𝑟2 − 𝑟𝑤0 + 1] ADF t-statistics such that 
𝑆𝐴𝐷𝐹𝑟2 = 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑟1∈[1,𝑟2−𝑟𝑤0+1]
𝐴𝐷𝐹𝑟1,𝑟2 .
5  Now allow the ending point 𝑟2 to vary between 𝑟𝑤0 and 𝑇, the last 
data point included in the estimation; we then obtain [𝑇 − 𝑟𝑤0 + 1] 𝑆𝐴𝐷𝐹𝑟2  statistics from a backward-
expanding window.  These 𝑆𝐴𝐷𝐹𝑟2  test statistics are then compared to the critical values.  The estimated 
origination and end dates of the first explosive episode are specified by: 
(4) 𝑟1?̃? = 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑟2∈[𝑟𝑤0 ,𝑇]
{𝑟2: 𝑆𝐴𝐷𝐹𝑟2 > 𝑐𝑣𝑟2
𝜌 } and 
(5) 𝑟1?̃? = 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑟2∈[𝑟1?̃?+ℎ,𝑇]{𝑟2: 𝑆𝐴𝐷𝐹𝑟2 < 𝑐𝑣𝑟2
𝜌 }, 
where 𝑐𝑣𝑟2
𝜌
 is the 100𝜌 critical values of the backward-expanding SADF statistic based on 𝑟2 observations 
and h is the minimum defined length of the bubble episode.  In essence, the origination date is defined as 
the first date that the sup test statistics 𝑆𝐴𝐷𝐹𝑟2  exceeds the corresponding critical value, and it terminates 
as soon as it falls below the corresponding critical values.  The estimated origination and collapse dates of 
the second explosive episode can be defined in a similar way.  PSY obtained the asymptotic distribution 
                                                             
5 The SADF statistic here is based on a backward-expanding window, different from the SADF statistic in PWY 
(2011) and PY(2011) where a forward-expanding window is used. 
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of the backward-expanding SADF test statistic and proved that under a variety of scenarios the SADF test 
can consistently detect the start and end dates of explosive periods.6  One important advantage of the PSY 
testing procedure is that it allows testing the bubble origination and termination dates on a real-time basis, 
which may be of considerable value to policymakers who want to reduce price variability and explosive 
episodes. 
Earlier work by PWY and PY are also based on recursively calculated ADF statistics, however in 
the PWY, the starting point of each regression 𝑟1 is set to the first observation of the sample, and in PY 
the starting point is selected based on the BIC value.  Homm and Breitung (2012) show that in various 
simulations the PWY procedure performs satisfactorily against other recursive procedures and is 
particularly effective as a real-time detection algorithm for explosive market behavior.  Regardless, in 
either case, the regression only involves a forward recursive window given that 𝑟1 is the same for every 
test statistic.  While the PWY and PY procedures can consistently detect the origination and termination 
dates of the first bubble period (𝐵1 in equation (2)), it is not difficult to understand that these two 
procedures may be severely biased when estimating the timespans of the second bubble period 𝐵2, 
especially when 𝐵1is longer than 𝐵2.  Since PWY and PY procedures use a single starting point for the 
entire testing process, signals from the first explosive episode may be mixed with the second one.  Often 
the downward bias from the first explosive sub-period can contaminate the ability of successful detection 
of the following explosive period.  Extensive finite sample simulations reported in PSY and Phillips, Shi, 
and Yu (2013b, c) show that in the presence of multiple bubbles the PSY test has significantly improved 
discriminatory power compared to the earlier PWY test and the CUSUM test developed by Homm and 
Breitung (2012). 
                                                             
6 Specifically, the asymptotic distribution of 𝑆𝐴𝐷𝐹𝑟2 (based on a backward-expanding window) follows  
 𝐹𝑟2
𝑟0 = Sup
𝑟1∈[0,𝑟2−𝑟0]
{
1
2
𝑟𝑤[𝑊(𝑟2)
2−𝑊(𝑟1)
2−𝑟𝑤]−∫ 𝑊(𝑟)𝑑𝑟[𝑊(𝑟2)−𝑊(𝑟1)]
𝑟2
𝑟1
𝑟𝑤
1/2
{𝑟𝑤 ∫ 𝑊(𝑟)
2𝑑𝑟
𝑟2
𝑟1
−[∫ 𝑊(𝑟)𝑑𝑟]
𝑟2
𝑟1
2
}
1/2 }, where 𝑟𝑤 = 𝑟2 − 𝑟1  and W is a standard Wiener 
process. 
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Several studies have applied the PWY and PY procedures to various agricultural markets and find 
mixed results.  Gilbert (2010b) examines seven commodity futures markets and only finds explosive 
periods in copper and soybean prices.  In contrast, Gutierrez (2013) finds evidence of explosiveness in 
wheat, corn and rough rice prices in 2007–2008 but not in soybean prices.  Phillips and Yu (2011) find no 
explosive periods in deflated coffee, cotton, cocoa, sugar, and feeder cattle cash prices.  The first essay of 
this dissertation is the first application of the PSY procedure to agricultural futures prices.  The results 
indicated that explosive periods only represent a very small portion of the price behavior over the past 40 
years.  Even so, if the bubble periods contains large price movements then this would raise significant 
public policy concerns. 
 
3.2.1 Futures Price Data 
We consider daily futures prices of individual contracts when testing for bubbles.  As shown by 
Bobenrieth, Bobenrieth, and Wright (2013), explosive periods identified by previous work that relies on 
cash prices (Phillips and Yu 2011) or rolling nearby futures prices (Gilbert 2010b, Gutierrez 2013), may 
be driven by fundamental demand and supply factors rather than an explosive bubble component.  In 
contrast, futures prices derived from an individual contract should behave as a random walk under fairly 
general conditions.  Specifically, the futures price at time 𝑡 for a contract maturing at 𝑇 is the expected 
cash price of a certain commodity at time 𝑇 conditional on the information available at time 𝑡 (e.g., Fama 
and French 1987, Tomek 1997), or 𝐹𝑡
𝑇 = 𝐸𝑡(𝑃𝑇|𝐼𝑡), assuming rational expectations, no risk premium, and 
no basis risk.  Hence, prices from individual futures contracts will behave approximately as a sequence of 
expected cash prices at maturity and follow a random walk (Peterson and Tomek 2005).  Deviations from 
a random walk in the series of prices for individual futures contracts may thus provide a more reliable test 
of explosive components in agricultural futures prices.7  
                                                             
7 In the case when risk premiums exist, the futures prices need to be adjusted by a constant or time-varying term.  
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Corn, soybean, and wheat futures traded at the CBOT, as well as wheat futures traded at the 
KCBT are used in the analysis (hereafter we refer to KC wheat to distinguish it from CBOT wheat futures 
which is referred to as simply “wheat”).  For each commodity, we examine one contract each year, 
typically the contract with the highest trading volume, i.e., the December contract for corn, the November 
contract for soybeans, and the July contract for the two wheat futures series.  Given that trading for 
agricultural futures contracts often extends more than a year before expiration, the price data need to be 
aligned to avoid periods of potentially overlapping bubbles.  For instance, futures quotes on 6/1/2010 are 
available for both December 2010 and December 2011 corn contracts.  If both prices pass the PSY test 
then this date will be considered explosive in both price sequences.  To avoid this potential overlap, we let 
each price sequence start 13 months before the contract expiration date and end on the last trading day of 
the month before the contract expires.  These two rules result in 13-month sample period for each contract.  
For example, the sample for December 2011 corn contract includes observations from 11/1/2010 to 
11/30/2011 and the sample for the December 2010 corn contract starts on 11/1/2009 and ends on 
11/30/2010.  Since the first 20 observations are used as the initial start-up sample for the PSY procedure 
(𝑟𝑤0  in the testing procedure, or the minimum window size), bubbles in the December 2011 contract will 
fall within 12/1/2010 to 11/30/2011.  For the December 2010 contract, the feasible range of bubbles is 
from 12/1/2009 to 11/30/2010.  Constructing data in this way ensures that all non-overlapping bubble 
periods, if they exist, can be detected in the individual contract sequences.   
We use log daily prices and the testing periods runs from January 2004 to October 2012.  This 
results in eight contracts (or individual price sequences) for corn and soybeans, and nine contracts for the 
two wheat futures.8 The resulting sample includes sub-periods when commodity prices were low and 
stable (2004 to mid-2006), booming (mid-2006 to mid-2008), sharply dropping (mid-2008 to year end-
2008), and booming again (2009-2012). 
                                                             
8 Since July contracts are used for the two wheat futures, the testing period for the July 2012 contract is June 2011-
June 2012.  To obtain the testing results for July-October 2012, the July 2013 contract is required.  In addition, 
November 2012 is the final soybean contract in our sample, so bubble testing ends in October 2012. 
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 3.2.2 Inference and the Wild Bootstrap Procedure 
Several inference issues can emerge when using individual daily futures prices for bubble tests.  First, an 
important characteristic of futures prices for an individual contract is that price variance increases as 
contract maturity approaches (Samuelson 1965).  This hypothesis has been widely-tested empirically, and 
in general, studies have agreed that the “time-to-maturity” effect does exist (e.g., Anderson 1985).  
Second, prices and price variability for annual crops are affected by the seasonality of underlying markets.  
This implies that, holding other factors constant, prices should be more volatile in the growing season as 
more information about expected yield arrives in this period (Tomek and Peterson 2001).  Fortunately, the 
PSY testing approach is likely to account for these situations, as the forward and backward recursive 
procedure ensures that for different regressions, the error terms are allowed to have different variances.9  
Finally, the PSY procedure calls for a well-defined sequence of critical values for the backward 
SADF test statistic when date-stamping bubbles.  PSY derived the asymptotic distribution of the SADF 
test statistic and obtained finite sample critical values via Monte Carlo simulation under the null of no 
bubbles.  To account for potential small sample sizes, Gutierrez (2013) uses a residual-based 
bootstrapping procedure to draw inferences from the empirical distribution of the test statistic when 
applying the PWY procedure.  The main reason for using a bootstrap inference is that hypothesis tests 
based on asymptotic theory may often seriously over-reject or under-reject when the sample size is small 
(MacKinnon 2002).  However, inference based on standard residual-based bootstrap for dynamic 
regression models is invalid if regression errors in equation (3) are not independent or identically 
distributed.  Since agricultural futures price data often exhibit conditional heteroskedasticity at daily and 
weekly frequencies (e.g., Taylor 1986, Yang and Brorsen 1994, Leuthold, Garcia, and Lu 1994), the 
bubble testing procedure based on a standard residual bootstrap or finite sample simulated critical values 
is likely inaccurate. 
                                                             
9 In addition, we do not include prices from the last trading month, which tend to present large price variabilities. 
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To account for conditional heteroskedasticity in the bubble tests, we use the wild bootstrap 
procedure of Gonçalves and Kilian (2004) when applying the PSY procedure.  Gonçalves and Kilian 
(2004) demonstrate the first-order asymptotic validity of the recursive wild bootstrap procedure for finite-
order autoregressions with possible conditionally heteroskedastic errors.  Specifically, we use the 
recursive wild bootstrap method to derive an empirical distribution of the backward SADF test statistic as 
follows: 
1. For each data sequence, we first estimate an autoregressive model under the null hypothesis 
of no bubble as in equation (3), where 𝛽𝑟1,𝑟2 = 0.  Denote the resulting residuals as 𝜀?̂?  and the 
estimated autoregressive coefficients as 𝛾𝑟1,𝑟2
𝑖 .   
2. Generate wild bootstrap residuals 𝜀?̂?
∗ such that 𝜀?̂?
∗ = 𝜀?̂?𝜂𝑡  , where 𝜂𝑡  is an i.i.d.  sequence with 
zero mean and unit variance.  Here we let 𝜂𝑡~ N(0,1).
10 
3. Generate recursive bootstrap samples 𝑃𝑡
∗ from 𝑃𝑡
∗ = 𝑃𝑡−1
∗ + ∑ 𝛾𝑟1,𝑟2
𝑖 ∆𝑃𝑡−1
∗𝑘
𝑖=1 + 𝜀?̂?
∗ for 𝑡 =
1,2, … . 𝑇.  We then calculate the backward SADF values on the bootstrap sample using 
equation (3) for every ending point given some minimum window size.  The White 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error is used while computing the ADF t-statistic. 
4. Repeat steps 1 to 3 many times, and obtain the bootstrap distribution of the backward SADF 
test statistic.  The number of bootstrap draws is set to 2,000.   
In essence, the wild bootstrap sample mimics the pattern of conditional heteroskedasticity in the 
original data generating process and is thus more effective than the simulated finite sample or standard 
residual-based bootstrap critical values.  The empirical distribution from the wild bootstrap can then be 
used to derive inference for the SADF test statistic with the original data (again using White standard 
errors).  We use the 95% quantile from the wild bootstrap distribution to date-stamp bubbles.  Gonçalves 
and Kilian (2004) argue that that the robust wild bootstrap procedure should be favored in empirical 
applications over the standard residual-based bootstrap based on an iid error assumption.  Cavaliere and 
                                                             
10 The results are robust to alternative distributions. 
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Taylor (2008) show that, under a unit root null with nonstationary volatility, test statistics from the wild 
bootstrap converge to the same asymptotic distribution as the test statistics computed on the original data.  
It can thus be inferred that the same results will hold for the SADF test statistic provided that the sup(.) 
operator is a continuous function (Gutierrez 2013). 
 
3.2.3 PSY Testing Results 
Several points must be considered prior to determining the existence of explosive periods and locating 
their origination and termination dates.  First, the lag order in equation (3) must be specified.  Phillips and 
Yu (2011) employ a lag order of zero arguing that the asymptotic distributions of the test statistics remain 
the same when a low lag order is used.  Similarly, PSY contend that adding lag orders can potentially 
influence the estimation results and suggest obtaining the ADF test statistics with a lag order of zero.  
However, in their most recent work, Phillips, Shi, and Yu (2013b) present simulation evidence that size 
distortions actually are smallest when a fixed lag length is used.  Consequently, we use a lag order of one 
(𝑘 = 1 in equation (5)) to allow for the possible low order autocorrelation that has been observed in daily 
agricultural futures returns (e.g., Taylor 1986, Yang and Brorsen 1994, Isengildina, Irwin, and Good 
2006).  Second, the minimum window size is chosen so that the chance of finding explosive periods is 
maximized and there are a sufficient number of observations for estimation.  The initial start-up sample 
for the generalized forward recursive analysis contains 20 observations, or roughly one month.  The 
minimum window size is 20 observations as well.  To illustrate, consider obtaining the SADF test 
statistics for a fixed ending data point 21 (𝑟2 = 21), two regressions are estimated where the first starts 
with observation 1 (𝑟1 = 1) and the second with observation 2 (𝑟1 = 2).  𝑆𝐴𝐷𝐹21 is then set to the larger 
ADF t-statistics calculated from those two regressions.   
Third, an assumption we implicitly make under the random walk null is that individual futures 
contract prices do not contain a risk premium, or 𝐹𝑡
𝑇 = 𝐹𝑡−1
𝑇 + 𝜀𝑡 .  It is possible that short hedgers reward 
long speculators with a risk premium for bearing price risk, as first argued by Keynes (1930) and Hicks 
(1939).  If this is true, futures prices before the maturity date are biased downward in order to embed the 
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risk payment.  Such a data generating process including a drift term is 𝐹𝑡
𝑇 = 𝑑𝑇−𝜂 + 𝐹𝑡−1
𝑇 + 𝜀𝑡 , as shown 
in equation (1).  Though the risk premium assumption remains rather controversial and empirical 
evidence provides mixed results (e.g., Carter 1999, Garcia and Leuthold 2004), it is true that when the 
drift term is large and the variance of the random component is small, the drift/risk premium term can 
dominate periods of price spikes.  Phillips, Shi, and Yu (2013a) show that when the drift term is 
negligible, or 𝜂 > 1 2⁄  for a fixed constant 𝑑, sharp price changes generated by explosive behavior can be 
consistently distinguished from a unit root process.  They also propose a consistent procedure to estimate 
𝜂, which we apply to our data and find that estimated values range from 1.07 to 1.65 for the individual 
futures contract series.  Hence, the drift term may be negligible for the data considered in this study, a 
result that is consistent with recent evidence on risk premiums in commodity futures markets (e.g., 
Sanders and Irwin 2012).  Overall, results from the PSY procedure applied to our current dataset indicate 
that test results are unlikely to be materially affected by a risk premium component in futures prices. 
Finally, when defining the end dates of the explosive periods in equations (4) and (5) note that 
price explosiveness needs to last at least h periods to be considered economically meaningful.  Phillips, 
Wu, and Yu (2011) suggest the minimum length of the explosive period to be 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑇).  With sample sizes 
for each contract ranging from about 240 to 260 days, this results in a minimum length of 5-6 days for our 
data.  In a competitive futures market it is reasonable to assume that information is reflected quickly in 
futures prices, even if not instantaneously, and market participants react rapidly to any new information.  
Hence, any price movement away from prices based on fundamentals is likely to be short-lived.  In this 
essay, a more expansive 3-day rule for defining bubble periods is used so that potentially abnormal 
periods are not missed because of a selection of a relatively large value for h. 
The PSY SADF testing procedure is illustrated in figure 3.1 where we detect and date-stamp 
bubbles in the 2008 contract prices of corn, soybeans, wheat, and KC wheat futures using critical values 
developed with the recursive wild bootstrap procedure.  Date-stamping results are found by comparing 
the SADF statistic with the critical value sequences.  Here 95% critical values are used.  With a minimum 
bubble length of three days (h = 3), three, four, zero, and two bubble episodes are identified in the 2008 
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corn, soybeans, wheat, and KC wheat contract prices, respectively.  For corn and soybeans, explosive 
episodes were found between the end of 2007 and the beginning of 2008, as well as mid-2008.  For KC 
wheat, the two explosive periods appeared between September and November of 2007.  In total, there 
were 30, 36, and 6 days of explosive prices in corn, soybeans, and KC wheat, respectively. 
Table 3.1 presents the PSY date-stamping results for 2004-2012 when using 95% critical value 
sequences.  All four grain futures experienced multiple periods of market explosiveness, with most 
bubbles appearing between the end of 2006 and 2008 when grain prices hit record highs.  For corn and 
soybeans, 59 and 68 days, respectively, out of the nine years contain bubbles, or about 3 percent of the 
sample.  There were 26 and 39 days of explosive prices for CBOT and KCBT wheat futures, respectively.  
In percentage terms, bubbles occurred in about 1 to 2 percent of the sample for these two markets.  Most 
of the bubble episodes were quite short, with only four of the explosive episodes lasting ten or more days, 
all of which occurred in 2006-2008.  Though there is some apparent correlation between high prices and 
explosive periods, it is interesting to note that the highest price spikes in corn and the two wheat markets 
did not occur during a bubble episode.  For instance, corn prices first peaked between the end of June and 
the beginning of July 2008, but no bubbles were found in this period.  For the two wheat futures, the peak 
of prices was observed in March 2008, but neither market experienced bubbles during this period. 
As a robustness check, we also consider 90% critical values when date-stamping for bubbles, as 
summarized in table 3.2.11 Compared to the more restrictive 95% critical value, the number of days 
experiencing a bubble increases notably for all four commodities.  In particular, with the exception of KC 
wheat, the percentage of days with bubbles more than doubled when using 90% critical values.  For corn 
and soybeans, most of the additional days occurred outside the 2006-2008 time frame.  In contrast, for the 
two wheat futures, more than half of the additional days occur before 2009.  Somewhat surprisingly, we 
find 33 and 29 days with bubbles during 2004 in the corn and soybean markets, a time when prices were 
                                                             
11 Specific dates of individual bubble periods are too numerous to present in a single table for 90% critical values. 
These sequences are available from the authors upon request. 
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relatively stable.  It is interesting to note that the 2004 bubble totals are comparable to the number of 
bubble days found in 2007-2008 in these two markets when prices were significantly more volatile.   
Given that 2006-2008 is a period with dramatic price spikes that has been of so much concern to 
policymakers and market participants, we provide details on the specific bubble episodes identified by the 
PSY procedure when using 90% critical values during these three years, as shown in table 3.3.  More than 
40% of the total bubble days identified during the 2004-2012 sample period occurred between 2006 and 
2008.  For KC wheat, 50 days, or 66% of the total number of days with bubbles during 2004-2012 are 
found in 2006-2008.  However, even with 90% critical values, bubbles occurred only about 10% of the 
time in corn and soybean markets between 2006 and 2008.  For the two wheat futures, the percentages are 
even lower—4.46% and 6.64% for wheat traded on CBOT and KCBT, respectively.  Moreover, no 
bubbles were found when the two wheat prices peaked in March 2008, and corn prices retained their 
random walk behavior between the end of June and the beginning of July 2008 when record high prices 
were observed.   
Overall, the results in this section appear to be in sharp contrast to the popular belief that 
speculative activities were the main driver of the 2006-2008 spike in commodity markets, as argued by a 
number of hedge fund managers, commodity end-users, policymakers, and some economists (e.g., 
Masters 2008, 2009, USS/PSI 2009, Baffes and Haniotis 2010, de Schutter 2010).  The results also reveal 
some sensitivity to the assumed significance level when date-stamping bubbles using the PSY procedure.  
In order to allow the most expansive definition of bubble periods, the Granger causality tests in the 
following section utilize the date-stamping results based on 90% critical values. 
 
3.3 Traditional and Modified Granger Causality Tests 
The next step is to examine the behavior of returns in relation to index positions during explosive and 
non-explosive periods.  We conduct traditional bivariate Granger causality tests as well as a modified 
Granger causality tests that incorporate price explosiveness interaction terms in order to formally test the 
causal and lead/lag relationship between returns and index investment.  The traditional Granger test 
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ignores any explosive behavior in the sample period and treats the entire dataset as one stable regime, 
while in the modified Granger test causality between returns and positions is allowed to change during 
explosive periods.  A comparison of the two tests can potentially reveal the importance of precisely 
identifying explosive periods, enabling us to more accurately assess the role of index investment in grain 
futures markets.   
The use of Granger causality is motivated in two ways.  First, the key idea behind the Masters 
Hypothesis is that a “wave” of financial index investment artificially inflated prices in agricultural futures 
markets.  If the Masters Hypothesis holds, the flow of index trader positions should systematically 
precede changes in commodity prices; i.e., index trader positions should contain a predictive component 
to futures returns.  Second, Hamilton and Wu (2013) derive a model of futures arbitrage in commodity 
markets, showing that if index funds' large net long positions change the risk premium that compensates 
traders taking the opposite position, then the positions of index traders should help predict excess returns 
for the contracts in which they actively participate.  Hamilton and Wu (2013) contend that this framework 
essentially provides a theoretical justification for the use of Granger causality tests.  While our results in 
the previous section did not find compelling evidence of a risk premium in grain futures markets on 
average over 2004-2012, this does not preclude time variation in risk premiums that is related to the flow 
of index trader positions. 
As noted earlier, the PSY date-stamping results are based on daily prices for individual futures 
contracts.  It was argued that deviations from a random walk for individual futures contracts provided a 
more reliable approach for detecting explosive price movements.  However, index trader position data 
from the CFTC are only available on a weekly basis.  For this reason, a weekly return series must be 
constructed that can be used for Granger causality testing.  One possibility is to generate weekly returns 
based on individual futures contract prices.  This is problematic for two reasons: i) the number of weekly 
observations available for each contract would be severely limited; and ii) index traders tend to 
concentrate their trading activities in agricultural futures markets in the most liquid and shortest maturity 
contracts ((Büyüksahin and Harris 2011, Sanders and Irwin 2011a, b, Stoll and Whaley 2010, Aulerich, 
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Irwin, and Garcia 2013).  The latter observation implies that if index traders do have an impact on futures 
markets, they are most likely to affect nearby prices.  Therefore, we use a continuous series of weekly 
returns over 2004-2012 in the Granger causality tests.  To obtain a measure of explosive episodes at the 
weekly frequency, we map the daily PSY date-stamping results to a weekly frequency by utilizing the 
rule that a week is considered explosive if at least one explosive day occurred during that week.  The 
weekly prices are the closing Tuesday price of the nearby futures contract since index trader positions 
available in CFTC reports refer to Tuesday positions.  Observations are switched to the next-to-expire 
contract on the last business day before the start of the delivery month.  Given the arbitrage linkage 
between different futures contracts in storable commodities, using returns based on nearby prices is 
unlikely to materially change the estimation results relative to a different method of constructing the 
return series for Granger causality tests. 
Since our main interest is the impact of index investment on price movements, we only report the 
one-way causality from index positions to returns.12 The first specification is shown below in equation (6): 
(6) 𝑅𝑡,𝑘 = 𝛼𝑘 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖,𝑘𝑅𝑡−𝑖,𝑘
𝐼
𝑖=1
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑗,𝑘𝑋𝑡−𝑗,𝑘
𝐽
𝑗=1
+ 𝜀𝑡,𝑘 , 
where 𝑅𝑡,𝑘 is the weekly return [𝑅𝑡,𝑘 = (ln𝑃𝑡,𝑘 − ln𝑃𝑡−1,𝑘) ∗ 100 ] for week t in market k and 𝑋𝑡,𝑘 is the 
change in index positions.  When calculating returns on contract roll dates, note that 𝑃𝑡−1,𝑘 refers to the 
price of the same futures contract as 𝑃𝑡,𝑘 but on the previous Tuesday.  The sample period is the same as 
that used in the date-stamping analysis, January 2004—October 2012, resulting in 461weekly 
observations for each commodity.  The lag structure, (i, j), for each market is determined by a search 
procedure over I=5 and J=5 and choosing the model that minimizes the Schwartz criteria to avoid over-
parameterization (Enders 1995, 88).  The resulting equations are tested for autocorrelation using the 
                                                             
12 Results of causality from index positions to returns are in general consistent with previous studies in that returns 
tend to lead index trader position changes (e.g., Aulerich, Irwin, and Garcia 2013).  These results are available from 
the authors upon request. 
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Lagrange-multiplier (LM) test.  More lags are added to the equation until no residual autocorrelation is 
found.  Causality from index investment to returns can be established if the joint hypothesis that 𝛽𝑗,𝑘 = 0 
for any j in market k is rejected.13 
To investigate whether the causality between returns and index positions differ in explosive and 
non-explosive periods, we introduce a dummy variable (D) that indicates bubble periods based on testing 
results from the modified PSY procedure.  Interaction terms between the dummy and index investment 
are also included in the Granger test.  Specifically, we construct equation (7) for the modified Granger 
test: 
(7) 𝑅𝑡,𝑘 = 𝛼𝑡,𝑘 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖,𝑘𝑅𝑡−𝑖,𝑘
𝐼
𝑖=1
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑗,𝑘𝑋𝑡−𝑗,𝑘
𝐽
𝑗=1
+ ∑ 𝜃𝑗,𝑘(𝑋𝑡−𝑗,𝑘
𝐽
𝑗=1
∗ 𝐷𝑡−𝑗,𝑘) + 𝜀𝑡,𝑘 . 
The inclusion of the dummy variable essentially enables us to detect possible shifts in the causal 
relationship in explosive periods compared to when the prices follow a random walk.  If index positions 
help to predict price changes during explosive periods, we would expect the null hypothesis that 𝛽𝑗 +
𝜃𝑗 = 0 to be rejected for any 𝑗 in market k.   
To extend models (6) and (7) to a multivariate framework, positions of additional traders in (6), 
and additional traders and their interaction terms are included in (7).  These additional traders can be 
producers, merchants, hedge funds, or other non-commercial traders.  The multivariate analysis may be 
more powerful than bivariate analysis if the variation in returns is related to the dynamic interaction of 
multiple types of traders rather than index traders alone.  As pointed out by Capelle-Blancard and 
Coulibaly (2011), Sanders and Irwin (2011b), and Aulerich, Irwin, and Garcia (2013), if the causality test 
                                                             
13 Grosche (2012) and Gilbert and Pfuderer (2012) argue that hypothesis tests based on (1) should be viewed 
through the lens of informational efficiency.  Specifically, the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH) implies that 
prices reflect all available public information, and therefore, it is impossible at time t to forecast the price for any 
future period t+k based on the public information set available at t (Fama 1970).  Consequently, it would be 
surprising to find that past index positions predict current returns in relatively efficient agricultural futures markets.  
This argument is problematic given the timing of CFTC data releases.  Specifically, CIT data compiled for CFTC 
reports are compiled on Tuesday but not released to the public until the following Friday.  So long as futures price 
changes are based on the Tuesday compilation date (as is done here) rather the Friday public release date, the market 
efficiency interpretation is not applicable since the CIT position data are not in the public domain on the compilation 
date. 
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in equations (6) and (7) are estimated on a market-by-market basis, the power of the standard statistical 
test might be compromised due to the existence of contemporaneously correlated error terms across 
markets.  We thus model the K markets as a system under Zellner’s Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
(SUR) framework which accounts for correlations across error terms.  The SUR estimation allows for the 
testing of system-wide causality (e.g., 𝛽𝑗,𝑘 = 0, for all j and k in equation (6)), an improvement over a 
strictly market-by-market estimation framework.  Equal constant terms across markets (i.e., 𝛼1 = 𝛼2 =
⋯ 𝛼𝑘) are also considered based on a Wald test.  If the null hypothesis is not rejected, the SUR system is 
re-estimated with a pooled estimate of constants across markets.  As the number of parameter estimates is 
decreased the efficiency of the test is further enhanced. 
Since the asymptotic theory of least-square regressions differs during explosive and non-
explosive periods, a technical issue needs to be addressed before presenting the test results.  Specifically, 
it may appear to be inappropriate to perform statistical inference for regressions during explosive periods.  
This is actually not a problem since we use returns rather than price levels in equations (6) and (7), and in 
order for returns to be explosive, prices need to increase at an increasing ratio.  This can be proven in a 
straightforward manner as follows: assume 𝑃𝑡+1 = 𝜌1𝑃𝑡 + 𝜖1 and  𝑃𝑡+2 = 𝜌2𝑃𝑡+1 + 𝜖2, where 𝜌1 >
1, 𝜌2 > 1, and 𝜖1and  𝜖1 are iid mean zero error terms.  Then returns can be calculated as 𝑅𝑡 =
log(𝑃𝑡+1/𝑃𝑡) = log (𝜌1 + 𝜖1/𝑃𝑡)  and 𝑅𝑡+1 = log(𝑃𝑡+2/𝑃𝑡+1) = log (𝜌2 + 𝜖2/𝑃𝑡+1).  If returns are 
explosive, then 𝑅𝑡+1 = 𝜇1𝑅𝑡 + 𝜀1 and 𝜇1 > 1, where 𝜀1 is an iid mean zero error term.  Taking 
expectations gives E[𝑅𝑡+1] = 𝜇1𝐸[𝑅𝑡].  Since  𝜇1 > 1,  we have E[log (𝜌2 + 𝜖2/𝑃𝑡+1 ) ] >  E[log (𝜌1 +
𝜖1/𝑃𝑡) ], or 𝜌2 > 𝜌1.  Thus in order for the returns to be explosive, price needs to rise at an increasing rate 
for consecutive periods.  Given that typical values of 𝛿𝑇 in equation (1) range from 1.005 to 1.05 in 
economic and financial data (Phillips, Wu, and Yu 2011), explosive returns for higher values imply that 
prices quickly go beyond being mildly explosive, essentially becoming undefined.  The mildly explosive 
assumption essentially sets an upper bound on how much returns can increase.   
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Finally, as is well-known, the results of Granger causality tests require careful interpretation.  For 
example, the rejection of the null hypothesis of no Granger causality may not be reflective of a true causal 
relationship between x and y, but rather the omission of variable z that is the true cause of both x and y 
(Newbold 1982).  Furthermore, only in the case of a linear system is failure to reject the null hypothesis 
of no Granger causality between x and y sufficient to imply the absence of “structural causality” (Hoover 
2001, 155).  Despite these and other related issues, Hamilton (1994) argues that,  
“…Granger causality tests can be a useful tool for testing hypotheses that can be framed as 
statements about the predictability of a particular series.  On the other hand, one may be skeptical 
about their utility as a general diagnostic for establishing the direction of causation between two 
arbitrary series.  For this reason, its best to describe these as tests of whether y helps forecast x 
rather than tests of whether y causes x.  The tests may have implications for the latter question, 
but only in conjunction with other assumptions.” (p.  308) 
 
Since index positions and agricultural futures prices are not two arbitrary series, but instead have a direct 
relationship under the “bubble hypothesis,” Granger tests should be useful in detecting a relationship 
between the two series if one exists. 
 
3.4 Results from the SCOT Position Data 
Traditional and modified Granger causality tests are conducted using position data from the CFTC’s 
Supplemental Commitments of Traders (SCOT) reports.  The SCOT report is released each Friday in 
conjunction with the legacy Commitments of Traders (COT) report and show the combined futures and 
options positions as of Tuesday’s market close for commercials, non-commercials, commodity index 
traders (CITs), and non-reporting traders.  The CIT positions are drawn from both the commercial and 
non-commercial positions in the legacy Commitments of Traders (COT) reports.  Irwin and Sanders 
(2012b) show that aggregate CIT positions in agricultural futures markets are highly correlated with 
quarterly benchmark positions available from the CFTC since the end of 2007.  This indicates 
measurement errors associated with aggregate CIT positions are likely rather small and supports the 
widespread view that CIT data provide valuable information about index trader activity in agricultural 
futures markets. 
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The publicly available SCOT reports start in January 2006.  The CFTC collected additional data 
for CBOT corn, soybean and wheat futures and KC wheat futures over 2004-2005 at the request of the 
U.S.  Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (USS/PSI 2009) and these data are also used in 
the present analysis.  Descriptive statistics for the SCOT data are presented in Table 3.3.  Commercial 
traders, non-commercial traders, and CIT investment activities are measured by their net long positions 
(i.e., number of long contract minus number of short contract).  As noted earlier, bubble episodes 
identified by 90% critical values (as shown in table 3.2) are used.  During explosive periods, average 
returns range from -0.11% in wheat futures to 0.82% in soybean futures, while during non-explosive 
periods average returns are mostly negative, ranging from -0.07% in corn to 0.02% in KC wheat.  This 
pattern is not surprising given that most of the explosive periods occurred during periods of increasing 
prices and are thus likely to exhibit positive returns.  As seen in the table, if index traders are in fact 
responsible for bubble occurrences, CIT net long positions did not increase nearly as much as one would 
expect during these time periods.  The wheat market experienced the largest increase, from about 167,000 
to 182,000, or only a 9% increase.  For the other three markets, CIT net positions either remained at the 
same level (KC wheat) or slightly decreased (corn and soybeans) in explosive periods.  Given that CIT 
positions are relatively stable in explosive and non-explosive periods, it would not be surprising to find 
little if any relationship of the positions and subsequent market returns.  On the other hand, non-
commercial traders experienced a much more significant increase in their net long positions during bubble 
episodes in both percentage and absolute value terms for all commodities except wheat.  For instance, net 
positions of non-commercials in the corn market increased by nearly 52,000 contracts, representing a 50% 
increase from non-explosive to explosive periods. 
The unconditional contemporaneous correlations between returns and investment activities are 
different in explosive and non-explosive periods for all three categories of traders.  Returns and CIT net 
long positions are generally only weakly correlated in non-explosive periods, with the correlation 
coefficient ranging from 0.01 in KC wheat to 0.07 in corn and soybeans.  This contemporaneous link 
strengthened notably during explosive periods.  For instance, the correlation coefficients increased to 0.63 
80 
and 0.72 in wheat and KC wheat futures markets, both of which are statistically significant.  A similar 
pattern is observed for commercial traders and non-commercial traders.  Nevertheless, correlation does 
not establish temporal causality since it only indicates the degree of a contemporaneous linkage. 
To further investigate the behavior of index investment, we plot CIT net positions along with the 
explosive periods identified by the modified PSY procedure in figure 3.2.  Some correspondence between 
the peaks of CIT positions and price explosiveness is observed in corn and soybean futures, especially 
during the explosive periods found in 2008.  However, when CITs held large net long positions between 
2010 and 2011 corn and soybean prices were mostly non-explosive.  The relation of CIT net positions and 
bubble occurrences becomes even less clear when analyzing the two wheat futures markets.  While CIT 
net long positions significantly increased for KC wheat futures after 2009, there are only two weeks with 
bubbles in total between 2009 and 2010.  Net positions held by CITs have been relatively stable over the 
entire sample period in CBOT wheat futures and many of the explosive periods occur as index traders 
reduce their net long positions.  Overall, it is difficult to visually distinguish a consistent pattern between 
CIT net positions and explosive periods. 
Table 3.4 reports the p-values for the traditional and modified bivariate Granger causality tests 
between returns and net long positions held by CITs, as well as the Breusch-Pagan cross-sectional 
dependence test statistic.  There is a clear, strong correlation across the four markets as the Breusch-Pagan 
test rejects the null of no cross-sectional dependence in the returns at the 1% level of significance, 
supporting the use of SUR.  The traditional Granger test indicates that CITs did not Granger cause returns 
in soybeans and the two wheat futures, but helps to predict returns in corn futures.  However, the 
estimated coefficient 𝛽1 in the corn equation is negative and very small in magnitude, the opposite of the 
notion that index investment created a massive bubble in commodity futures markets (e.g., Masters 2008, 
2009).  System-wide, the null of no CIT impact across all four markets is rejected.  The results from the 
traditional bivariate Granger causality tests are consistent with most of the previous studies in the area.   
For the modified analysis, no causal relationship can be established from changes in CIT net 
positions to returns in either explosive or non-explosive periods for soybeans and the two wheat futures 
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markets.  For corn, statistical significance is found.  However, in contrast to von Braun and Torero (2009), 
the modified test suggests that CITs Granger cause returns in corn futures during non-explosive periods 
rather than during explosive periods.  Consistent with the traditional bivariate test results for corn, the 
relationship is negative in both explosive and non-explosive periods, although the magnitude decreases 
when market exhibit bubbles.  The system-wide null of no CIT impact across all four markets during 
explosive periods is not rejected for the modified test. 
Table 3.5 reports results for the multivariate Granger causality tests between returns and CIT 
position changes for each market.  Net positions of commercial and non-commercial traders are added to 
each equation to account for effects from other traders.  Again, since the Breusch-Pagan test suggests 
strong cross-sectional dependence across markets, the tests are carried out under the SUR framework.  
Statistical significance is not evident at the five percent level for soybeans and the two wheat futures 
markets in the traditional formulation of the multivariate model.  The system-wide null hypothesis of no 
CIT impact is not rejected either.  In the modified multivariate Granger test, we do not find any 
differential impact in explosive and non-explosive periods in any of the four markets or the system as a 
whole.  Tests (not reported) for the null hypothesis that commercial or non-commercial traders do not 
cause returns could not be rejected in any case for the four markets.  These results are in general 
consistent with the bulk of previous studies such as Stoll and Whaley (2010), Brunetti, Buyuksahin, and 
Harris (2011), Sanders and Irwin (2011a, b). 
  
3.5 Results from the DCOT Position Data 
As a robustness check, the modified bivariate and multivariate Granger tests are also applied to positions 
from the CFTC’s Disaggregated Commitment of Traders (DCOT) reports.  The DCOT reports were first 
published in September 2009 and later extended back to June 2006, yielding 334 observations in total.  
Traders are separated into five categories: producers and merchants, swap dealers, managed money, other 
reportables, and non-reportables.  According to the CFTC, a swap dealer primarily deals in swaps and 
uses the futures markets to manage or hedge the associated risks.  The counterparties of a swap dealer 
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may be either speculative traders or traditional commercial traders.  While there is some uncertainty 
whether the underlying positions held by swap dealers are hedging or speculative in nature, their trading 
activities have been used extensively as a proxy for the positions of index investors (e.g., Brunetti and 
Buyuksahin 2009, Brunetti, Buyuksahin, and Harris 2011, Büyüksahin and Harris 2011, Sanders and 
Irwin 2011a).  Irwin and Sanders (2012b) show that aggregate swap dealer positions in agricultural 
futures markets have a moderately high correlation with quarterly benchmark positions available from the 
CFTC beginning at the end of 2007.   
Results of the modified Granger causality tests on the DCOT data are reported in Table 3.6.  The 
only statistical significance is found in the corn equation for the bivariate analysis, where net positions of 
swap dealers Granger cause returns only during non-explosive periods.  This impact is once again 
negative, consistent with the estimates found in other corn equations using the SCOT data.  The system-
wide null of no swap dealer impact across all four grain markets is not rejected for either type of modified 
Granger test.   
 
3.6 Summary and Conclusions 
This paper analyzes the market impact of financial index investment in grain futures markets during 
explosive and non-explosive periods of price behavior.  We focus on this problem because grain futures 
markets are at the forefront of concerns about the effect of index investment on food commodity prices 
and previous research has not rigorously assessed this plausible differential effect.  Policymakers could 
potentially misinformed about the market impact of financial index investment if this differential effect is 
ignored (Robles, Torero, and von Braun 2009, von Braun and Torero 2009).  The specific markets 
analyzed in the study include corn, soybeans, and wheat traded at the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) 
and wheat traded at the Kansas City Board of Trade (KCBT).  The sample consists of daily prices for 
individual futures contracts, returns calculated from weekly nearby prices, and index trader positions for 
each market over January 2004-October 2012. 
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In the first part of the analysis the forward and backward recursive procedure developed by 
Phillips, Shi, and Yu (2012) is used to detect and date-stamp explosive periods in the four grain futures 
markets.  This test is more powerful than previously developed tests because it can detect the existence of 
multiple explosive periods and find origination and termination dates of each explosive period.  
Inferences for the bubble date-stamping test statistic are obtained using a recursive wild bootstrap 
procedure with White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors as discussed in Gonçalves and Kilian 
(2004).  We use daily price sequences for individual futures contracts to date-stamp explosive periods.  
The findings indicate that all four grain futures markets experienced multiple bubbles during the sample 
period.  For corn and soybeans, about 3% of the sample period exhibited bubble behavior when 95% 
critical values are used.  For the two wheat futures, the number is lower—prices were explosive about 1 to 
2% of the time.  Most of the explosive episodes are quite short, with only four periods across all four 
markets lasting at least 10 days in duration.  The number of days experiencing bubbles increases notably 
for all four commodities when 90% critical values are considered.  It also appears that more than 40% of 
the bubbles occurred in 2006-2008, the period of central concern to policy makers.   
In the second part of the analysis, Granger causality tests are used to investigate lead-lag 
dynamics between index trader positions and weekly nearby returns (price changes) in the four grain 
futures markets.  We introduce a dummy variable into the Granger regressions and create interaction 
terms between this dummy variable and index positions to distinguish explosive and non-explosive 
periods.  This is the first study in the literature to examine the causal linkages from index investment to 
commodity futures price changes while allowing for differential impacts during rigorously time-stamped 
market regimes.  We also examine whether the estimated lead-lag dynamics are sensitive to conditioning 
on the positions of other large commercial and non-commercial traders.  We find no evidence that index 
positions Granger cause returns in the soybean and two wheat futures markets during non-explosive or 
explosive periods.  However, evidence does emerge in corn markets that index investment influences 
returns.  However, the effect in corn futures markets is small, negative, and driven by behavior during the 
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non-explosive period.  This runs counter to the argument that index-based investments created a massive 
bubble in commodity markets (Masters 2008, 2009).   
On balance, the findings provide little evidence to support the notion that index investment was a 
primary driver of the spikes in grain futures prices in recent years.  Stated differently, the results add to 
the growing body of literature showing that the “Masters Hypothesis” is simply not a valid 
characterization of reality, i.e.  buying pressure from financial index investment in recent years did not 
cause massive bubbles in agricultural futures prices.  This is not to say that the large influx of index 
investment did not have any impact in agricultural futures markets.  Irwin and Sanders (2012a) argue that 
index investment may have several long-lasting and beneficial economic impacts, including a decrease in 
the cost of hedging for traditional physical market participants, a dampening of price volatility, and better 
integration of agricultural futures markets with financial markets.   
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3.8 Tables and Figures 
 
Table 3.1  SADF Date-Stamping Results for Grain Futures Markets (95% Critical Values), January 
2004- October 2012 
  Explosive Periods 
Length 
(days) 
    Explosive Periods 
Length 
(days) 
       
Corn 1/16/2004 - 1/21/2004 3  Soybeans 2/24/2004 - 2/26/2004 3 
 7/28/2004 - 7/30/2004 3   6/17/2005 - 6/22/2005 4 
 9/14/2005 - 9/19/2005 4   10/23/2006 - 10/30/2006 6 
 10/13/2006 - 10/18/2006 4   11/15/2007 - 11/27/2007 8 
 10/25/2006 - 10/30/2006 4   12/24/2007 - 1/18/2008 18 
 12/26/2006 - 1/2/2007 5   6/11/2008 - 6/19/2008 6 
 6/13/2007 - 6/18/2007 4   6/30/2008 - 7/3/2008 4 
 12/11/2007 - 12/17/2007 5   12/29/2008 - 1/6/2009 6 
 12/20/2007 - 1/15/2008 17   5/28/2009 - 6/2/2009 4 
 6/11/2008 - 6/18/2008 6   9/22/2011 - 9/26/2011 3 
 7/2/2009 - 7/8/2009 4   9/30/2011 - 10/7/2011 6 
 Total 59 (2.66%)   Total 68 (3.07%) 
       
Wheat 10/15/2008 - 10/28/2008 10  KC Wheat 9/27/2007 - 10/1/2007 3 
 7/29/2010 - 8/2/2010 3   11/28/2007 - 11/30/2007 3 
 9/16/2011 - 9/23/2011 6   9/11/2008 - 9/16/2008 4 
 11/22/2011 - 11/28/2011 4   10/6/2008 - 10/10/2008 5 
 7/2/2012 - 7/5/2012 3   10/15/2008 - 10/28/2008 10 
 Total 26 (1.17%)   7/29/2010 - 8/2/2010 3 
     1/25/2011 - 1/27/2011 3 
     9/19/2011 - 9/23/2011 5 
     11/23/2011 - 11/28/2011 3 
         Total 39 (1.76%) 
Notes: Corn, soybeans, and wheat are traded at the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) and KC wheat is 
traded at the Kansas City Board of Trade (KCBT).  Explosive prices need to last at least three business 
days to be considered a bubbles.  Number of days experiencing bubbles are reported for each commodity 
for each year.  Numbers in parentheses are the percentage of days with bubbles.  
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Table 3.2 Number of Days with Bubbles identified by the SADF Date-Stamping Procedure for 
Grain Futures Markets by Year (90% Critical Values), January 2004- October 2012 
Year Corn Soybeans Wheat KC Wheat 
2004 33 29  2 
2005 5 19 3  
2006 29 18 3 4 
2007 21 20 8 17 
2008 22 39 21 29 
2009 15 12 7  
2010 9 11 8 4 
2011 4 11 17 13 
2012 27 6 9 7 
Sum 165 165 76 76 
 (7.45%) (7.45%) (3.43%) (3.43%) 
Notes: Corn, soybeans, and wheat are traded at the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) and KC wheat is 
traded at the Kansas City Board of Trade (KCBT).  Explosive prices need to last at least three business 
days to be considered a bubbles.  Number of days experiencing bubbles are reported for each commodity 
for each year.  Numbers in parentheses are the percentage of days with bubbles.  
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Table 3.3 SADF Date-Stamping Results for Grain Futures Markets (90% Critical Values), January 
2006- December 2008 
  Explosive Periods 
Length 
(days) 
    Explosive Periods 
Length 
(days) 
       
Corn 10/12/2006 - 10/19/2006 6  Soybeans 8/16/2006 - 8/22/2006 5 
 10/23/2006 - 10/30/2006 6   8/25/2006 - 8/29/2006 3 
 11/1/2006 - 11/9/2006 7   9/11/2006 - 9/13/2006 3 
 11/22/2006 - 11/30/2006 6   10/23/2006 - 10/31/2006 7 
 12/26/2006 - 1/2/2007 5   11/14/2007 - 11/28/2007 10 
 6/12/2007 - 6/18/2007 5   12/10/2007 - 12/12/2007 3 
 12/10/2007 - 1/17/2008 27   12/20/2007 - 1/18/2008 20 
 6/10/2008 - 6/18/2008 7   2/22/2008 - 2/26/2008 3 
 7/21/2008 - 7/23/2008 3   2/28/2008 - 3/3/2008 3 
 Sum 72 (9.56%)   6/6/2008 - 6/20/2008 10 
     6/26/2008 - 7/3/2008 6 
     12/26/2008 - 12/31/2008* 4 
     Sum 77 (10.24%) 
       
Wheat 5/16/2006 - 5/18/2006 3  KC Wheat 8/17/2006 - 8/22/2006 4 
 6/13/2007 - 6/15/2007 3   3/30/2007 - 4/3/2007 3 
 12/4/2007 - 12/10/2007 5   6/12/2007 - 6/15/2007 4 
 9/9/2008 - 9/12/2008 4   9/27/2007 - 10/1/2007 3 
 10/6/2008 - 10/28/2008 17   11/27/2007 - 11/30/2007 4 
 Sum 32 (4.26%)   12/6/2007 - 12/10/2007 3 
     2/5/2008 - 2/11/2008 5 
     9/9/2008 - 9/16/2008 6 
     10/3/2008 - 10/28/2008 18 
         Sum 50 (6.64%) 
Notes: Corn, soybeans, and wheat are traded at the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) and KC wheat is 
traded at the Kansas City Board of Trade (KCBT).  Explosive prices need to last at least three business 
days to be considered a bubbles. Number of days experiencing bubbles are reported for each commodity 
for each year.  Numbers in parentheses are the percentage of days with bubbles. The period identified by 
“*” expands from the end of 2008 to 2009 (1/6/2009).
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Table 3.4 Descriptive Statistics for Returns and Trader Positions from CFTC Supplemental Commitment of Traders (SCOT) Reports for 
Grain Futures Markets, January 2004-October 2012 
Panel A: Corn 
 Explosive (N=53)   Non-Explosive (N=408)  
 Mean SD Min Max Corr  Mean SD Min Max Corr 
Return 0.46% 2.41% -5.32% 6.64%   -0.07% 1.95% -7.16% 8.00%  
Comm -380 204 -750 7 -0.467  -341 184 -760 15 -0.108 
NonComm 151 117 -76 357 0.494  100 120 -150 373 0.099 
CIT 312 126 73 495 0.27  334 103 65 504 0.069 
Panel B: Soybeans 
 Explosive (N=53)   Non-Explosive (N=408)  
 Mean SD Min Max Corr  Mean SD Min Max Corr 
Return 0.82% 1.89% -3.72% 4.90%   -0.03% 1.63% -6.81% 4.92%  
Comm -178 101 -355 -12 -0.266  -148 93 -362 30 -0.131 
NonComm 73 66 -65 221 0.289  48 64 -68 225 0.131 
CIT 125 56 27 199 0.113  128 46 28 201 0.072 
Panel C: Wheat 
 Explosive (N=25)   Non-Explosive (N=436)  
 Mean SD Min Max Corr  Mean SD Min Max Corr 
Return -0.11% 2.88% -5.20% 5.80%   -0.06% 2.04% -7.65% 6.36%  
Comm -126 43 -200 -69 -0.803  -124 43 -213 -25 -0.067 
NonComm -33 31 -87 13 0.686  -26 28 -97 40 0.058 
CIT 182 23 139 216 0.629  167 49 34 230 0.035 
Panel D: KC Wheat 
 Explosive (N=28)   Non-Explosive (N=433)  
 Mean SD Min Max Corr  Mean SD Min Max Corr 
Return 0.00% 2.61% -5.04% 4.68%   0.02% 1.87% -7.11% 6.42%  
Comm -43 25 -89 -2 -0.706  -42 25 -112 8 -0.09 
NonComm 21 17 -12 49 0.671  18 20 -21 68 0.084 
CIT 29 9 15 51 0.718   29 10 12 53 0.014 
Notes: Corn, soybeans, and wheat are traded at the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) and KC wheat is traded at the Kansas City Board of Trade 
(KCBT).  SD is the standard deviation.  Comm refers to commercial traders, NonComm refers to non-commercial traders, and Corr is the 
correlation between row variable and return.  Comm, NonComm, and CIT are reported in thousands of contracts.  Numbers in bold are significant 
at the 5% level.  
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Table 3.5 Bivariate Granger Causality Test Results for Grain Futures Markets, Supplemental 
Commitment of Traders (SCOT) Positions, January 2004-October 2012 
Panel A. Traditional Bivariate Granger Causality Test 
𝑅𝑡,𝑘 = 𝛼𝑡,𝑘 +∑𝛾𝑖,𝑘𝑅𝑡−𝑖,𝑘
𝐼
𝑖=1
+∑𝛽𝑗,𝑘𝑋𝑡−𝑗,𝑘
𝐽
𝑗=1
+ 𝜀𝑡,𝑘 
  p-value   Estimate   
Market, k i,j 𝛽𝑗 = 0,  ∀𝑗      𝛽𝑗     
Corn 1,1 0.003   -0.0002   
Soybeans 1,1 0.629   0.0000   
Wheat  1,1 0.901   0.0000   
KC Wheat 1,1 0.339   -0.0002   
  p-value  Breusch-Pagan test of independence 
             𝛽𝑗,𝑘 = 0,  ∀𝑗, 𝑘   chi2(6)   p-value   
System  0.046  1132.400  0.0000  
        
Panel B. Modified Bivariate Granger Causality Test 
𝑅𝑡,𝑘 = 𝛼𝑡,𝑘 +∑𝛾𝑖,𝑘𝑅𝑡−𝑖,𝑘
𝐼
𝑖=1
+∑𝛽𝑗,𝑘𝑋𝑡−𝑗,𝑘
𝐽
𝑗=1
+∑(𝜃𝑗,𝑘𝑋𝑡−𝑗,𝑘
𝐽
𝑗=1
∗ 𝐷𝑡−𝑗,𝑘) + 𝜀𝑡,𝑘 
        
  p-value Estimate 
Market, k i,j 𝛽𝑗 = 0,  ∀𝑗 𝜃𝑗 = 0,  ∀𝑗 
𝛽𝑗 = 𝜃𝑗
= 0, ∀𝑗 𝛽𝑗 + 𝜃𝑗 = 0, ∀𝑗  𝛽𝑗 𝜃𝑗 
Corn 1,1 0.003 0.547 0.011 0.795 -0.0003 0.0002 
Soybeans 1,1 0.836 0.605 0.805 0.524 -0.0000 -0.0002 
Wheat  1,1 0.712 0.288 0.568 0.319 -0.0000 0.0003 
KC Wheat 1,1 0.383 0.477 0.594 0.611 -0.0002 0.0008 
        
 p-value 
Breusch-Pagan test of 
independence 
 𝛽𝑗,𝑘 = 0,  ∀𝑗, 𝑘 𝜃𝑗,𝑘 = 0,  ∀𝑗, 𝑘 𝛽𝑗,𝑘 + 𝜃𝑗,𝑘 = 0,  ∀𝑗, 𝑘 chi2(6)    p-value 
System 0.044 0.757 0.823 1124.414   0.0000  
Notes: Corn, soybeans, and wheat are traded at the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) and KC wheat is 
traded at the Kansas City Board of Trade (KCBT).  R is nearby return, X is change in CIT net positions, 
and D is the dummy variable indicates price explosiveness.  The intercepts of the modified Granger 
causality test are estimated as a single pooled parameter across all markets. Bold values are statistically 
significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 3.6 Multivariate Granger Causality Test Results for Grain Futures Markets, Supplemental 
Commitment of Traders (SCOT) Positions, January 2004-October 2012 
Panel A. Traditional Multivariate Granger Causality Test 
𝑅𝑡,𝑘 = 𝛼𝑡,𝑘 +∑𝛾𝑖,𝑘𝑅𝑡−𝑖,𝑘
𝐼
𝑖=1
+∑𝛽𝑗,𝑘𝑋𝑡−𝑗,𝑘
𝐽
𝑗=1
+ 𝑩𝒌𝒁𝒌 + 𝜀𝑡,𝑘 
  p-value   Estimate   
Market, k i,j 𝛽𝑗 = 0,  ∀𝑗      𝛽𝑗     
Corn 1,1 0.022   -0.0002   
Soybeans 1,1 0.614   -0.0001   
Wheat  1,1 0.529   0.0001   
KC Wheat 1,1 0.592   -0.0002   
  p-value  Breusch-Pagan test of independence 
   𝛽𝑗,𝑘 = 0,  ∀𝑗, 𝑘    chi2(6)   p-value   
System  0.189  1121.273  0.0000  
        
Panel B. Modified Multivariate Granger Causality Test 
𝑅𝑡,𝑘 = 𝛼𝑡,𝑘 +∑𝛾𝑖,𝑘𝑅𝑡−𝑖,𝑘
𝐼
𝑖=1
+∑𝛽𝑗,𝑘𝑋𝑡−𝑗,𝑘
𝐽
𝑗=1
+∑𝜃𝑗,𝑘𝑋𝑡−𝑗,𝑘
𝐽
𝑗=1
∗ 𝐷𝑡−𝑗,𝑘 + 𝑩𝒌𝒁𝒌 + 𝑩𝒌(𝒁𝒌 ∗ 𝑫𝒌) + 𝜀𝑡,𝑘 
        
  p-value Estimate 
Market, k i,j 𝛽𝑗 = 0,  ∀𝑗 𝜃𝑗 = 0,  ∀𝑗 
𝛽𝑗 = 𝜃𝑗
= 0, ∀𝑗 
𝛽𝑗 + 𝜃𝑗 = 0, 
∀𝑗 𝛽𝑗 𝜃𝑗 
Corn 1,1 0.017 0.577 0.058 0.940 -0.0003 0.0002 
Soybeans 1,1 0.657 0.391 0.517 0.288 -0.0001 -0.0007 
Wheat  1,1 0.712 0.939 0.921 0.867 0.0001 0.0001 
KC Wheat 1,1 0.560 0.585 0.770 0.666 -0.0002 0.0009 
        
 p-value 
Breusch-Pagan test of 
independence 
 𝛽𝑗,𝑘 = 0,  ∀𝑗, 𝑘 𝜃𝑗,𝑘 = 0,  ∀𝑗, 𝑘 𝛽𝑗,𝑘 + 𝜃𝑗,𝑘 = 0,  ∀𝑗, 𝑘 chi2(6)    p-value 
System 0.179 0.299 0.853 1079.379  0.0000  
Notes: Corn, soybeans, and wheat are traded at the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) and KC wheat is 
traded at the Kansas City Board of Trade (KCBT).  R is nearby return, X is change in CIT net positions, D 
is the dummy variable indicates price explosiveness, and Z is a matrix that includes lagged positions of 
commercial and non-commercial traders.  The intercepts of the modified Granger causality test are 
estimated as a single pooled parameter across all markets.  Bold values are statistically significant at the 
5% level. 
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Table 3.7 Modified Granger Causality Test Results for Grain Futures Markets, Disaggregated 
Commitment of Traders (DCOT) Positions, June 2006-February 2012 
Panel A. Modified Bivariate Granger Causality Test 
𝑅𝑡,𝑘 = 𝛼𝑡,𝑘 +∑𝛾𝑖,𝑘𝑅𝑡−𝑖,𝑘
𝐼
𝑖=1
+∑𝛽𝑗,𝑘𝑋𝑡−𝑗,𝑘
𝐽
𝑗=1
+∑𝜃𝑗,𝑘𝑋𝑡−𝑗,𝑘
𝐽
𝑗=1
∗ 𝐷𝑡−𝑗,𝑘 + 𝜀𝑡,𝑘 
  p-value Estimate 
Market, k i,j 𝛽𝑗 = 0,  ∀𝑗 𝜃𝑗 = 0,  ∀𝑗 
𝛽𝑗 = 𝜃𝑗
= 0, ∀𝑗 𝛽𝑗 + 𝜃𝑗 = 0, ∀𝑗 𝛽𝑗 𝜃𝑗 
Corn 1,1 0.007 0.673 0.023 0.657 -0.0003 0.0001 
Soybeans 1,1 0.505 0.848 0.685 0.564 0.0001 0.0001 
Wheat  1,1 0.346 0.698 0.519 0.512 0.0001 0.0002 
KC Wheat 1,1 0.386 0.450 0.419 0.320 -0.0003 -0.0010 
 p-value 
Breusch-Pagan test of 
independence 
 𝛽𝑗,𝑘 = 0,  ∀𝑗, 𝑘 𝜃𝑗,𝑘 = 0,  ∀𝑗, 𝑘 𝛽𝑗,𝑘 + 𝜃𝑗,𝑘 = 0,  ∀𝑗, 𝑘 chi2(6)    p-value 
System 0.040 0.861 0.543 767.214  0.0000  
        
Panel B. Modified Multivariate Granger Causality Test 
𝑅𝑡,𝑘 = 𝛼𝑡,𝑘 +∑𝛾𝑖,𝑘𝑅𝑡−𝑖,𝑘
𝐼
𝑖=1
+∑𝛽𝑗,𝑘𝑋𝑡−𝑗,𝑘
𝐽
𝑗=1
+∑𝜃𝑗,𝑘𝑋𝑡−𝑗,𝑘
𝐽
𝑗=1
∗ 𝐷𝑡−𝑗,𝑘 + 𝑩𝒌𝒁𝒌 + 𝑩𝒌(𝒁𝒌 ∗ 𝑫𝒌) + 𝜀𝑡,𝑘 
  p-value Estimate 
Market, k i,j 𝛽𝑗 = 0,  ∀𝑗 𝜃𝑗 = 0,  ∀𝑗 
𝛽𝑗 = 𝜃𝑗
= 0, ∀𝑗 𝛽𝑗 + 𝜃𝑗 = 0, ∀𝑗 𝛽𝑗 𝜃𝑗 
Corn 1,1 0.019 0.720 0.059 0.683 -0.0003 0.0002 
Soybeans 1,1 0.486 0.357 0.617 0.490 -0.0002 0.0007 
Wheat  1,1 0.621 0.988 0.880 0.914 0.0001 -0.0000 
KC Wheat 1,1 0.543 0.624 0.670 0.510 -0.0003 -0.009 
 p-value 
Breusch-Pagan test of 
independence 
 𝛽𝑗,𝑘 = 0,  ∀𝑗, 𝑘 𝜃𝑗,𝑘 = 0,  ∀𝑗, 𝑘 𝛽𝑗,𝑘 + 𝜃𝑗,𝑘 = 0,  ∀𝑗, 𝑘 chi2(6)    p-value 
System 0.170 0.890 0.877 777.472  0.0000  
Notes: Corn, soybeans, and wheat are traded at the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) and KC wheat is 
traded at the Kansas City Board of Trade (KCBT).  R is nearby return and X is change in swap dealer net 
positions, D is the dummy variable indicates price explosiveness, and Z is a matrix that includes lagged 
net positions of merchants, managed money, and other reportables.  Intercepts are estimated as a single 
pooled parameter across all markets.  Bold values are statistically significant at the 5% level. 
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Figure 3.1 PSY Date-Stamping Results in Grain Futures Markets (2008 Contracts) 
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Figure 3.2 Explosive Periods and Commodity Index Trader (CIT) Net Long Positions in Grain 
Futures Markets, January 2004-October 2012 
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CHAPTER 4 
BUBBLES IN GRAIN FUTURES MARKETS: WHEN ARE THEY MOST 
LIKELY TO OCCUR? 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Agricultural commodity markets have experienced large price volatility since 2004.  For instance, the 
deflated FAO food price index increased more than 60% from the beginning of 2004 to mid-2008 before 
subsequently plummeting by over 30% at the end of 2008.1 The extreme price ﬂuctuations have had 
worldwide repercussions, often acting as a destabilizing economic and political inﬂuence in many 
countries (Arezki and Bruckner 2011, Bellemare 2011).  Given the magnitude of these increases, the 
consequences can be especially devastating to consumers in less-developed countries.  The World Bank 
(2008) estimates that the cost in 2008 associated with high food and fuel prices to consumers in 
developing countries was about $680 billion, pushing over 130 million people into extreme poverty and 
increasing by 44 percent the number of children suffering permanent cognitive and physical injury due to 
malnutrition.   
To date, much of the academic debate on recent agricultural price volatility has centered on 
whether speculative activities or fundamentals are to blame.  The first stream of research directly tests the 
effect of index investment activities by financial traders on agricultural price movements, finding little 
evidence that index traders were a major driver of recent price spikes (e.g., Stoll and Whaley 2010, 
Sanders and Irwin 2011, Hamilton and Wu 2013).  A related area of research examines the co-movements 
between commodity and financial prices over time, with some concluding that the financialization of 
commodity markets contributed to rising prices of non-energy commodity futures by more fully 
                                                             
1 See http://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/foodpricesindex/en/. 
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integrating commodity and financial markets (e.g., Tang and Xiong 2012).  A second stream of research 
attempts to explain agricultural price movements through structural models, estimating the relative 
importance of various possible contributing factors in driving price volatility (e.g., Carter, Rausser, and 
Smith 2012, McPhail, Du, and Muhammad 2012, Baumeister and Kilian 2013).  With the exception of 
McPhail, Du, and Muhammad (2012), these structural studies typically find that price behavior can be 
largely attributed to either global or market-specific supply/demand conditions.   
A third stream of research focuses on directly testing for a bubble component in agricultural 
prices.  Research in this category attempts to identify periods when prices deviate away from a random 
walk and become mildly explosive using recursive testing procedures developed by Phillips, Wu, and Yu 
(2011), Phillips and Yu (2011),  and Phillips, Shi, and Yu (2012).  Several studies have recently applied 
these recursive testing procedures to various agricultural markets and find mixed results (Gilbert 2010b, 
Phillips and Yu 2011, Gutierrez 2013).  In general, these studies indicate that bubbles, or mildly explosive 
prices, do exist in grain markets after 2004.  However, as shown in the first essay of this dissertation, 
bubble episodes only represent a very small portion of the price behavior in agricultural commodity 
markets.  In addition, most bubbles are short-lived, with 80 to 90% lasting fewer than 10 days.  Previous 
studies, however, have mainly focused on detecting and date-stamping bubbles, without further 
investigation of the underlying causes of these explosive episodes.   
In this essay, we extend the research on bubble testing by examining the conditions in which 
bubbles are more likely to occur in U.S. grain futures markets.  We first identify the exact episodes of 
explosive behavior, including origination and termination dates, in corn, soybeans, wheat, and KC wheat 
futures markets during the recent volatile period of 2004-2012.  These explosive episodes are obtained by 
applying the multiple bubble testing procedure developed by Phillips, Shi, and Yu (2012) to series of 
prices for individual futures contracts.  To account for potential small sample bias and conditional 
heteroskedasticity, inferences are derived from the recursive wild bootstrap procedure as discussed in 
Gonçalves and Kilian (2004).  We find that the correspondence between high prices and explosive periods 
is in fact rather low, with many periods experiencing large price volatility yet retaining behavior 
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statistically indistinguishable from a random walk.  We further investigate the relationship between 
explosive periods and fundamental and non-fundamental factors using the rare events logit model of King 
and Zeng (2001a, b) that accounts for bias induced by event rarity.  Under the resale option theory of 
Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) and Scheinkman (2013), relating bubbles to factors other than speculative 
(non-fundamental) activities is equivalent to investigating the conditions in which investors are more 
likely to generate divergent beliefs.  Results suggest that bubbles are more likely to occur in the presence 
of low ending stocks-to-use ratios, increasing exports, booming economic growth, and a weak US dollar. 
In addition, contrary to popular public views, investment activities carried out by commodity index 
traders and general speculative activities (as measured by Working’s T) tend to reduce bubble occurrence.   
 
4.2 Testing for Bubbles 
We use the recursive bubble testing procedure recently developed by Phillips, Shi, and Yu (2012, PSY 
hereinafter) to date-stamp bubbles in grain futures markets.  Specifically, PSY use a generalized 
framework with variable window widths in the recursive regressions on which the test procedure is based.  
Defining the estimation start and end points as 𝑟1 and 𝑟2, respectively, the following estimation equation 
is recursively estimated for a given price sequence {𝑃𝑡}: 
(1) ∆𝑃𝑡 = 𝛼𝑟1,𝑟2 + 𝛽𝑟1,𝑟2𝑃𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑟1,𝑟2
𝑖 ∆𝑃𝑡−𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1
+ 𝜀𝑡 , 
where ∆𝑃𝑡 = 𝑃𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡−1, 𝑘 is the lag order, and 𝜀𝑡  ~𝑖𝑖𝑑 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑟1,𝑟2
2 ).  The ADF t-statistic corresponding to 
this estimation equation is 𝐴𝐷𝐹𝑟1 ,𝑟2 =
𝛽𝑟1,𝑟2
𝑠𝑒(𝛽𝑟1,𝑟2)
.  The varying window size of the regression 𝑟𝑤 is a 
function of 𝑟1 and 𝑟2 such that 𝑟𝑤 = 𝑟2 − 𝑟1 + 1.  Defining 𝑟𝑤0  as the minimum window size required to 
estimate equation (3) and a fixed ending point 𝑟2, the starting point 𝑟1 can vary between the first 
observation to observation 𝑟2 − 𝑟𝑤0 + 1.  By varying the starting point 𝑟1 there are [𝑟2 − 𝑟𝑤0 + 1] ADF t-
statistics for any fixed ending point 𝑟2.   
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Let 𝑆𝐴𝐷𝐹𝑟2  be the maximum of those [𝑟2 − 𝑟𝑤0 + 1] ADF t-statistics such that 𝑆𝐴𝐷𝐹𝑟2 =
𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑟1∈[1,𝑟2−𝑟𝑤0+1]
𝐴𝐷𝐹𝑟1,𝑟2.
2 Now allow the ending point 𝑟2 to vary between 𝑟𝑤0 and 𝑇, the last data point 
included in the estimation; we then obtain [𝑇 − 𝑟𝑤0 + 1]  𝑆𝐴𝐷𝐹𝑟2  statistics from a backward-expanding 
window.   These 𝑆𝐴𝐷𝐹𝑟2  test statistics are then compared to the critical values.  The estimated origination 
and end dates of the first explosive episode are specified by: 
(2) 𝑟1?̃? = 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑟2∈[𝑟𝑤0 ,𝑇]
{𝑟2: 𝑆𝐴𝐷𝐹𝑟2 > 𝑐𝑣𝑟2
𝜌 } and 
(3) 𝑟1?̃? = 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑟2∈[𝑟1?̃?+ℎ,𝑇]{𝑟2: 𝑆𝐴𝐷𝐹𝑟2 < 𝑐𝑣𝑟2
𝜌 }, 
where 𝑐𝑣𝑟2
𝜌
 is the 100𝜌% critical values of the backward-expanding SADF statistic based on 𝑟2 
observations and h is the minimum defined length of the bubble episode.   
The above testing procedure calls for a well-defined sequence of critical values for the backward 
SADF test statistic when date-stamping bubbles.  To account for conditional heteroskedasticity in the 
bubble tests and the potential small sample bias, we use the wild bootstrap procedure discussed in 
Gonçalves and Kilian (2004) when applying the PSY procedure.  Gonçalves and Kilian (2004) 
demonstrate the first-order asymptotic validity of the recursive wild bootstrap procedure for finite-order 
autoregressions with possible conditionally heteroskedastic errors.  Specifically, we use the recursive wild 
bootstrap method to derive an empirical distribution of the backward SADF test statistic as follows: 
1. For each data sequence, we first estimate an autoregressive model under the null hypothesis 
of no bubble as in equation (3), where 𝛽𝑟1,𝑟2 = 0.  Denote the resulting residuals as 𝜀?̂?  and the 
estimated autoregressive coefficients as 𝛾𝑟1,𝑟2
𝑖 .   
2. Generate wild bootstrap residuals 𝜀?̂?
∗ such that 𝜀?̂?
∗ = 𝜀?̂?𝜂𝑡  , where 𝜂𝑡 is an i.i.d.  sequence with 
zero mean and unit variance.  Here we let 𝜂𝑡~ N(0,1).
3 
                                                             
2 The SADF statistic here is based on a backward-expanding window, different from the SADF statistic in Phillips, 
Wu, and Yu (2011) and Phillips and Yu (2011) where a forward-expanding window is used. 
3 The results are robust to alternative distributions. 
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3. Generate recursive bootstrap samples 𝑃𝑡
∗ from 𝑃𝑡
∗ = 𝑃𝑡−1
∗ + ∑ 𝛾𝑟1,𝑟2
𝑖 ∆𝑃𝑡−1
∗𝑘
𝑖=1 + 𝜀?̂?
∗ for 𝑡 =
1,2, … . 𝑇.  We then calculate the backward SADF values on the bootstrap sample using 
equation (3) for every ending point given some minimum window size.  The White 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error is used while computing the ADF t-statistic. 
4. Repeat steps 1 to 3 many times, and obtain the bootstrap distribution of the backward SADF 
test statistic.  Here the number of bootstrap draws is set to 2,000.   
In essence, the wild bootstrap sample mimics the pattern of conditional heteroskedasticity in the original 
data generating process and is thus more effective than the traditional finite sample or standard residual-
based bootstrap critical values.  The empirical distribution from the wild bootstrap can then be used to 
derive inference for the SADF test statistic for the original data calculated using the White standard error.  
We use the 95% quantile from the wild bootstrap distribution to date-stamp bubbles.  Gonçalves and 
Kilian (2004) argue that that the robust wild bootstrap procedure should be favored in empirical 
applications over the standard residual-based bootstrap based on an iid error assumption.   
 
4.3 Date-Stamping Bubbles in Grain Futures Markets 
We consider daily log futures prices of corn, soybean, and wheat traded on the Chicago Board of Trade 
(CBOT), as well as the hard red winter wheat futures contract traded on the Kansas City Board of Trade 
(KCBT).  As discussed in the first essay of this dissertation, sequences of individual futures contract 
prices are used instead of rolling nearby futures prices.  Bobenrieth, Bobenrieth, and Wright (2013) show 
that in the presence of supply and demand shocks in a rational storage model cash prices of storable 
commodities may behave in a bubble-like fashion, but the “bubble” is driven entirely by fundamentals.  
Therefore explosive periods identified by previous work that relies on cash prices (Phillips and Yu 2011) 
or rolling nearby futures prices (Gilbert 2010b, Etienne, Irwin, and Garcia 2012, Gutierrez 2013), may be 
driven by fundamental demand and supply factors rather than an explosive bubble component.  In 
contrast, futures prices derived from an individual contract should behave as a random walk under fairly 
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general conditions.  Specifically, the futures price at time 𝑡 for a contract maturing at 𝑇 is the expected 
cash price of a certain commodity at time 𝑇 conditional on the information available at time 𝑡 (e.g., Fama 
and French 1987, Tomek 1997), or 𝐹𝑡
𝑇 = 𝐸𝑡(𝑃𝑇|𝐼𝑡), assuming rational expectations, no risk premium, and 
no basis risk.   Hence, prices from individual futures contracts will behave approximately as a sequence of 
expected cash prices at maturity and follow a random walk (Peterson and Tomek 2005).   Deviations from 
a random walk in the series of prices for individual futures contracts may thus provide a more reliable test 
of bubble components in agricultural futures prices. 
The sample period from 2004 to 2012 is used.  The resulting sample includes sub-periods when 
commodity prices were low and stable (2004 to mid-2006), booming (mid-2006 to mid-2008), sharply 
dropping (mid-2008 to year end-2008), and booming again (2009-2012).  We consider one contract per 
commodity each year, typically the contract with the highest trading volume.  Specifically, these include 
the December contract for corn, November contract for soybeans, and July contract for the two wheat 
futures.  To avoid overlapping bubbles, the sample for each contract starts on the first day that is 13 
months before the contract expires.  The sample for each contract ends on the last trading day of the 
month before the contract expires.  This results in 240-260 observations for each contract.  Using these 
rules, the end of each sample is November 2012, October 2012, and June 2012 for corn, soybeans, and the 
two wheat futures, respectively.  In addition, we set the minimum window size to 20, or roughly one 
month of data.  The minimum bubble length is set to 3 days, or ℎ = 3.  This is slightly shorter than the 5-
6 days as suggested by the log (𝑇) rule of Phillips, Wu, and Yu (2011).  We use this minimum bubble 
period definition to provide a higher chance of detecting the bubble episodes that may be of concern to 
policymakers. 
For illustration, the PSY testing procedure is presented in figure 4.1 where we detect and date-
stamp bubbles in the 2008 contract prices of the four commodities using critical values developed with 
the recursive wild bootstrap procedure.  Date-stamping results are found by comparing the SADF statistic 
with the 95% critical value sequences.  With a minimum bubble length of three days (ℎ = 3), three, four, 
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zero, and two bubble episodes are identified in the corn, soybeans, wheat, and KC wheat 2008 contract 
prices, respectively.  Note that there are cases with explosive prices lasting fewer than 3 days, which do 
not count as bubble episodes. 
Table 4.1 shows the bubble episodes for each commodity during 2004-2012.  Most bubbles did 
not last longer than five days, with only four episodes lasting more than 10 days for all four commodities 
combined.   The longest bubbles lasted for 17 and 18 days between the end of 2007 and beginning of 
2008 in the corn and soybeans markets, respectively.  Bubbles are most frequently observed in the 
soybean market, followed by the corn and KC wheat markets.  For wheat traded on the CBOT, only four 
bubbles are identified—one in October 2008, one in mid-2010, and the others in the second half of 
2011—in total 23 days over the nine years considered.  Bubbles occurred most often in 2008, followed by 
2007 and 2011.  Overall, bubbles are rather rare events in grain futures markets, accounting for only 
2.22% of the total price behavior throughout the sample period for all four commodities. 
Given the fact that 2004-2012 is a period marked with enormous price volatility that has been of 
central concern to policymakers, the PSY test results may appear somewhat surprising.  The findings are 
especially notable for 2007-2008 when dramatic price spikes occurred.  On one hand, a number of hedge 
fund managers, commodity end-users, policymakers, and some economists argue that speculative 
activities, especially index investment, was one of the main drivers of the 2007-2008 spike in commodity 
futures prices, effectively causing a massive bubble in commodity futures prices that was transmitted to 
the cash market through normal arbitrage relationships (e.g., Masters 2008, 2009, USS/PSI 2009, Baffes 
and Haniotis 2010, de Schutter 2010).  Robles, Torero, and von Braun (2009) contend that speculative 
activities drove agricultural prices away from fundamentals during the food crisis period of 2006-2008; 
this effect, however, did not exist before 2006 or after 2008.  The speculative-driven argument seems 
logical given that the large flow of index investment into these markets largely coincided with the record 
high prices in commodity markets.  Nevertheless, findings from the PSY procedure suggest that only 33, 
39, 10, and 20 business days appear to have experienced price explosiveness in corn, soybeans, wheat, 
and KC wheat futures, respectively, over 2007-2008.  Even at the heart of the price spikes in mid-2008, 
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we find a combined total of only 16 days of explosive prices in the corn and soybean futures markets and 
none in the two wheat futures markets. 
It is common to conflate price spikes with bubbles; however, the PSY test results do not support 
this notion.  Figure 4.2 provides further insight by plotting prices versus all significant bubble periods.4 
While there is some correspondence between high prices and explosive periods (e.g., June 2008 in corn 
and soybean markets), there is no evidence of bubbles in many other periods when prices reached 
historical highs.  This pattern is especially evident in the two wheat futures, as bubbles did not occur 
between the end of 2007 and the beginning of 2008 when wheat prices reached a historical high of 
$12/bushel.   For corn and soybeans, prices in 2011 were just as high as in mid-2008, but no bubbles were 
found in 2011.  In addition, several bubble episodes are identified in corn and soybean markets between 
2004 and 2005 when prices were relatively stable.  Even during the 2007-2008 price spikes of 
considerable concern to policymakers, price explosiveness in corn, soybeans, wheat, and KC wheat 
futures was observed only about 7%, 8%, 3%, and 4% of the time, respectively, during these two years. 
It is also interesting to note that not all bubbles identified by the PSY procedure occurred when 
prices experienced sharp increases or were at high levels.  This pattern is especially prevalent for the two 
wheat futures.  For instance, the 10/15/2008-10/28/2008 period is explosive for the CBOT wheat market, 
but the price of the July 2009 wheat contract declined from $6.02/bu. at the beginning of the period to 
$5.61/bu., a reduction of about 7%.  Similarly, this period is also explosive for hard red winter wheat 
futures, when the price of KC wheat decreased by about 5%.  These explosive periods happened when 
prices were declining, which can be classified as “negative” bubbles.  About 40% of the periods with 
bubbles identified in this study are negative.  Given that positive bubbles have been well-documented 
historically and have received extensive attention, the lack of focus on negative bubbles in agricultural 
futures markets is somewhat surprising given that they occur rather frequently.  Weil (1990), among 
                                                             
4 Nearby prices are used in the plot as concatenating prices of individual futures contract may create large jumps and 
therefore misleading conclusions. 
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others, shows that the interaction between prices and fundamentals could lead to prices undervalued 
compared to fundamentals, indicative of a negative bubble.   Phillips, Shi, and Yu (2013) attribute the 
negative bubbles found in the S&P 500 index as a result of contagion effect from the bursting of bubbles 
in other markets.  Hence, the negative bubbles in October 2008 for the two wheat futures market may be 
due to the global financial crisis, which began in September 2008.   
We also investigate the possible seasonal pattern of bubble occurrence.  Table 4.2 shows the 
monthly distribution of bubble episodes in the four markets.  It can be seen that the distribution is highly 
skewed, with over 60% of the bubbles occurring between October and January in each market.  The 
pattern is especially significant in the two wheat markets, with the month of October alone accounting for 
over 40% of the total bubble days.  By contrast, very few bubbles occurred between February and May in 
any of the four markets.  Since winter wheat in the U.S. is typically planted from mid-August through 
October, it may be that uncertainty in the planting season leads to conditions favoring explosive prices.  
For corn and soybeans, it may be that production surprises in the harvest season (typically from late 
September through the end of November) drive bubbles.  Or it may be the uncertainty in the planting 
season in South America (August through November) that affects bubble occurrences during this period.   
 
4.4 What’s Behind the Bubbles? 
Despite the enormous price volatility in commodity markets since 2004, the PSY testing 
procedure only finds bubbles in grain futures prices about 2% of the time.  Simply put, it is surprising to 
see that bubbles are so rare given the high price levels and the prolific public attention on speculative 
activities that allegedly created massive bubbles in commodity markets in recent years.  As demonstrated 
in figure 4.2, the correspondence between high prices and explosive periods is rather low, with many 
periods experiencing large price volatility yet retaining behavior statistically indistinguishable from a 
random walk.   
A key question, then, is: What are the driving forces behind the bubbles that do occur? And for 
that matter, why do some periods with large price volatilities contain a bubble component while others do 
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not? Moreover, what are the economic forces that separate bubbles from other price behavior that justifies 
fundamentals? There is some work in the theoretical literature that has attempted to explain the factors 
that generate bubble occurrence, showing that bubbles can be caused by irrational or rational behavior of 
market participants, sustained by the expectation of a higher price in future periods.  For example, 
theoretical models show that uninformed or noise traders can impact market prices with unpredictable 
trading patterns that make arbitrage risky (De Long et al. 1990).  In contrast, the rational bubble literature 
argues that an explosive bubble component in prices is not a mispricing effect but rather a result of self-
confirming rational expectations by representative individuals.  Under the rational bubble framework, 
observed prices depends on factors in addition to those already reflected in market fundamentals.  Tirole 
(1985) shows that rational bubbles are theoretically possible with overlapping generations for finitely 
lived individuals, provided the flow of future payoffs grows at a slower rate than the economy. 
While theoretical work often points to speculators as the driving force behind bubbles, correctly 
modeling and predicting speculators’ trading activities may sometimes prove to be difficult given that 
many of the trading strategies are proprietary and with trading behaviors do not always follow an obvious 
pattern.  So unless better techniques may be devised to empirically document speculative behavior, 
associating bubbles with speculative activities will require that we restrict ourselves to publicly-available 
information about speculative activities in the market.  However, if bubbles are not solely generated by 
speculative activities, there seems to be an obvious discrepancy between the conventional definitions of a 
bubble, namely, that it is speculator-driven, and the argument that other factors may play a role. 
A recent theoretical model developed by Scheinkman (2013) provides a framework that may 
resolve this discrepancy.  Specifically, Scheinkman’s model (a condensed version of the model as 
discussed in Scheinkman and Xiong (2003))  allows for heterogeneous beliefs of market participants so 
that optimists and pessimists coexist.  Differences of opinions occur mainly because investors react to the 
same information in different ways, so that rational investors will use signals in the optimal fashion while 
irrational investors fail to do so.  There is also a cost difference between going long and going short that 
allows optimists’ views to be expressed more fully than pessimists’ views.  With fluctuating beliefs, 
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bubbles—defined here as the divergence between the amount the least optimistic buyer is willing to pay 
and his valuation of future payoffs—are more likely to occur when the volatility of beliefs increases 
among investors.  When the belief is not homogeneous, investors are willing to pay prices exceeding their 
own valuation of future payoffs because they believe there will exist in the future more optimistic buyers 
willing to pay more.  When divergence in beliefs increases among investors, the probability that the 
option to resell will be exercised increases.  As a result, the value of this resale option and trading volume 
will increase.  Ultimately, the difference between asset prices and valuation, or the bubble size, becomes 
larger. 
Recent empirical work by Xiong and Yu (2011) show that the resale option theory of Scheinkman 
and Xiong (2003) may help to explain the 2005-08 Chinese warrants bubble.  Panel regression analysis 
suggests that the size of the price bubble is positively related to trading volume and return volatility, and 
negatively related to the number of tradable shares and the maturity of the warrant, all of which are 
consistent with the Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) resale option theory of bubbles.  Under this framework, 
relating bubbles to factors other than speculative activities may thus be viewed as identifying market 
conditions under which investors are more likely to generate different beliefs.  This provides a theoretical 
justification for the following econometric model of factors driving bubbles in agricultural futures 
markets. 
 
4.5 Rare Events Logit Model 
We turn to analysis of the contributing factors to these bubbles in grain futures markets between 2004 and 
2012.  This may be accomplished through a logit model that deals with binary dependent variables.  
Consider a conventional logit model, where the dependent variable 𝑦 follows a Bernoulli distribution and 
is defined as: 
(4) 𝑦𝑡 = {
1                                     with probability π , bubble occurs
0                                     with probability 1-π, no bubbles 
. 
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We are interested in estimating the conditional probability of  Pr (𝑦𝑡 = 1|𝑋 = 𝑥𝑡) where 𝑥𝑡is a vector of 
explanatory variables.  The estimation equation may be written as: 
(5) 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝜋) ≡ ln (
𝜋
1 − 𝜋
) = 𝑋𝛽 + 𝜀. 
This is equivalent to: 
(6) 𝜋 =
𝑒𝑋𝛽
1 + 𝑒𝑋𝛽
=
1
1 + 𝑒−𝑋𝛽
 . 
The maximum likelihood estimator for the conventional logit model is well-known to have finite 
sample bias but with bias diminishing with larger samples.  However, King and Zeng (2001a, b) show 
that the bias may be amplified in the presence of rare events; that is, the number of zeros (nonevents) is 
dozens to thousands of times more than the number of ones (events) in the dependent variable.   
Specifically, they argue that in rare events logit model, not only is the traditional maximum likelihood 
estimator ?̂? a biased estimate of 𝛽, but the estimated probability ?̂? is an inferior estimator of true 
probability even if ?̂? is unbiased.  The bias remains significant even in large samples.  The basic 
argument is that while the distribution for nonevents may be well approximated given the large number of 
zeros available, estimating the distribution of events may be severely inaccurate due to their rarity.  This 
leads to classification errors such that the “cutting point” for distinguishing events from nonevents is 
biased in the direction of favoring zeros at the expense of ones.   
King and Zeng (2001a, b) suggest a straightforward procedure to correct the bias in ?̂?.  Defining 
the bias-corrected coefficient estimates as 𝛽, then in empirical application, the following estimates should 
be calculated: 
(7) 𝛽 = ?̂? − (𝑋′𝑊𝑋)−1𝑋′𝑊𝜉, 
where 𝜉𝑖 = 0.5𝑄𝑖𝑖[(1 + 𝑤1)?̂?𝑖 − 𝑤1], 𝑄𝑖𝑖 are the diagonal elements of 𝑄 = (𝑋
′𝑊𝑋)−1𝑋′, and 𝑊 =
𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(?̂?𝑖(1 − ?̂?𝑖)𝑤𝑖).  In essence, the bias term is estimated through a weighted least-square regression 
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that involves 𝑊as the weight.  The variance matrix of 𝛽 is 𝑉(𝛽) = (
𝑛
𝑛+𝑘
)
2
𝑉(?̂?).  Clearly, the variance of 
the bias-corrected estimates is always smaller than the variance of original estimate, as (
𝑛
𝑛+𝑘
)
2
< 1. 
The second step in correcting the rare events bias is to correct for the bias in probability 
calculation.  Though estimating the probability using bias-corrected estimate 𝛽 in equation (7) performs 
better than using MLE estimate ?̂?, King and Zeng (2001a, b) argue that ?̃? is still not optimal since it 
ignores estimation uncertainty, resulting in too low of a probability for an event.  They show that the 
following probability estimate is less biased for rare events: 
(8) 𝑃𝑟(𝑌𝑖 = 1) ≈ ?̃?𝑖 + 𝐶𝑖 =
1
1+𝑒−𝑋?̃?
+ 𝐶𝑖 , where 
 𝐶𝑖 = (0.5 − ?̃?𝑖)?̃?𝑖(1 − ?̃?𝑖)𝑥0𝑉(𝛽)𝑥0
′ . 
Since 𝐶𝑖 is positive with rare events data (?̃?𝑖 < 0.5), the corrected probability will usually be larger than 
the probability calculated using equation (7).  The correction term gets larger as the uncertainty in 𝛽, or 
𝑉(?̂?) increases. 
King and Zeng (2001a, b)King and Zeng (2001a, b) show in Monte Carlo experiments that the 
effect of bias corrections in both coefficient estimates and probability calculation gets larger as the events 
becomes rarer and the sample size becomes smaller.  In empirical applications, the bias term can have 
significant economic implications when sample sizes are sufficiently large.  The rare events logit model 
has for example been widely used in political science to explain wars, presidential elections, 
entrepreneurship, epidemiological infections, and, especially, international relations (e.g., Collier and 
Hoeffler 2004, Wagner 2006). 
 
4.6 Speculative and Fundamental Factors 
In this section, we consider several factors that have been identified as contributing influences to recent 
increases in volatility that may also affect the occurrence of explosive episodes in grain futures markets.  
First and foremost is index trading activity in commodity futures markets.  Hedge fund manager Michael 
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Masters has testified numerous times (Masters 2008, 2009) before the U.S. Congress and Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) that unprecedented buying pressure from index investment created 
a series of massive bubbles in commodity futures prices.  These bubbles were then transmitted to spot 
prices through arbitrage linkages between futures and spot prices, with the end result that commodity 
prices far exceeded fundamental values.  Irwin and Sanders (2012) use the term “Masters Hypothesis” as 
a short-hand label for this argument.  Several prominent international development organizations (e.g., 
Robles, Torero, and von Braun 2009, de Schutter 2010) have expressed strong support for the Masters 
Hypothesis, arguing that index positions are indeed the primary culprit of recent high food prices.  Given 
the alleged claim that index traders have caused a speculative bubble in commodity markets, it is natural 
to consider whether their trading activities played a role in bubble occurrence.   
Here index activities are measured by their net positions in futures and options market (number of 
long contracts minus number of short contracts).  The commodity index trader (CIT) position data are 
obtained from the CFTC’s Supplemental Commitments of Traders (SCOT) reports.  The SCOT report is 
released each Friday in conjunction with the legacy Commitments of Traders (COT) report and show the 
combined futures and options positions as of Tuesday’s market close for commercials, non-commercials, 
commodity index traders, and non-reporting traders, where options positions are adjusted to the delta-
equivalent futures position.  The index positions are drawn from both the commercial and non-
commercial positions in the legacy Commitments of Traders (COT) reports.  Irwin and Sanders (2012) 
show that aggregate index trader positions in agricultural futures markets are highly correlated with 
quarterly benchmark positions available from the CFTC since the end of 2007.  This indicates 
measurement errors associated with aggregate index trader positions are likely rather small and supports 
the widespread view that index position data provide valuable information about index trader activity in 
agricultural futures markets.  The publicly available SCOT reports start in January 2006.  The CFTC 
collected additional data for CBOT corn, soybean and wheat futures and KC wheat futures over 2004-
2005 at the request of the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (USS/PSI 2009) and 
these data are also used in the present analysis. 
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To assess more generally the effect of speculators on bubble occurrence, we consider an 
alternative measure of speculative activities in futures market—Working’s speculative T index, which is 
defined as: 
(9) 𝑇 = 1 + 𝑆𝑆 (𝐻𝐿 + 𝐻𝑆)⁄   if 𝐻𝑆 ≥ 𝐻𝐿, or 
(10) 𝑇 = 1 + 𝑆𝐿 (𝐻𝐿 + 𝐻𝑆)⁄   if 𝐻𝑆 < 𝐻𝐿, 
where SL and SS are long and short positions held by speculators and HL and HS long and short positions 
of hedgers.   The index measures the extent to which speculation is excessive relative to the level of 
hedging activity in the market.   Peck (1980, 1037) notes that the speculative index “ ...reﬂects the extent 
by which the level of speculation exceeds the minimum necessary to absorb long and short hedging, 
recognizing that long and short hedging positions could not always be expected to offset each other even 
in markets where these positions were of comparable magnitudes.” Peck (1981) finds that the speculative 
index tends to be lower in grain markets during a more volatile period (1971-1977) compared to an earlier 
period (1964-1971) when prices are more tranquil, contrary to conventional wisdom.  Streeter and Tomek 
(1992) show that interday price volatility also tends to be smaller when speculation, as measured by 
Working’s T, is large relative to hedging activities in the soybean market.  More recently, McPhail, Du, 
and Muhammad (2012) find that while Working’s T plays a rather important role in corn price 
movements between 2000 and 2011 it negatively affects short-run corn prices.  However, Du, Yu, and 
Hayes (2011) show that speculation in crude oil futures (again as measured by Working’s T) increases oil 
price variation.  Büyükşahin and Robe (2013) show that Working’s T helps predict the dynamic 
conditional correlation between the rates of return on 17 commodities and on equities from 2000 to 2010, 
an indication that the financialization of commodity markets could lead to increased equity-commodity 
co-movement. 
When constructing Working’s T, positions of speculators and hedgers are derived from the non-
commercial and commercial trader category of the CFTC SCOT report, respectively.  Weekly indexes are 
converted to daily data by assuming constant positions throughout the week.  To account for the impact of 
index investment, we add CIT positions from the SCOT report to speculator positions.  In addition, when 
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classifying the non-reporting traders we follow Sanders, Irwin, and Merrin (2010) and allocate the non-
reporting traders’ positions to the commercial and non-commercial trader categories using the same ratio 
as reporting traders.   
Apart from speculative activities, we also examine five contributing factors that reflect different 
fundamental market conditions.  As discussed in the previous section, relating other factors to price 
bubbles may be viewed as identifying market conditions under which investors are more likely to 
generate divergent beliefs as proposed by Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) and Scheinkman (2013).  With 
volatile beliefs among investors, it is possible that bubbles will arise because even the most optimistic 
market participant can expect buyers willing to pay more in the future, effectively raising the difference 
between observed prices and the valuation of future payoffs.   
The first fundamental factor we consider is inventory.  For storable commodities like grains, the 
importance of inventory in cash price determination has long been discussed.   The annual storage model 
first introduced by Gustafson (1958) shows that storage arbitrage can introduce positive autocorrelation in 
cash prices, which can smooth out price volatility.  However, when aggregate stocks are low, spot prices 
increase sharply to meet the market clearing condition in the presence of low inventories (Gardner 1979, 
Wright and Williams 1991, Cafiero and Wright 2011).   Wright (2011) finds that annual cash prices and 
stocks-to-use ratios over the past 40 years conform to this relationship and argues that the scarcity 
argument can explain recent price spikes.  Hochman et al. (2011) find that, neglecting inventory demand, 
prices in 2007 would have been 38% to 52% lower than the observed cash prices in that year.  Even 
though the Gustafson (1958) model was developed for cash prices, the scarcity argument is also relevant 
to prices in the futures market since the futures price is determined by the current cash price, inventory 
and interest costs, as well as convenience yield (Working 1949).  Or it could be that when supply and 
demand is tight, the increase in market participants driven by financialization will lead to more divergent 
investor expectations (Scheinkman and Xiong 2003, Scheinkman 2013) 
The inventory data used here are obtained from the World Agricultural Supply and Demand 
Estimates (WASDE) report released by the USDA.  Every month, the WASDE report provides an 
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estimate of world and U.S. end-of-marketing-year stocks for both old and new crops.  The world supply 
and demand estimates follow the U.S. marketing year cycle, and so do not adjust for differences in 
marketing years among different countries.  The estimated stocks-to-use ratio measures the level of 
carryover stock as a percentage of the total use, and thus represents the tightness of the current supply-
demand relationship in grain markets.  Here we use the estimates for the current marketing year.  The 
monthly estimates are then converted to daily data, which assumes a constant ending stocks-to-use ratio 
throughout the month.   Because the price of corn in the U.S. is highly affected by the world supply and 
demand conditions, our main results are based on the world ending stocks-to-use ratio. 
The second fundamental factor considered is U.S. exports, which directly affects domestic 
inventory in the U.S. Despite the recent growth in biofuels production, exports remain an important factor 
in grain price determination since the amount of U.S grains exported to other countries significantly 
increased over the past few years.  For instance, soybean exports increased from 24.1 million metric tons 
(MMT) during 2003-2004 marketing year to 41.9 MMT during 2010-2011, or an increase of over 70%.5 
For corn, the amount exported from the U.S. to other countries increased by about 30% during 2007-2008 
when prices reached historical highs, compared to the 2003-2004 marketing year.  Abbott, Hurt, and 
Tyner (2011) find that the land required to produce the amount of U.S. soybeans exported to China 
increased from 8.3 million acres of the 2005 crop to 22.8 million acres of the 2010 crop.  They argue that 
the additional land required to meet soybean export demand was primarily obtained through acreage 
shifting from wheat and other crops, since only minor changes in total land use were observed during the 
same period.  It is therefore expected that export sales will be an important factor in driving U.S. grain 
price movements.  U.S. exports data are obtained from the USDA's export sales reporting system 
available through Foreign Agricultural Services (FAS).  These weekly data are converted to daily data 
based on the Friday-Thursday reporting cycle.  Compared to the ending stocks-to-use ratio, which is only 
                                                             
5 The data is obtained from the USDA Foreign Agricultural Services (FAS) USDAPS&D online database. 
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available on a monthly basis, the export data are likely to contain information absorbed by traders at a 
higher frequency since it is reported weekly. 
The third fundamental factor considered is the exchange rate.  Consider for example that the 
monthly average exchange rate of U.S. dollar against the Euro decreased from 1.13 in January 2000 to 
0.75 in December 2004.  By July 2008, the Dollar/Euro exchange rate reached a historical low of 0.63.  
As the U.S. dollar declines in value, the cost of importing products from the U.S. is lower.  Since the U.S. 
is a major exporting country for grains, a weak U.S. dollar is likely to increase exports and reduce the 
amount of available domestic grain, contributing to the commodity price boom observed since 2004.   
Abbott, Hurt, and Tyner (2008) show that between 2002 and 2007, the trade-weighted U.S. dollar 
depreciated 22%, while the value of agricultural exports increased 54%, with grain and oilseed exports 
increasing even more at 63%.  They consider the depreciation of the U.S. dollar as one of the primary 
driving factors behind the 2008 commodity price spike.  Other studies conclude that the falling U.S. 
dollar played a more minor role.  Mitchell (2008) for example, finds that about 20% of the food price 
increase from January 20002 to February 2008 may be attributed to dollar weakness.  However, exchange 
rates not only reflect part of the exports sales information, but contain broader macroeconomic factors.   
For instance, Rime, Sarno, and Sojli (2010) apply a microstructure model to show that a large portion of 
information regarding current and expected macroeconomic fundamentals are intimately related to order 
flows, which is a powerful predictor of daily exchange rates movements under an out of-sample context.  
Gilbert (2010a) argues that commodity prices exhibit excess sensitivity to exchange rate movements due 
to either (1) the business cycle component within exchange rates and commodity prices not captured by 
other demand-side variables, or (2) the causality when constructing exchange rate indexes that run from 
commodity prices to exchange rate that includes commodity currencies.  It is therefore interesting to test 
whether exchange rates help contribute to bubbles in grain markets.  The daily exchange rate data are 
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obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St.  Louis, and the trade-weighted U.S. dollar index against 
major currencies is used.  6 
The fourth factor we consider is real global economic activity.  Several studies suggest that rapid 
economic growth in developing countries, notably China and India, is an important driving force of 
commodity price spikes (e.g., Abbott, Hurt, and Tyner 2011).  Gilbert (2010a) shows that macroeconomic 
shocks may generate a greater price response than crop-specific demand shocks under a capital asset 
pricing model.  Though the importance of macroeconomic factors has been asserted, direct incorporation 
of macroeconomic variables into empirical models has been hindered by the low frequency of 
macroeconomic indicators, which are typically only available on an annual or quarterly basis (e.g., GDP).  
In addition, currently available indicators of economic growth tend to be mostly partial measurements for 
specific regions, unable to reflect global economic activities.  We follow Kilian (2009) and use an index 
based on the dry cargo shipping rate as a measure of global real activity.   The rationale for using this 
index is that the demand of transport services is primarily determined by world economic growth (e.g., 
Klovland 2004).  Kilian (2009) shows that the indicator can capture shifts in the demand for industrial 
commodities driven by the global business cycle.  Unlike other macro-economic indicators that are 
typically available at an annual or quarterly basis (e.g., GDP), the index can be constructed on a monthly 
frequency, providing a larger sample size more suitable for evaluating the demand shocks arising from 
fluctuations in global business cycle.  Appendix A provides a detailed explanation of how the index is 
constructed.   We further convert the monthly estimates to daily data, assuming a constant value of the 
index throughout the month.7 
As an alternative to Kilian’s index, we also consider crude oil prices to represent world economic 
activities.  Kilian (2009) suggests that the cumulative effects of positive global demand shocks have been 
the main driver of crude oil prices since 2003.  Therefore it is expected that the behavior of oil prices is 
                                                             
6  Here major currencies index includes the Euro Area, Canada, Japan, United Kingdom, Switzerland, Australia, and 
Sweden. See http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/DTWEXM?cid=105 for details. 
7 The index is available at http://www-personal.umich.edu/~lkilian/reaupdate.txt 
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likely to capture much of the information contained in the global business cycle.  Additionally, oil prices 
may directly affect grain prices in two ways.  The first and traditional channel is the impact of large 
fluctuations in crude oil prices have on the price of fertilizers and transportation costs, which constitute a 
substantial proportion of the crop production costs.   The second and more recent channel is due to the 
rise in ethanol production during the last decade, which has forged links between corn and crude oil prices 
through demand linkages e.g.  (e.g., Mallory, Irwin, and Hayes 2012).  This linkage has its roots in both 
policies and market incentives.  For example, the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) set a minimum annual 
blending requirement for ethanol usage in 2005 which was later expanded in 2007.  At least partially 
influenced by these mandates, ethanol production capacity underwent a massive wave of expansion 
through 2010.  High crude oil prices have also created market incentives for ethanol use as a gasoline 
extender and octane enhancer.  The ethanol mandate, in conjunction with market incentives for ethanol 
production, has had a large impact on corn consumption.   The estimated impact of the increased demand 
for biofuels on corn prices range from 30% in real terms by Rosegrant et al. (2008) to 70% by Lipsky 
(2008).   In addition, considerable volatility in the crude oil market has been transmitted to the corn 
market (e.g., Trujillo-Barrera, Mallory, and Garcia 2012) .  Indeed, as argued by Wright (2011), demand 
for corn from ethanol production is the largest exogenous shock on corn prices in recent years.  Given that 
grain markets themselves are linked, it is likely that ethanol production also impacts the soybean and two 
wheat markets.  However, Baumeister and Kilian (2013) argue that while there is some degree of linkage 
between high grain prices and the rising real price of oil, this linkage appears to be largely driven by 
common macroeconomic determinants rather than the pass-through effect from oil prices to grain prices.  
It would be thus interesting to investigate the effect of oil prices on bubble occurrence in grain futures 
markets.  The price of oil is represented by the daily nearby prices of WTI crude oil futures contracts 
traded on the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX). 
 
4.7 Estimation Results 
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As a first step in conducting the empirical analysis, we examine the relationship between explosive prices 
and the seven contributing factors specified in the previous section.  As shown in table 4.3, CIT net 
positions tend to be higher during explosive periods in corn, soybeans, and wheat futures, but lower for 
KC wheat futures. However, the differences between explosive and non-explosive are statistically 
insignificant except in the case of soybeans. Interestingly, the pattern is completely opposite for 
Working’s T, which tends to be lower during explosive periods in corn and soybean futures, but higher 
for CBOT wheat futures.  It also appears that explosive prices in corn and soybeans tend to occur when 
the global economy is in a boom phase.  By contrast, the average global economic index is lower during 
bubble episodes for the two wheat futures prices.  Further, the price of nearby crude oil futures is on 
average higher when grain markets experience a bubble.  This price difference is also statistically 
significant, except in the case of corn.  The world ending stocks-to-use ratio tends to be lower during 
bubble periods for corn, soybeans, and KC wheat.  For wheat, the difference in the stocks-to-use ratio 
between bubble and non-bubble periods is statistically significant.  U.S. exports are consistently higher 
during explosive periods but statistical significance only exists in the corn and KC wheat markets.  
Exchange rates tend to be lower during explosive periods, consistent with expectations.  Overall, when 
pooled across the four commodities, the world stocks-to-use ratio, exchange rate, and Working’s T are 
lower during explosive periods, while real economic growth index, crude oil prices, U.S. exports, and CIT 
activity tends to be higher when prices are explosive.  The pooled differences between explosive and non-
explosive periods are all statistically significant. 
To further illustrate the relationship between bubble episodes and various influencing factors, we 
plot the values of selected variables along with the explosive periods identified by the PSY procedure for 
the corn market in figure 4.3.  CIT positions tend to be slightly larger during explosive periods, but there 
are also periods when CITs held large positions but prices were not explosive (e.g., mid-2010).  For 
Working’s T, bubbles occur mostly when the level of “excess” speculation is low.   A similar pattern is 
observed for the ending stocks-to-use ratio, which tends to be lower than 15% when bubbles occur.  For 
exchange rates and real economic activity, bubbles typically appear when the U.S. dollar is weak and 
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global economic is strong.  Of course, consistent relationships between explosive periods and influencing 
factors may be difficult to construct based on a simple graphical mapping. 
The data considered in this study have various frequencies.  For instance, while CIT net positions, 
Working’s T index, and U.S. exports are available on a weekly basis, the ending stocks-to-use ratio and 
global real economic growth indexes are only available monthly.  To match the daily date-stamping of 
bubbles, these data are converted to a daily basis either assuming constant values or taking averages over 
the period.   This may lead to less accurate estimation results for several reasons.  First, the simple 
interpolation procedures used in this study do not account for possible intraday variability.  The 
regressions may thus be estimated with errors in independent variables, which tend to generate bias in the 
estimated coefficients (Chen, Hong, and Nekipelov 2011).  In addition, aligning the data to daily 
frequencies from monthly and weekly data may result in heteroskedasticity in the error structure, which 
can lead to potential inferences problems.  To address the mixed frequency problems in the context of 
vector autoregressions, recent literature has adopted a type of model called Mi(xed) Da(ta) S(ampling), or 
MIDAS (e.g., Andreou, Ghysels, and Kourtellos 2010).  However, Trujillo-Barrera and Pennings (2013) 
find that MIDAS can only provide limited improvement in grain price forecasts within a two-month 
horizon.  Since econometric procedures dealing with the mixed frequency problem are not available in the 
context of the rare events logit model, we do not address the issue in this paper. 
Results from the rare events logit model are presented in table 4.4, with different measures of 
speculative activities (i.e., Working’s T index and CIT net positions) and global real economic activity 
(i.e., Kilian’s index and crude oil prices) considered in the various regressions.  Models are estimated 
pooling across the four commodities, as estimation bias may be reduced when sample sizes become 
larger.  King and Zeng (2001a, b) show that the difference in estimation results from rare events and 
conventional logit models becomes smaller as the sample size increases, an indication that the estimation 
bias is reduced in both models.  For instance, when the percentage of ones is equal to 2.8%, the difference 
in estimated absolute risk between conventional and rare events logit models reduces from about 22% 
with a sample size of 2,000 to about 5% with a sample size of 10,000.   Given that the four grain markets 
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share many similarities, pooling across commodities is likely to reduce the estimation bias due to event 
rarity.  To account for the obvious seasonality patterns discussed in the previous section, quarterly 
dummies are also included in the estimation.   
Regressions (1) and (2) suggest that CITs reduce the probability of a bubble occurring in grain 
futures markets.  This directly contradicts Masters’ (2008, 2009) argument that the massive wave of 
commodity index investments distorted underlying supply and demand relationships, thereby leading to a 
bubble in commodity markets.  For the more general measure of speculative activities as measured by 
Working’s T index, regressions (3)-(5) in table 4.4 suggests that rather than increasing the probability of 
bubbles, bubble occurrence is reduced when the value of the index increases.  This negative effect is 
statistically significant as well.  The findings suggest that the added liquidity due to increasing speculative 
trading and index investment may in fact have improved market efficiency, apparently lowering the 
market vulnerability to bubbles.  While counter-intuitive, our results are consistent with the bulk of 
previous studies on the impact of index investment and speculation on grain futures markets such as 
McPhail, Du, and Muhammad (2012), Sanders and Irwin (2010), Irwin and Sanders (2012), Sanders and 
Irwin (2012), and Stoll and Whaley (2010). 
Estimation results suggest that when global real economic growth (represented by Kilian’s index) 
expands, bubbles are more likely to occur.  This effect is statistically significant for all models.  It appears 
that the price of oil also has a statistically significant effect in all models.  Interestingly, within the same 
model (column (5)), the statistical significance of both global economic growth index and crude oil prices 
remains, indicating that the price of oil may contain additional information not already included in 
Kilian’s index.  The world ending stocks-to-use ratio has a negative impact on the probability of bubble 
occurrence.8 When inventory level declines, small demand or supply disruptions may cause large price 
fluctuations.  This amplified effect may thus lead to overreactions among traders, effectively causing a 
                                                             
8 When using the US ending stocks-to-use ratio, the statistical significance in general disappears but the sign 
remains negative. Results based on the U. ending stocks-to-use ratio are available from the authors upon request. 
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futures market bubble.  A similar conclusion may be drawn for U.S. exports, which also positively 
increases the probability of bubble occurrences in grain futures markets.  Exchange rates tend to 
negatively affect bubble occurrence as well.  As stated previously, a weak U.S. dollar may lead to 
increased exports, reducing grain availability in domestic markets and resulting in an increased 
probability of bubble occurrence.  However, when the price of crude oil is used, the statistical 
significance of the exchange rates disappears and the sign becomes positive.  In addition, for all models 
estimated, bubbles are statistically more likely to occur in the fourth quarter and less likely in the second 
quarter than the first quarter.  Equality tests between pairs of estimated coefficients suggest that the fourth 
quarter is also more likely to experience bubbles than the second and third quarters  
We follow King and Zeng (2001a, b) and calculate the probability of bubbles occurring under 
various conditions.  For brevity, we only consider model (1) when speculative activities are represented 
by CIT net long positions and global economic growth is represented by Kilian’s index.9  The results are 
presented graphically in figure 4.4.  We first consider the case when all four explanatory variables are at 
their mean values in the fourth quarter.  The probability of a bubble is about 3% when all variables are 
held to their means, which is slightly higher than the 2% observed in the actual data.  With a one standard 
deviation increase in global economic growth index, the probability of bubble occurrence increases from 
3.3% to 4.3%, or a 29.4% increase in relative terms.  For the world ending stocks-to-use ratio, a one 
standard deviation increase, or a 3.8% increase from the mean of 17.9%, the probability of bubble 
occurring is reduced by 2.3%, or a 31.9% decrease in relative terms.  The effect of the exchange rate is 
similar but with a slightly smaller magnitude, as a one standard deviation increase of exchange rate index 
is expected to reduce the chance of bubble occurrence to 2.3%.  For U.S. exports, the probability of 
bubble occurrence is increased by 17.4% in relative terms with a one standard deviation increase from the 
mean. 
                                                             
9 Probability estimates for other models with alternative specifications are available from the authors upon request. 
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Perhaps the most surprising result is the effect of CIT net positions.  With a one standard 
deviation increase in the index, the probability of a bubble decreased from 3.33% to 2.78%, a 16.57% 
decrease in relative terms.  The magnitude of the effect appears to be comparable to the effect of U.S. 
exports with an opposite sign.  One explanation may be that as index traders participate in commodity 
futures, markets benefit from the increased volume and added liquidity, which apparently reduces the 
likelihood of bubbles.  However, given that bubbles are rare events during the sample period, the effect of 
the added liquidity may still be small. 
 
4.8 Conclusions 
The large volatility in agricultural commodity prices since 2004 have had worldwide 
repercussions, often acting as a destabilizing economic and political influence.  In this essay, we 
investigate the conditions in which bubbles are more likely to occur in grain futures markets.  The sample 
is from 2004 to 2012.  We apply the multiple bubble testing procedure developed by Phillips, Shi, and Yu 
(2012) to detect and date-stamp bubbles in corn, soybeans, and wheat markets.  To account for potential 
conditional heteroskedasticity and small sample bias, bubble date-stamping inferences are derived from 
the recursive wild bootstrap procedure as discussed in Gonçalves and Kilian (2004).  We find that overall, 
about 2% of the total sample experienced price explosiveness in the four grain markets.  While we do find 
some correspondence between the price spikes and bubbles, there are many periods with high price levels 
that do not contain a bubble.  This is especially true during many of the periods of 2006-2008 that have 
received the most intense focus among policymakers and economists alike.  Findings from the bubble 
testing procedure suggest that only 33, 39, 10, and 20 business days appear to have experienced price 
explosiveness in corn, soybeans, wheat, and KC wheat futures during 2007-2008, respectively.  Even at 
the heart of the price spikes in mid-2008, we find a combined total of only 16 days of explosive prices in 
the corn and soybean futures markets and none in the two wheat futures markets.  The distribution of 
bubbles over time tends to be highly concentrated between October and January, with over 60% of the 
bubbles occurring in this period. 
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It is surprising that periods with similar prices sometimes contain bubbles and sometimes do not.  
We attempt to explain this seemly perplexing phenomenon using various fundamental and non-
fundamental factors.  Based on the resale option theory of  Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) and 
Scheinkman (2013), relating bubbles to factors other than speculative activities may be viewed as 
identifying market conditions under which investors are more likely to generate different beliefs.  We 
apply the rare events logit model of King and Zeng (2001a, b) that accounts for bias induced by events 
rarity to examine the effects of various contributing factors on the probability of bubble occurrence.  We 
find that as the level of speculation exceeding the minimum level required to absorb hedging activities 
and index trading activity increase, the probability of bubble occurrence is reduced.  We also find that 
booming economic growth, high crude oil prices, low inventory, large U.S. export sales to other 
countries, and a weak U.S. dollar are associated with lower probability of bubble occurrences, an 
indication that investors are more likely to generate divergent opinions. 
One of the key findings of this essay is that speculators are unlikely to be the primary driver of 
the 2004-2012 grain futures price spikes.  We find that the net long positions of index traders negatively 
affect the probability of bubble occurrence. This directly contradicts the argument that financial index, 
investment overwhelmed normal supply/demand functions during record price spikes and sparked 
massive bubbles (Masters 2008 2009).  We also find that a general measure of speculation (Working’s T 
index) increases, bubbles tend to be less likely to occur as well. It is important to recognize that 
Working’s T is a measure of excess speculative positions relative to the minimum level necessary in the 
market.  It does not imply a level of “excessive” speculative activities in futures market.  Working in fact 
argues that what may be “technically an ‘excess’ of speculation is economically necessary for a well-
functioning market” (Working 1960, p.197).  Thus, our results suggest that the increasing speculative 
activities as measured by Working’s T are in fact economically meaningful for futures markets, which 
apparently are beneficial to market functioning by reducing the probability of bubble occurrence.  Thus, 
when bubbles do appear it may be a sign that speculative activity in futures markets is inadequate, 
resulting in a less-liquid market.  These findings are consistent with those of Peck (1981), Streeter and 
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Tomek (1992) and McPhail, Du, and Muhammad (2012) who find that Working’s T has a negative effect 
on price volatility and price movements.   
The findings of this study also suggest that fundamentals play an important role in bubble 
occurrences in grain futures markets. Under the resale option theory of Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) and 
Scheinkman (2013), bubbles tend to occur more often when investors hold more divergent beliefs. 
Therefore, it appears that in the presence of low inventories, uncertainty rises in the market as any small 
supply or demand disruption is likely to trigger large impacts on prices compared to when there is 
sufficient inventory.  This apparently encourages heterogeneous investor expectations, the net result being 
an increase in bubble frequency.  Indeed, as argued by Wright (2011), the price behavior over the past 
few years may not be so unusual as some have suggested, and the main forces of elevated volatility in 
grain market can be explained using the scarcity argument. While little research has applied behavioral 
finance theory to explain agricultural commodity price movements, our results are nevertheless consistent 
with the findings in the finance literature that low supply of shares tend to be associated with prices away 
from fundamentals (e.g. Cochrane 2002).  In addition, we also find that large exports to other countries, a 
weak U.S. dollar, high crude oil prices, and strong global economic growth may contribute to this price 
sensitivity by further increasing divergent beliefs among investors in the market.   
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4.10 Tables and Figures 
 
Table 4.1  Explosive Periods Identified by the PSY Procedure with Wild Bootstrap in Grain 
Futures Markets, 2004-2012 
  
Explosive Periods 
Length 
(Days)   
  
Explosive Periods 
Length 
(Days) 
       
Corn 1/16/04 - 1/21/04 3  Soybeans 2/24/04 - 2/26/04 3 
 7/28/04 - 7/30/04 3   6/17/05 - 6/22/05 4 
 9/14/05 - 9/19/05 4   10/23/06 - 10/30/06 6 
 10/13/06 - 10/18/06 4   11/15/07 - 11/27/07 8 
 10/25/06 - 10/30/06 4   12/24/07 - 1/18/08 18 
 12/26/06 - 1/2/07 5   6/11/08 - 6/19/08 6 
 6/13/07 - 6/18/07 4   6/30/08 - 7/3/08 4 
 12/11/07 - 12/17/07 5   12/29/08 - 1/6/09 6 
 12/20/07 - 1/15/08 17   5/28/09 - 6/2/09 4 
 6/11/08 - 6/18/08 6   9/22/11 - 9/26/11 3 
 7/2/09 - 7/8/09 4   9/30/11 - 10/7/11 6 
 Total 59   Total 68 
  (2.64%)    (3.07%) 
       
Wheat 10/15/08 - 10/28/08 10  KC Wheat 9/27/07 - 10/1/07 3 
 7/29/10 - 8/2/10 3   11/28/07 - 11/30/07 3 
 9/16/11 - 9/23/11 6   9/11/08 - 9/16/08 4 
 11/22/11 - 11/28/11 4   10/6/08 - 10/10/08 5 
 Total 23   10/15/08 - 10/28/08 10 
  (1.08%)   7/29/10 - 8/2/10 3 
     1/25/11 - 1/27/11 3 
     9/19/11 - 9/23/11 5 
     11/23/11 - 11/28/11 3 
     Total 39 
            (1.83%) 
Notes: Corn, soybeans, and wheat are traded at the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) and KC wheat is 
traded at the Kansas City Board of Trade (KCBT).  The sample periods end in November, October, and 
June for corn, soybeans, and two wheat futures, respectively.  Numbers in parentheses are percentages of 
days with explosive prices.  The minimum length of explosive periods is 3 days. 
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Table 4.2 Monthly Distributions of Explosive Prices in Grain Futures Markets, 2004-2012  
Month Corn Soybeans Wheat KC Wheat Pooled 
 ---------------------------------------------%------------------------------------------- 
Jan 23.7 14.7 0.0 7.7 14.3 
Feb 0.0 4.4 0.0 0.0 1.6 
Mar 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Apr 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
May 0.0 2.9 0.0 0.0 1.1 
Jun 16.9 19.1 0.0 0.0 12.2 
Jul 11.9 4.4 8.7 5.1 7.4 
Aug 0.0 0.0 4.4 2.6 1.1 
Sep 6.8 5.9 26.1 28.2 13.2 
Oct 13.6 16.2 43.5 41.0 23.8 
Nov 0.0 11.8 17.4 15.4 9.5 
Dec 27.1 20.6 0.0 0.0 15.9 
Notes: Corn, soybeans, and wheat are traded at the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) and KC wheat is 
traded at the Kansas City Board of Trade (KCBT).  The sample periods end in November, October, and 
June for corn, soybeans, and two wheat futures, respectively.  The minimum length of explosive prices is 
3 days. 
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Table 4.3 Summary Statistics of Explanatory Variables in Grain Futures Markets, 2004-2012 
  Explosive   Non-Explosive 
Diff b/t 
Means Variable N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max   N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Panel A. Corn 
CIT Net 59 347.8 95.1 90.8 430.5  2177 331.4 105.0 64.6 503.9 16.4  
Working's T 59 1.1 0.1 1.0 1.3  2177 1.1 0.1 1.0 1.4 -0.1 *** 
Real Econ 59 41.6 11.9 18.2 55.6  2177 16.4 26.8 -52.1 57.7 25.2 *** 
Price of Oil 59 79.8 26.6 34.0 137.4  2177 74.4 22.1 31.7 145.9 5.4  
World Stocks 59 12.5 1.7 9.4 16.8  2177 13.9 2.0 9.3 17.2 -1.4 *** 
US Exports 59 211.3 40.0 160.0 300.5  2177 183.5 47.0 46.4 304.6 27.8 *** 
Exchange 59 78.0 5.1 71.4 87.9  2177 78.0 5.5 68.0 90.6 0.0  
              
Panel B. Soybeans 
CIT Net 68 146.6 40.6 31.9 187.4  2145 127.1 46.9 27.1 201.3 19.5 *** 
Working's T 68 1.1 0.0 1.1 1.2  2145 1.2 0.1 1.0 1.5 -0.1 *** 
Real Econ 68 32.0 28.9 -47.8 57.4  2145 17.0 26.5 -52.1 57.7 15.0 *** 
Price of Oil 68 85.6 28.9 34.6 145.9  2145 74.0 22.0 31.7 145.8 11.6 *** 
World Stocks 68 16.2 1.4 13.9 18.9  2145 17.6 2.4 12.2 22.9 -1.4 *** 
US Exports 68 134.2 61.2 35.1 245.2  2145 123.3 86.4 4.8 486.9 10.9  
Exchange 68 75.6 4.6 70.5 86.4  2145 78.1 5.5 68.0 90.6 -2.5 *** 
              
Panel C. Wheat 
CIT Net 23 175.1 31.6 138.8 209.4  2106 167.2 48.9 33.7 229.6 7.9  
Working's T 23 1.5 0.1 1.3 1.6  2106 1.4 0.2 1.1 1.8 0.1 *** 
Real Econ 23 -0.7 7.4 -10.7 15.3  2106 19.9 24.7 -52.1 57.7 -20.6 *** 
Price of Oil 23 78.5 9.9 62.7 94.0  2106 73.7 22.6 31.7 145.9 4.9 ** 
World Stocks 23 21.5 2.7 18.5 25.0  2106 20.2 3.2 14.8 26.0 1.3 ** 
US Exports 23 15.7 7.8 4.1 27.8  2106 14.5 11.3 0.5 82.6 1.2  
Exchange 23 75.8 6.3 68.8 85.0  2106 78.2 5.6 68.0 90.6 -2.4 * 
              
Panel D. Kansas Wheat 
CIT Net 39 27.7 10.2 16.3 50.9  2087 29.0 9.9 12.1 53.2 -1.3  
Working's T 39 1.1 0.1 1.1 1.3  2087 1.1 0.1 1.0 1.4 0.0  
Real Econ 39 12.3 22.0 -9.3 57.7  2087 19.8 24.7 -52.1 57.7 -7.4 ** 
Price of Oil 39 82.8 10.3 62.7 101.3  2087 73.7 22.6 31.7 145.9 9.1 *** 
World Stocks 39 19.8 3.2 14.8 24.9  2087 20.3 3.2 14.8 26.0 -0.4  
US Exports 39 49.6 17.1 20.2 124.4  2087 42.2 19.8 4.3 138.7 7.4 ** 
Exchange 39 76.5 4.1 71.0 85.0  2087 78.2 5.6 68.0 90.6 -1.7 ** 
              
Panel E. Pooled 
CIT Net 189 188.3 132.3 16.3 430.5   8515 165.2 126.4 12.1 503.9 23.1 ** 
Working's T 189 1.2 0.2 1.0 1.6  8515 1.2 0.2 1.0 1.8 -0.1 *** 
Real Econ 189 27.0 25.7 -47.8 57.7  8515 18.3 25.8 -52.1 57.7 8.7 *** 
Price of Oil 189 82.4 23.6 34.0 145.9  8515 73.9 22.3 31.7 145.9 8.4 *** 
World Stocks 189 16.4 3.9 9.4 25.0  8515 18.0 3.8 9.3 26.0 -1.5 *** 
US Exports 189 126.4 83.1 4.1 300.5  8515 91.9 84.0 0.5 486.9 34.5 *** 
Exchange 189 76.6 5.0 68.8 87.9  8515 78.1 5.6 68.0 90.6 -1.6 *** 
Notes: N refers to the number of days with bubbles. The units for CIT net positions, price of oil, world stocks, and 
US exports are 1,000 contracts, $/barrel, %, and 1,000 metric tons, respectively.  The last column reports the 
differences in means between explosive and non-explosive periods for each explanatory variable.  One, two, and 
three asterisks indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4.4 Estimation Results from Rare Events Logit Model in Grain Futures Markets, 2004-2012 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
CIT Net Long -0.002** -0.002***    
 (0.001) (0.001)    
      
Working's T   -1.664** -2.036** -1.742** 
   (0.784) (0.823) (0.761) 
      
Real Economic Growth 0.011***  0.011***  0.010*** 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
      
Price of Oil  0.027***  0.028*** 0.026*** 
  (0.007)  (0.007) (0.007) 
      
World Stocks-to-Use -0.105*** -0.119*** -0.060*** -0.057** -0.045* 
 (0.024) (0.028) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) 
      
US Exports 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001  0.001  0.001* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
      
US Exchange Rate -0.065*** 0.029 -0.055*** 0.046 0.036 
 (0.014) (0.029) (0.014) (0.029) (0.030) 
      
Quarter 2 -0.361 -0.523** -0.418 -0.583** -0.641** 
 (0.256) (0.252) (0.258) (0.251) (0.257) 
      
Quarter 3 0.156  0.028  0.125  -0.006 -0.048 
 (0.224) (0.244) (0.225) (0.244) (0.250) 
      
Quarter 4 0.865*** 0.943*** 0.880*** 0.980*** 0.918*** 
 (0.208) (0.204) (0.207) (0.204) (0.206) 
      
Constant 2.637** -6.169** 2.881** -6.479** -6.297** 
  (1.218) (2.854) (1.404) (2.872) (2.944) 
Sample Size 8704 8704 8704 8704 8704 
Notes: The dependent variable takes a value of 1 when bubble occurs, and 0 otherwise.  Standard errors in 
parentheses. The units for CIT net positions, price of oil, world stocks, and US exports are 1,000 
contracts, $/barrel, %, and 1,000 metric tons, respectively.  One, two, and three asterisks indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Figure 4.1 SADF Date-Stamping Results for Grain Futures Contracts in 2008 (𝒉 =3 days)
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Figure 4.2 Explosive Periods and Prices in Grain Futures Markets, 2004-2012 (𝒉 =3 days)
Feb04 Jul05 Nov06 Apr08 Aug09 Dec10
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
P
ri
ce
, 
$
/b
u
.
(a) Corn
Feb04 Jul05 Nov06 Apr08 Aug09 Dec10
0.0
4.0
8.0
12.0
16.0
20.0
P
ri
ce
, 
$
/b
u
.
(b) Soybeans
Feb04 Jul05 Nov06 Apr08 Aug09 Dec10
0.0
3.0
6.0
9.0
12.0
15.0
P
ri
ce
, 
$
/b
u
.
(c) Wheat
Feb04 Jul05 Nov06 Apr08 Aug09 Dec10
0.0
3.0
6.0
9.0
12.0
15.0
P
ri
ce
, 
$
/b
u
.
(d) Kansas Wheat
137 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Explosive Episodes in the Corn Futures Market and Influencing Factors, 2004-2012
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Figure 4.4 Effects of Explanatory Variables on Bubble Occurrence in Grain Futures Markets, 
2004-2012 
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CHAPTER 5 
 CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
 
The central theme of this dissertation is to test and understand bubbles in agricultural futures markets.  In 
particular, the recent forward and backward recursive bubble testing procedure of Phillips, Shi, and Yu 
(2012) which is capable of date-stamping the exact origination and termination dates of multiple bubbles 
is applied to various agricultural markets.  Much of the academic debate on recent price spikes in food 
commodity prices has focused on the role of index investment, without paying much attention to the 
broader issue of the existence of bubble components in agricultural prices.  Given that theoretical models 
clearly demonstrate the potential for irrational trading and other speculative activities to fuel bubbles, 
there is a clear need to examine whether bubbles exist in agricultural futures markets.  In addition, 
previous bubble testing procedures generally provide only a mechanism for detecting the existence of 
bubbles without determining the exact origination and termination dates of bubble episodes, which may 
be of particular importance to policymakers seeking to formulate adequate policy responses.  In light of 
this issues, this dissertation has three specific objectives: (1) to detect bubble behavior in agricultural 
futures markets and any patterns in this behavior over time; (2) to test whether index traders drove price 
movements in agricultural futures markets during the explosive periods that are of particular concern to 
policymakers; and (3) to determine under what market conditions bubbles in agricultural futures markets 
are most likely to occur.  The dissertation consists of three stand-alone essays that focus on each of these 
objectives. 
In the first essay, we focus on an in-depth analysis of historical patterns of bubbles in a variety 
of agricultural markets including grains, softs, and livestock products.  We use the daily prices from 
individual futures contracts to test whether speculative bubbles exist in 12 agricultural markets and to 
identify whether patterns of bubble behavior exist over time.  The samples begin as far back as 1970 and 
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run through 2011.  The findings demonstrate that all 12 agricultural markets experienced multiple periods 
of price explosiveness.  However, bubble episodes represent a very small portion—between 1.5 to 2%—
of the price behavior during the 42-year period.  In addition, most bubbles are short-lived with 80 to 90% 
lasting fewer than 10 days.  Though receiving far less attention, negative bubbles contribute significantly 
to price behavior, accounting for more than one-third of explosive episodes.  Markets over-react during 
both positive and negative explosive episodes, leading to a correction as they return to a random walk.  
This adjustment back to fundamental values is most pronounced with positive bubbles particularly in the 
earlier part of the sample.  While the magnitudes of the corrections are generally small, there were a few 
instances of significant increases in prices and large over-reactions, most notably in the softs (e.g., cocoa 
1973, coffee 1994, cotton 2010).  We also find that explosive periods did not become more common or 
last longer in the second half of the sample period and that the most recent bubble episodes may not have 
been as severe as in mid-1970s.  These findings are largely consistent with theoretical models (e.g., Tirole 
1982) that imply commodity futures contracts are unlikely to be highly susceptible to bubbles because 
these contracts are finite-horizon instruments with virtually no constraints on short-sales.  The low 
likelihood of bubbles is also supported by experimental studies, which show that the introduction of a 
futures market lessens the incidence of bubbles (Forsythe, Palfrey, and Plott 1984, Noussair and Tucker 
2006).  The implication of this study is that while bubbles appear to have been a persistent phenomenon 
in agricultural futures markets, the arrival of new market participants coupled with a dramatic increase of 
trading volumes and open interest, as well as the adoption of new trading technologies, have apparently 
increased market liquidity and resulted in improved responsiveness to information over time. 
 In the second essay, we focus on analyzing the market impact of financial index investment in 
grain futures markets during explosive and non-explosive periods of price behavior as defined by the 
Phillips, Shi, and Yu (2012) bubble testing procedure.  Corn, soybeans, and wheat traded at the Chicago 
Board of Trade (CBOT) and wheat traded at the Kansas City Board of Trade (KCBT) are examined over 
January 2004-October 2012.  In the first part of the analysis the forward and backward recursive 
procedure developed by Phillips, Shi, and Yu (2012) is used to detect and date-stamp bubbles in the four 
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grain futures markets.  To account for conditional heteroskedasticity and small sample bias, inferences are 
derived using a recursive wild bootstrap procedure.  The findings indicate that all four grain futures 
markets experienced multiple bubbles during the sample period.  However, bubbles represent only about 
2% of the price behavior over 2004-2012.  In the second part of the analysis, Granger causality tests are 
used to investigate lead-lag dynamics between index trader positions and weekly returns (price changes) 
in the four grain futures markets.  We find no evidence that index investment causes returns in the 
soybean and two wheat futures markets during non-explosive or explosive periods.  In corn, evidence 
does emerge that index investment influences returns in corn market.  However, the impact is small, 
negative, and tends to occur in non-explosive periods, the opposite of that expected if financial index 
investment is responsible for inflating prices artificially.  On balance, the findings provide little support 
for the claim that index investment was a primary driver of the spikes in grain futures prices in recent 
years.  Our results raise the possibility that agricultural futures prices in recent years experienced several 
periods of bubble-like price behavior, but this behavior was not generally associated with commodity 
index investment.   
In the third essay, we go beyond date-stamping bubble periods and attempt to relate the 
timelines of bubble occurrence with various fundamental and non-fundamental factors.  We again use the 
recently developed multiple bubble testing procedures of Phillips, Shi, and Yu (2012) to detect and date-
stamp bubbles in corn, soybean, and wheat futures markets over 2004-2012.  To account for conditional 
heteroskedasticity and small sample bias, inferences are derived using a recursive wild bootstrap 
procedure.  Despite the enormous price volatility in commodity markets since 2004, the PSY testing 
procedure only finds bubbles in grain futures prices about 2% of the time.  We find that the 
correspondence between high prices and explosive periods is in fact rather low, with many periods 
experiencing large price volatility yet retaining behavior statistically indistinguishable from a random 
walk.  To accounts for bias due to the rare occurrence of an event, we apply a logit model to investigate 
conditions under which bubbles are more likely to occur in grain futures markets.  Under the resale option 
theory of Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) and Scheinkman (2013), relating bubbles to various market 
142 
 
conditions is equivalent to investigating under what conditions investors are more likely to generate 
divergent beliefs.  We find that in the presence of large aggregate global demand, high crude oil prices, 
low ending stocks-to-use ratios, large US export sales to other countries, and a weak US dollar, bubbles 
are more likely to occur.  On the other hand, index investment activities carried out by commodity index 
traders, as well as speculative activity exceeding the minimum level required to absorb hedging activities 
as measured by the Working’s T, reduces considerably the probability of a bubble. This runs contrary to 
the claim that index investment, or speculation in general drives agricultural futures prices well-above 
fundamental values. 
Several conclusions from this dissertation are worthy of special attention.  First, while we find 
evidence of bubbles throughout the sample period in 12 agricultural commodity markets, it is important to 
note that bubbles are extremely rare events that in general account for only 1%-2% of the total price 
behavior.  In addition, we attempt to infer the strength of bubbles directly from price changes during 
explosive episodes.  The underlying rationale of the argument lies in the efficient market theory that 
prices should correctly reflect fundamental demand and supply conditions when bubbles are absent.  
During both positive and negative explosive periods, markets overreact and then correct as prices return 
to a random walk.  The degree to which price corrects may be viewed as the magnitude to which prices 
are truly distorted.  It appears that this correction effect is more pronounced in positive bubbles 
particularly during the earlier part of the sample.  While these adjustments are statistically significant, 
they are small in magnitude, ranging from 1.4% to 0.5%.  The implication is that not only are bubbles 
rather rare, but they are small and typically disappear within two weeks.  This conclusion is consistent 
with many market analysts’ view on commodity futures markets (e.g., Kemp 2013).  Given the current 
debate on the driving forces of commodity price movements that has resulted in a polarized standoff 
between whether fundamentals or speculations are to blame, the conclusions drawn in this dissertation 
provides an alternative view of how commodity prices are formulated.  A framework that embraces both 
fundamental and speculative influences is likely to provide a more realistic view of commodity markets. 
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Second, a recurring point discussed in the dissertation is the role of speculators and in particular, 
commodity index traders, on the recent commodity price boom.  We not only directly test for a linkage 
between index-based investment activities and price movements during bubble and non-bubble periods, 
but also indirectly test for the role of commodity index investment through a careful examination of the 
historical bubble patterns in agricultural futures markets.  More importantly, we relate the bubble 
occurrence probability to index investment activities and a measure of the more general speculative 
activity in futures markets.  When all the evidence is combined, we find that commodity index traders are 
unlikely to be the driving force behind the recent price spikes in commodity markets.  It is also likely that 
more general speculative activities, as measured by the level of speculation exceeding the minimum 
necessary to absorb long and short hedging, tend to reduce the probability of bubble occurrence by adding 
liquidity to commodity markets.   
Third, while receiving far less attention, it appears that commodity futures market are 
occasionally characterized by negative bubbles—that is, the price of a commodity sharply drops below its 
fundamental value before rebounding back.  Indeed, as the first essay demonstrates, nearly one third of 
the total explosive episodes identified in 12 agricultural commodity markets are negative bubbles during 
1970-2011.  With negative bubbles, individuals may become overly pessimistic about future prices with 
expectations for a downturn in the short-term prices.  Though positive bubbles have been well-
documented historically and have received extensive attention, the lack of analysis on negative bubbles in 
agricultural futures markets is somewhat surprising given that they occur rather frequently.  Weil (1990), 
among others, shows that the interaction between prices and fundamentals could lead to prices being 
undervalued compared to fundamentals, indicative of a negative bubble.  Phillips, Shi, and Yu (2013) 
attribute the negative bubbles found in the S&P 500 index to a contagion effect from the bursting of 
bubbles in other markets.  Relating this argument to our analysis, the negative bubbles of October 2008 in 
the two wheat futures market found in this dissertation may therefore be due to the global financial crisis, 
which began in the fall of 2008.   
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One limitation of this dissertation is that the bubble testing procedure of Phillips, Shi, and Yu 
(2012) assumes no direct role of movements in the fundamental supply and demand condition.  Studies 
suggest that under a competitive storage model, a stock out or near stock out can generate occasional 
violent explosions in cash prices independent of bubble behavior (e.g., Wright and Williams 1991, 
Bobenrieth, Bobenrieth, and Wright 2013).  While we avoid directly discussing the role of inventory by 
using individual futures contract prices which in theory follow a random walk, it would be interesting to 
test empirically whether bubbles found in this study indeed exist in simulated data generated from a 
rational storage model.  In addition, given the broad range of commodities involved in recent price spikes, 
another potential extension to the current work would be to examine whether bubbles exist in other 
commodity markets, such as energy futures.  It would also be interesting to investigate the sources of 
negative bubbles in agricultural futures markets.  Specifically, whether the negative bubbles are 
independent of positive bubbles or due to the popping of a previous bubble in this same market, or a 
result of contagion effect from other markets (Phillips, Shi, and Yu 2013).  Future research is also needed 
to investigate possible ramifications of the presence of negative bubbles in commodity futures markets. 
There are two additional possible extensions specific to the third essay.  First, instead of using a 
rare events logit model, we may directly use the probability of bubble occurrence obtained from the 
bubble date-stamping procedure as the left-hand-side variable and estimate a least square regression 
model with a continuous dependent variable.  However, the probability distribution is likely to be highly 
skewed and additional corrections may be needed in the estimation.  In addition, one implication from the 
resale option theory of Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) and Scheinkman (2013) is that during the periods 
of volatile beliefs, trading volume is likely to increase dramatically.  A second potential future work is 
thus to include a variable to indicate trading volume in the rare events logit model, and evaluate the 
impact of trading volume on bubble occurrence in grain futures market.  This leads to one possibility of 
directly testing the applicability of the resale option model to agricultural futures markets. 
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APPENDIX A 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE GLOBAL REAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 
INDEX 
 
 
Kilian (2009) develops a global real economic activity index to represent the demand of industrial 
commodities in global business markets.  The index is based on dry cargo single voyage ocean freight 
rates.  The raw data is obtained from the monthly report on “Shipping Statistics and Economics” 
published by Drewry Shipping Consultants Ltd.  Specifically, Kilian follows the following steps to 
construct the index: 
1. Eliminate fixed effects.  This is done by first computing the period-to-period growth rates of each 
raw series, then taking the equal-weighted average of all growth rates.  A cumulative growth rate 
is then computed for each period, with the value of January 1968 normalized to unity. 
2. The resulting series obtained from step 1 is then deflated using the US CPI. 
3. The real index is then detrended using linear regressions. 
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